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It has long been the starting point in international law that a sovereign state is entitled to exclusively have control over the 
activity taking place on its soil, and that states should abstain from attempts to intervene in such internal affairs of each other. 
However, increasing globalisation and the advent of internet have shaken up this status quo – a traditional territorial ap-
proach to the regulation of novel phenomena in the online world is simply no longer sufficient. At the same time, overly broad 
extraterritorial claims by one state can be seen unacceptable by other states that are also interested in regulating the matter 
themselves. As it is discussed in this work, the contrast between these two approaches is highly relevant in the field of pro-
tection of personal data. 
 
The aim of this work is to (1) examine the extent of the extraterritorial mechanisms of the EU General Data Protection Regu-
lation, after which (2) a critical assessment of these mechanisms will be performed from the perspective of international law. 
Both of these questions will be reviewed from a mainly doctrinal point of view, with certain additional sociological arguments 
being presented in relation to question (1). When examining question (2), the doctrinal method will take on a critical dimen-
sion, as the assessment of reasonableness of the extraterritorial mechanisms of the GDPR will be performed using principles 
of public international law as a normative framework. In order to establish said framework, a review of the concepts of sover-
eignty, jurisdiction and extraterritoriality will take place in the beginning of the work. Due to the political nature of extraterritori-
ality, political viewpoints will also be considered, where relevant. 
 
The GDPR employs several different mechanisms that stretch the Regulation’s effects beyond the borders of the EU. Some 
of these effects are more direct than the others. First of all, the GDPR has a rather broad territorial scope under Article 3, 
pursuant to which the Regulation applies to non-EU controllers and processors that either have an establishment in the EU 
or target data subjects in the EU. In addition, the GDPR has an effect on controllers and processors receiving personal data 
from a data exporter in the EU, even if they would not be otherwise subject to the Regulation under its territorial scope. Fur-
thermore, the European influence abroad is visible through the European Commission’s adequacy decisions, bilaterally and 
multilaterally negotiated instruments, the Regulation’s Brussels effect and even the public awareness concerning privacy 
matters that has been affected, at least indirectly, by the strict requirements of the EU data protection law. 
 
In order to critically assess these mechanisms, a novel approach that accounts for all relevant factors when evaluating an 
extraterritorial assertion is assumed. While it is not possible to definitively claim that an extraterritorial claim is unacceptable, 
an overall assessment considering the principles of comity and sovereign equality can be helpful in order to establish 
whether certain extraterritorial assertions are questionable and to find alternative regulatory solutions that would be better in 
line with international law. Therefore, considering multiple factors, such as fairness, proportionality, justification, and predicta-
bility, it is concluded that certain extraterritorial mechanisms of the GDPR can be considered overly broad, especially when 
there is no real chance that they could be enforced. For this reason, the study suggests that special emphasis should be 
given to those extraterritorial mechanisms that are enforceable within the EU and to mechanisms that require no enforce-
ment action in order to function. Additionally, a proper balance between the interests between the EU and other independent 
regulators needs to be sought when determining the extent of the requirements of the GDPR, as it was cautiously implied in 
the recent CJEU judgment in C-507/17 – Google. 
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Suvereenien valtioiden yksinoikeus säännellä omalla alueellaan tapahtuvaa toimintaa on toiminut vuosikymmenten ajan läh-
tökohtana kansainvälisessä oikeudessa. Tähän periaatteeseen sisältyy myös muiden valtioiden velvollisuus olla puuttumatta 
tällaisiin toisten valtioiden sisäisiin asioihin. Globalisaatio ja internetin kehitys ovat kuitenkin horjuttaneet tätä lähtökohtaa –
territoriaalista lähestymistapaa ei voi enää pitää riittävänä takaamaan verkossa tapahtuvan toiminnan sääntelyn aukotto-
muutta ja tehokkuutta. Toisaalta, liian laajat ekstraterritoriaaliset vaatimukset voivat olla kyseenalaisia muiden valtioiden kan-
nalta, sillä näillä valtioilla voivat olla omat intressit säännellä kyseistä toimintaa. Kuten tutkielmasta ilmenee, kyseinen lähes-
tymistapojen vastakkainasettelu on erityisen relevantti henkilötietojen suojaa koskevan sääntelyn kontekstissa. 
 
Tutkielman tavoitteina on (1) tarkastella EU:n yleisen tietosuoja-asetuksen (TSA) ekstraterritoriaalisia vaikutusmekanismeja 
ja näiden laajuutta, minkä jälkeen tarkoituksena on (2) arvioida näitä mekanismeja kriittisesti kansainvälisen oikeuden peri-
aatteiden valossa. Tarkastelussa käytetään pääasiallisesti lainopillista metodia, minkä lisäksi kysymyksessä (1) esitetään 
tiettyjä sosiologisia lisäargumentteja. Kysymyksessä (2) lainopilliseen metodiin liittyy kriittinen näkökulma, koska TSA:n 
ekstraterritoriaalisten mekanismien kohtuullisuutta arvioidaan käyttämällä normatiivisena pohjana kansainvälisen julkisoikeu-
den periaatteita. Jotta tämä normatiivinen pohja voidaan perustaa, tutkielman alussa tutkitaan suvereniteetin, toimivallan 
(engl. jurisdiction) ja ekstraterritoriaalisuuden käsitteitä. Koska ekstraterritoriaalisuus on perusluonteeltaan poliittista, myös 
poliittisia näkökulmia otetaan esiin tarvittaessa.  
 
TSA:ssa käytetään useita eri mekanismeja, joiden avulla asetuksen vaikutukset ulottuvat EU:n rajojen ulkopuolille. Osa 
näistä mekanismeista on suorempia kuin toiset. Ensinnäkin TSA:lla on 3 artiklan perusteella melko laaja alueellinen sovelta-
misala, minkä johdosta asetus soveltuu EU:n ulkopuolisiin rekisterinpitäjiin ja henkilötietojen käsittelijöihin, joilla joko on toimi-
piste EU:ssa tai jotka kohdistavat toimintansa unionissa sijaitseville rekisteröidyille. Lisäksi TSA vaikuttaa rekisterinpitäjiin ja 
käsittelijöihin, jotka vastaanottavat henkilötietoja tietojen viejältä EU:sta, vaikka kyseiset toimijat eivät muuten olisi asetuksen 
alaisia sen alueellisen soveltamisalan mukaisesti. Eurooppalaisen tietosuojalainsäädännön vaikutus ulkomailla näkyy myös 
Euroopan komission tietosuojan riittävyyttä koskevissa päätöksissä, kahden- ja monenkeskisesti neuvotelluissa asiakirjoissa, 
asetuksen Bryssel-efektissä ja jopa yleisessä yksityisyyskysymyksiä koskevassa valveutuneisuudessa, johon ovat vähintään 
epäsuorasti vaikuttaneet EU:n tietosuojalainsäädännön tiukat vaatimukset.  
 
Näiden mekanismien kriittiseksi arvioimiseksi työssä käytetään uudenlaista lähestymistapaa, jossa huomioidaan kaikki 
ekstraterritoriaalisia väitteitä arvioidessa merkitykselliset tekijät. Vaikka ei olekaan mahdollista varmuudella väittää, ettei tiet-
tyä ekstraterritoriaalista väitettä voi hyväksyä, kokonaisarviointi kansainvälisen kohteliaisuuden (engl. comity) ja suvereeni-
sen yhdenvertaisuuden periaatteiden valossa voi olla hyödyllinen. Tällainen kokonaisarvio on eduksi, kun tutkitaan ovatko 
tietyt ekstraterritoriaaliset väitteet kyseenalaisia ja selvitetään vaihtoehtoisia lainsäädännöllisiä ratkaisuja, jotka sopisivat pa-
remmin kansainväliseen oikeuteen. Täten, ottaen huomioon useita eri tekijöitä, kuten reiluuden, suhteellisuuden, oikeutuk-
sen ja ennakoitavuuden, päädytään siihen, että tiettyjä TSA:n ekstraterritoriaalisia mekanismeja voidaan pitää liian laajoina 
etenkin, kun niiden täytäntöönpanolle ei ole todellista mahdollisuutta. Tämän vuoksi tutkielmassa ehdotetaan, että erityistä 
painoarvoa tulisi antaa ensinnäkin niille ekstraterritoriaalisille mekanismeille, jotka ovat täytäntöönpantavissa EU:n sisällä ja 
toiseksi nille, jotka eivät edellytä lainkaan täytäntöönpanotoimenpiteitä toimiakseen. Lisäksi, kuten EUT varovasti viittasi vii-
meaikaisessa tuomiossaan asiassa C-507/17 – Google, on syytä etsiä asianmukaista tasapainoa EU:n ja muiden itsenäisten 
lainsäätäjien intressien välillä, kun määritellään TSA:n vaatimusten täytäntöönpanon laajuutta. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Blurring the territorial borders 
It has long been the starting point in international law that a sovereign state is entitled 
to exclusively have control over the activity taking place on its soil, and that states 
should abstain from attempts to intervene in such internal affairs of each other.1 For 
decades, such an approach has served mankind rather well – save for some uncertain-
ties concerning, e.g., crimes taking place on state borders or on the high seas, the 
overall amount of jurisdictional conflicts has been rather low.  
However, growing globalisation and especially the advent of the internet have perma-
nently shaken this status quo. The amount of transnational trade activities keeps in-
creasing, and more and more business are relying on processing of personal data as 
their key source of income. With the globalisation of data processing operations, an 
increasing number of parties are also taking interest in regulating the processing activ-
ities. Many states and other entities have been participating in such regulation by en-
acting strict and widely-applicable requirements concerning the processing and reten-
tion of personal data, demonstrating their divergent subjective interests in the matter – 
one can consider, for instance, the ambitious CCPA in California2 and the somewhat 
questionable3 Yarovaya laws in Russia4 – in this respect, the EU is no exception.5  
At the core of the issue is the difficulty of regulating online conduct: if states only regu-
lated the activity taking place within their own territory, the level of protection provided 
to their citizens would be insufficient – online, individuals deal with a great amount of 
foreign companies that would not be covered by their home state’s law, and forum shop-
ping would be rather easy for the businesses engaging in online activity.6 At the same 
time, however, if many states introduce legislation attempting to globally regulate the 
 
1 See the statements of 17th century Dutch jurist Ulrik Huber, who categorically claimed that a state’s 
laws are only applicable within the state’s territory and on every person within its territory (Bernhardt 
1995, p. 338).  
2 For a review of the California Consumer Privacy Act, see DLA Piper 2018. 
3 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch 2016. 
4 For a review of the retention requirements under the Yarovaya laws, see Zhuravlev & Brazhnik 
2018. 
5 For additional examples, see Svantesson 2013b, p. 113–122. 
6 It is not always even clear, what really constitutes an activity “within a certain territory” – is it the 
location of the subject or the object of the activity, or, perhaps, the equipment used that should be 
the decisive factor? 
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same type of activities, it might not be possible for those doing business online to adjust 
their activity to be compliant with every single applicable law. Unsolved, this problem 
could greatly complicate or even make it impossible to practice cross-border trade and 
other types of online business.7 Consequently, a balance needs to be sought between 
guaranteeing the effectivity of a law regulating online activity and the sufficient level of 
protection of individuals online, and the reasonable approach to extraterritorial applica-
bility of laws regulating cyberspace activities. Such balance is paramount in order to 
avoid a situation where compliance with all applicable legislation creates too much of a 
burden for businesses willing to engage in cross-border trade activities.8  
The problem described above is especially relevant in the context of data protection 
law9 – it is therefore important to investigate what actual effects the EU data protection 
regime has outside the EU borders in order to ensure its own efficiency. Furthermore, 
it is also important to review whether all of these effects are reasonable from the point 
of view of other states, which are, after all, primarily entitled to regulate the activity taking 
place within their territory. Such reasonableness assessment could help us develop 
better and more widely accepted ways of regulating data processing activities, which 
could, in the end, result in better protection for individuals in the EU and worldwide. 
1.2 The aims, the research questions and the scope of this thesis 
The aim of this thesis is to study the extraterritoriality of the EU data protection10 law – 
particularly, how it is justified and how it is applied in practice outside the EU. As dis-
cussed later on, the GDPR has an exceptionally wide and somewhat vaguely defined 
territorial scope, which may be considered unreasonable by parties outside the EU and 
which may even clash with local legislation and values in non-EU countries.11 The aims 
of this work are, on one hand, to identify the mechanisms of the GDPR which have an 
effect outside the EU, and, on the other hand, assess whether they are reasonable from 
 
7 Ryngaert 2015a, p. 74–75, Svantesson 2013b, p. 21–22. 
8 See Svantesson 2013a, p. 278. 
9 While data protection law regulates all data processing activities, not only the ones taking place in 
an online environment, most of the territorial issues associated with cross-border data processing 
activities are, indeed, characteristic to the processing of personal data taking place online. 
10 While the core meaning of the right to privacy and the right to the protection of personal data is not 
identical (see, for instance, the differences in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter), for the purposes of this 
work, I will use the concepts of privacy and data protection synonymously, unless the context spe-
cifically implies otherwise. 
11 See, e.g., Wimmer 2018, p. 571. 
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the perspective of non-European parties. The research questions of this work can there-
fore be formulated as follows: 
(1) What are the extraterritorial mechanisms of the EU General Data Protection 
Regulation? 
(2) Are all of the extraterritorial mechanisms identified above in question (1) rea-
sonable from the perspective of international law? 
The scope of the EU data protection law has often been regarded as extraterritorial12 – 
however, there are numerous different definitions to what is actually referred to when 
one speaks about “extraterritoriality”. With ambiguity concerning the definition of extra-
territoriality comes the confusion regarding its justification: by enacting requirements 
that have an effect outside the state borders, the regulator, at least to some extent, 
contests other states’ sovereignty and sole authority to regulate the conduct taking 
place on their territory.13 How should such an encroachment be legitimised, and when 
do such extraterritorial claims go too far to be accepted by other states? Due to these 
uncertainties, before it is possible to evaluate the extraterritorial mechanisms of the 
GDPR, it is first necessary to assess on a general level the different definitions of ex-
traterritoriality and certain issues related thereto – namely, how extraterritorial asser-
tions should be justified and how they can be enforced.  
These questions concerning extraterritoriality as a phenomenon will be reviewed in sec-
tion 2, at the beginning of which I will briefly look into the concepts of state sovereignty 
and jurisdiction. After this, I will examine in further detail the definition of extraterritoriality 
and certain different issues and debates related thereto in order to create a robust 
framework for the assessment of the extraterritorial claims made in the GDPR. Only 
after establishing the findings concerning extraterritoriality in general, it is possible to 
apply them in the context of the EU data protection law and evaluate, to which extent 
the EU data protection law is extraterritorial, and to which extent these extraterritorial 
assertions and effects are reasonable. In section 3, I will look in further detail into the 
extraterritoriality of EU data protection legislation, focusing on the extraterritorial mech-
anisms of the GDPR itself and considering, where applicable, the interpretations of rel-
 
12 See, e.g., Greze 2019, Azzi 2018, Kuner 2015a, Svantesson 2015a, Van Alsenoy & Koekkoek 
2015. 
13 Gerber 1984, p. 212. 
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evant provisions of the DPD. Following this review, in section 4, I will assess the rea-
sonableness of the extraterritorial mechanisms of the GDPR from the point of view of 
international law, examining the findings of section 2 in the context of EU data protection 
law and the arguments presented from an European perspective in order to justify the 
Regulation’s extraterritoriality. At the end of this work, after identifying certain issues 
with the extraterritoriality of the GDPR, I will examine some different approaches to the 
subsequent development and interpretation of the EU data protection law in order to 
improve its extraterritorial flexibility and reasonableness.  
As the focus of this work is a general discussion concerning the extraterritorial nature 
of the GDPR, I will not examine the multitude of specific situations and scenarios where 
the GDPR could apply outside the EU in connection with question (1).14 Instead, based 
on the text of the provisions and the relevant case law, I will look into the extraterritori-
ality of the GDPR on a more general level, highlighting the specific mechanisms that 
give the GDPR its extraterritorial effect and reviewing the relevant case-law concerning 
these mechanisms in order to establish the current extraterritorial extent of the GDPR.  
Additionally, it should be noted at this point that some ambiguity might be related to 
question (2) as its aim is to assess the reasonableness of the extraterritoriality of the 
GDPR – the word ”reasonable” carries multiple different meanings ranging from ration-
ality to moderateness.15 For the purposes of this work, I will focus on the concept’s latter 
dimension, as I will examine the moderateness and fairness of the EU data protection 
law. Therefore, it is not my intention to question the legitimacy of the EU data protection 
law as a whole – instead, I will examine the justification of the extraterritorial effects of 
EU data protection law, considering, inter alia, how fair the assertions are from the point 
of view of all other non-EU states, whether the assertions are proportionate, well-
founded, and predictable. In my review, I will also take into account the differences 
between making an extraterritorial assertion in the legal text and the enforcement of 
such an assertion, highlighting the enforceability as one of the criteria determining the 
reasonableness of an assertion. When seeking an answer to question (2), the interests 
of other states will be examined and weighed against the EU’s interests in order to 
determine the possible limitations to the extraterritorial application of the EU data pro-
tection requirements.  
 
14 The EDPB has made an assessment of specific example scenarios in the EDPB Guidelines 3/2018. 
15 Merriam-Webster 2019. 
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1.3 Methods 
The nature of the research questions of this work is twofold: in question (1), I will identify 
the prevailing extraterritorial effects of the current EU data protection law, and in ques-
tion (2), I will evaluate their reasonableness by assessing their justification and effectiv-
ity. For this reason, different research methods16 will be assumed in order to properly 
review both of these questions.17  
The main aim of question (1) is to clarify the current content of law – therefore, a doc-
trinal method will be assumed in order to review it, as the aim of clarifying the content 
of law in force is at the core of doctrinal research.18 In Finnish legal research, doctrinal 
method has been traditionally divided into its practical and theoretical counterparts, with 
the former focusing on the interpretation of normative material and the latter focusing 
on its systematisation.19 Despite this division, the use of both of these elements, at least 
to a certain extent, will be visible over the course of this work when assessing question 
(1)20 – by the means of the primary practical doctrinal method, I will interpret the relevant 
provisions, along with applicable case law and other sources of law, in order to assess 
whether an effect outside the EU is achieved; whereas by means of the theoretical doc-
trinal method, I will organise the different extraterritorial effects and assertions of the 
GDPR based on their severity and impact and create an overall picture of the extrater-
ritoriality of the GDPR. 
As the first research question concerns primarily the content of the secondary EU law, 
its characteristic features will affect this doctrinal research, which is why teleological 
arguments often preferred by the CJEU are awarded a high priority in the interpretation 
of the provisions of the GDPR.21 Additionally, the specifics of the hierarchy of legal 
 
16 Methods in legal research can be considered as a type of tools or frameworks for the assessment 
of research question established in different branches of law. This framework may place emphasis 
on different matters and should be selected individually based on the nature of the question (Hirvo-
nen 2011, p. 4–5). 
17 At the beginning of the work, I will also look into the meaning of the concept of extraterritoriality, 
as well as certain other international law concepts related to it. This review, however, will serve as a 
groundwork for the review of the actual research questions; hence, no specific method will be as-
sumed for the review of the concept of extraterritoriality. However, the source material used for this 
review will be discussed in the next section. 
18 Neergaard & Nielsen 2011, p. 105; Hirvonen 2011, p. 22. 
19 Hirvonen 2011, p. 25. 
20 See Aarnio 1997, p. 36–37. 
21 While teleological arguments are not the only ones used in doctrinal research of EU law, they are 
most prominent ones (see Talus & Penttinen 2015, p. 16). Teleological interpretation of EU law can 
be seen connected with the effet utile of EU law (Reichel 2018, p. 114, 122–123). 
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sources in EU law is to be considered – secondary law, such as the GDPR itself, are to 
be interpreted in the light of primary EU law, i.e., the TEU, the TFEU and the Charter, 
and in accordance with the relevant CJEU case law.22 It should be noted that while there 
are various national-level provisions concerning the protection of personal data even 
within the EU,23 the first research question concerns specifically the extraterritoriality of 
the general requirements of the GDPR.24 As the GDPR is equally binding in all Member 
States,25 national legislation concerning the protection of personal data will not be re-
viewed, and the nature of the research will be specifically EU-doctrinal.26  
However, as it will be discussed later on, not all effects of EU data protection law stem 
directly from the specific provisions of the GDPR – some of the extraterritorial effects 
have a much more subtle effect caused by, among other things, the EU’s cooperation 
with other states in the field of data protection and, in some instances, the mere exist-
ence of a high-level data protection regime set in place by the EU. The extent of the 
extraterritorial effect in these cases will be examined by taking into account a wider 
perspective examining the relationship between law and society, i.e., the effect of EU 
data protection regime on non-European persons and states on a larger scale.27 
Another variation of doctrinal research is adopted when reviewing the question (2). As 
the aim of the second question is to assess the reasonableness of the extraterritorial 
assertions of the EU data protection law, a mere descriptive examination of the content 
of these assertions is no longer sufficient. Therefore, the while the method assumed for 
the review of the second question remains doctrinal, it will take on a critical dimension. 
The focus of critical doctrinal research is to examine the content of current legal norms 
 
22 See, e.g., Riesenhuber 2017, p. 251. The source material used throughout this work will be further 
reviewed in the next section. 
23 National data protection laws of the EU Member States concern specific clarifications to or dero-
gations from the provisions of the GDPR, where such are allowed – the core principles of the GDPR 
remain the same throughout the Union (see Recital 8 of the GDPR). 
24 The autonomous nature of EU law as a legal order has been affirmed in C-26/62 – Van Gend en 
Loos, where the Court found that “the community constitutes a new legal order of international law 
for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights. (…) Independently of the legis-
lation of member states, community law therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is 
also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage”. See also Reichel 
2018, p. 109. 
25 Köndgen 2017, p. 138. 
26 It should also be emphasised that this thesis focuses specifically on the examination of EU law. 
For this reason, even though I will examine certain legislative aspects from outside the EU, especially 
in section 2 concerning the concept of extraterritoriality, the examination will not constitute a com-
parative study examining the differences between the jurisdictions concerned. 
27 Hirvonen 2011, p. 29; see also Tuori 2000, p. 317. 
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critically from an internal perspective, and the normative scale for the assessment will 
be based on the principles found within the legal system itself.28 For the purposes of 
this work, I will review the extraterritorial mechanisms of the GDPR from the viewpoint 
of the principles of public international law.29 Further emphasising the use of a critical 
doctrinal approach, at the end of this work several different propositions will be dis-
cussed as possible solutions to the potential difficulties faced by the extraterritoriality of 
the GDPR.30  
However, a normative scale founded purely on the criteria found within the legal system 
will not necessarily be sufficient for the assessment of the extraterritorial mechanisms 
of the GDPR, as exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction is a subject that can strongly split 
politically polarised opinions. Extraterritorial assertions, even if they are made with good 
intentions, can be viewed as a show of power or even imperialism,31 and can, at worst, 
even spark a diplomatic crisis.32 For this reason, while law and politics is not the core 
method for the review of the second question and while the political arguments will not 
form the base for the critical evaluation of the GDPR, certain political viewpoints will be 
taken into account insofar as they are relevant for the evaluation of the effects of the 
GDPR. These political arguments will, however, be kept separate from critical doctrinal 
assessment of extraterritoriality. 
1.4 Source material 
As the first question is deeply rooted in EU law, the systematics and the hierarchy of 
legal sources in EU law will be acting as a basis throughout this work.33 The main 
 
28 Hirvonen 2011, p. 50; Määttä 2015, p. 36; see also Tuori’s theory of critical legal positivism, Tuori 
2000, p. 325, 342. 
29 It has been argued that data protection law is located at the boundary of public and private inter-
national law (Bygrave 2000, p. 252). However, its belonging to each of these groups is contextual – 
when the matter concerned is the activity of a private actor, such as the signing of a data processing 
agreement, the framework selected should focus more on the private international law. However, in 
this case I will be reviewing the general assertions of jurisdiction made by the EU in the GDPR, and, 
consequently, the assessment framework will be based on public international law (Kuner 2010a, p. 
183) 
30 Kolehmainen 2015, p. 2–3. 
31 Zielonka 2008, p. 475.  
32 Brownlie 2008, p. 304. A great deal of literature concerning extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction 
has been released in the field of political science, see, e.g., Emmenegger & Eggenberger 2018 ex-
amining the political aspects of the US using its market power to penetrate through the Swiss banking 
secrecy.  
33 It has even been argued that the doctrinal method in EU law can, in fact, be seen as less of an 
independent method and more of a specific type of approach to different sources of EU law that is to 
be combined with other methods (Reichel 2018, p. 109). 
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sources of EU law are the primary and secondary legislation.34 The primary law – 
namely, the TEU, TFEU and the Charter of Fundamental Rights35 – is at the top level 
of the hierarchy of legal sources, and, as noted above, the core principles laid down in 
these instruments guide the consequent interpretation of lower-level sources of law.36 
Secondary law includes the regulations, directives and decisions enacted by the EU. 
These norms contain most of the subject matter provisions of EU law, and they can be 
seen as specifying the content of the general principles expressed in the primary law.37 
The GDPR, being a regulation, belongs to this group of legislative instruments, and its 
foundation in the primary EU law is acknowledged in Recital 1 of the Regulation.38  
While the secondary law provides specification to the principles contained in the primary 
norms, this level of precision is often not enough on a practical level. The interpretation 
of the secondary norms is therefore assisted by the case law of the CJEU – while the 
Court’s reasoning and decisions do not have a formally binding nature, in practice, the 
interpretations of the Court become part of the binding law.39 Additional assistance in 
the interpretation of the GDPR (and, where relevant, the DPD) is also provided by the 
preparatory and explanatory documents relating to the GDPR and the DPD,40 and by 
the opinions, guidelines and other instructions of the WP29 and the EDPB. While these 
documents lack binding nature, CJEU Advocates General have referred to them in their 
reasoning.41 
While these normative sources, along with academic writings and DPA guidance con-
cerning the matter, will form the base of argumentation in relation to the first research 
 
34 Köndgen 2017, p. 120. 
35 As of 2009, the Charter was given legal status as primary EU legislation pursuant to Article 1 of 
the Treaty of Lisbon (see amended Article 6 TEU). 
36 Even inside the primary law, a hierarchical structure can be observed: it has been argued that the 
principles contained in Article 2 TEU serve as a basis for the entirety of the EU legal system, and 
with all other primarily law being based on these principles (Talus & Penttinen 2015, p. 4).  
37 Article 288 TFEU. Raitio 2016, p. 203. While the legal status of the recitals of secondary law is 
somewhat unclear, it has been concluded that they cannot be given same independent and binding 
character as the provisions of these instruments (Köndgen 2017, p. 141–142). 
38 As reasoned above, while the field of data protection is also regulated on a national level within 
the EU, only the EU law instruments will be examined over the course of this work. 
39 Article 267 TFEU; Talus & Penttinen 2015, p. 8. The legal status of the opinions of Advocates 
General is less significant, as the views expressed in the opinions do not bind the Court – the rea-
soning in these opinions, however, can provide additional help in the interpretation of EU law (Raitio 
2016, p. 136). 
40 However, as will be discussed later on, the explanatory documents offer little help in the evaluation 
of the territorial scope of the GDPR. 
41 See, e.g., Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in C-507/17 – Google, delivered on 10 January 
2019, para 34. 
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question, when evaluating the reasonableness of EU law and the effect of its extrater-
ritorial assertions, the use of these purely normative sources will not be sufficient. For 
this reason, these sources will, at least to some extent, give way to the social and polit-
ical arguments concerning the extraterritorial impact of the EU data protection law. 
Additionally, the normative sources of EU law will not be helpful in section 2, where I 
will lay the groundwork for the assessment of the research questions by clarifying the 
definition of extraterritoriality and other relevant international law concepts. While this is 
not a discrete research question per se, specific type of source material is still needed 
to address the matter. Due to, on one hand, the inherent decentralised nature of inter-
national law and the lack of legislative instruments comparable to, e.g., national consti-
tutions,42 and, on the other hand, the non-normative nature of the concept of “extrater-
ritoriality”,43 there will likely be as many definitions to extraterritoriality as there are com-
mentators looking into its definition. The process of reviewing the different definitions is 
essential in order to find a the one best suited for the purposes and subsequent re-
search questions of this work.44 As the character of the issues concerned when exam-
ining data protection law is rather novel, the approach to defining and justifying extra-
territoriality that will be assumed will also be modern and practical. 
2  Jurisdiction and extraterritoriality in international law 
2.1 Sovereignty 
Before I begin the examination of extraterritoriality as a concept, it is useful to briefly 
examine the many-sided concept of sovereignty,45 as broad extraterritorial claims of 
certain states can sometimes be considered infringements on other states’ sovereignty 
and thereto related privileges.46 Sovereignty is often used as a term describing a state’s 
power to act independently and without external control in different circumstances, and 
 
42 Currie 2008, p. 4; McConville & Chui 2017, p. 254. 
43 See, e.g., Svantesson 2013b, p. 83–85. 
44 When discussing extraterritoriality, the importance of critical reading of academic material cannot 
be overstressed. Due to its highly politicised nature, there are numerous commentators viewing ex-
traterritorial assertions as either inherently unacceptable or, on the opposite, completely permissible 
(for instance, US commentators tend to critically view the EU data protection law as exorbitant or 
even unacceptable under international law, see, e.g., Lam 2017, p. 10). 
45 Crawford 2012, p. 448; Svantesson 2013b, p. 77–81. 
46 Perritt 2000, p. 892. 
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it may also include certain responsibilities and internal and external aspects.47 It is also 
possible to differentiate between the internal and external aspects of sovereignty, i.e., 
the freedom of internal self-determination and external independence from other states 
respectively.48  
With multiplicity of different definitions and meanings, the various understandings of 
sovereignty have also been thoroughly criticised. Being an abstraction and simplifica-
tion of reality, the meaning of the term remains rather ambiguous and context-specific.49 
However, as this work focuses on extraterritorial legislation and thereto related limita-
tions, I will concentrate on the aspect of sovereignty that relates to the sovereign state’s 
sole authority to practise, within its own geographical territory, the functions that belong 
to it as a sovereign state.50 
Even more uncertainties arise when the context of sovereignty is applied in the EU 
context. The EU, being a sui generis union of sovereign states,51 is not a sovereign 
state itself in its traditional meaning and lacks some of the competences that are often 
considered a part of state sovereignty52 – the EU’s competences are limited to those 
granted to it by the Member States, and, consequently, EU has no competence-com-
petence.53 Consequently, the EU Member States acting together behind the EU retain 
their status as independent sovereign states.  
However, when examining the EU as an actor in the international field, it is clear that it 
bears many similarities with other “conventional” sovereign states – under Article 47 
TEU, the EU has legal personality, which has been internationally recognised.54 While 
 
47 Fox 1997, p. 293–294; Endicott 2010, p. 245; Crawford 2012, p. 447. See also Endicott 2010, p. 
245, according to whom sovereignty consists, on a basic level, of the state’s absolute power within 
a community, absolute independence externally from other states and full power as a legal person 
in international law. 
48 Koskenniemi 2005, p. 240–241. 
49 Crawford 2012, p. 448. Koskenniemi goes as far as stating that due to its ambiguity, sovereignty 
indeed does not have – and cannot be given – any fixed meaning or “natural extent” that could be 
always applicable (Koskenniemi 2005, p. 242). 
50 Island of Palmas Case, p. 838. This can be seen to include, on one hand, the state’s right to 
exclude other states from practising such functions within its borders and, on the other hand, the 
state’s obligation to protect the rights of other states within the state’s own territory. 
51 See also Petkova 2018, p. 1136, describing the EU as a “quasi-federated entity”. 
52 This transfer of rights is referred to as the principle of conferral, Raitio 2016, p. 215–216; see also 
Köndgen 2017, p. 119. 
53 See Tiilikainen et al. 2005, p. 34, discussing competence-competence of the EU in the context of 
the then-relevant Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
54 Hijmans 2016, p. 467, 505. 
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the EU does share its regulatory competence with the Member States in the field of data 
protection,55 the binding and significant nature of the GDPR makes the EU itself as “the 
principal – if not sole – actor” representing the Member States in this field.56 Additionally, 
as I will be specifically focusing on the assertions of jurisdictions made by the EU,57 the 
encroachments on the “sovereignty” of the EU will not be discussed here. Thus, while 
the EU is not a sovereign state per se, from an external perspective, the EU can still be 
compared to other independent sovereign legislators in the field of data protection. 
While the core differences between the EU and other sovereign states should be borne 
in mind, they will not substantially affect the course of this work. 
In light of the meaning of sovereignty reviewed above, it is clear that when a regulator 
attempts to influence conduct outside its borders, it intrudes, at least to some extent, 
into the realm of exclusive rights and freedoms of another states, i.e., an encroachment 
of another state’s sovereignty takes place.58 In this context, it is also relevant to briefly 
examine the principles of comity and sovereign equality. While not a legal obligation, 
comity refers to a principle according to which “States respect each other’s policy 
choices and interests in a given case, without inquiring into the substance of each 
other’s laws”.59 In accordance with the principle of comity, states should therefore re-
frain from trying to control such activity that another state is better suited to regulate.60 
The principle of sovereign equality serves a similar purpose – while it does not imply a 
de facto equality of power between different sovereign nations, it refers to the “equal 
courtesy”, with which all states should treat each other.61 It should also be noted that 
this principle does not refer to a scenario in which a majority of states could impose their 
views on a minority – therefore, the EU Member States all together as sovereign entities 
are not entitled to impose their data protection views on a single non-EU state.62 As it 
 
55 See Article 4 TFEU. 
56 Hijmans 2016, p. 467. 
57 As opposed to the ones made against the EU. 
58 Gerber 1984, p. 212. 
59 Ryngaert 2015b, p. 147. 
60 Ryngaert 2015b, p. 148. 
61 Instead, it signifies an equality of rights and status in comparison with other nations, including the 
right to retain exclusive authority within its territory, “regardless of disparities in economic or military 
power” (Muse 1996–1997, p. 241–242; see also Ryngaert 2015b, p. 6). 
62 Lowe 2007, p. 114–116. A comparison can be made to decision-making in international organisa-
tions: does sovereign equality refer to the “one country, one vote” principle used in, e.g., the UN 
General Assembly (Article 18(1) of the UN Charter), or does the state population play a decisive role, 
like it does in the EU Parliament (Article 14(2) TEU)? Neither of these approaches can, however, be 
directly applied outside international organisations: the latter approach could imply, for instance, that 
the most populous states, such as China, could be entitled to impose their views on all smaller states.  
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will be discussed later on, these principles should be considered when attempting to 
regulate phenomena with a naturally-occurring cross-border character, such as online 
activities.63  
2.2 Jurisdiction 
As with sovereignty discussed above, there is no single correct and exhaustive defini-
tion for jurisdiction, either.64 However, in general, jurisdiction can be defined to mean 
the extent of a state’s right65 and ability to “regulate conduct or the consequences of 
events”,66 and it is, indeed, closely linked to state sovereignty.67 There are multiple dif-
ferent specific activities that fall under the scope of the umbrella term “jurisdiction”, with 
the use of legislative power being just one of such activities. Jurisdiction can, therefore, 
as it is classically viewed, concern (i) the state’s power to enact legislation (legislative 
or prescriptive jurisdiction), (ii) the state’s power do adjudicate a certain matter (judicial 
or adjudicative jurisdiction), or (iii) the state’s power to enforce its law (enforcement or 
executive jurisdiction).68 Each of these types of jurisdiction can be exercised extraterri-
torially.69 
In addition to the multiple dimensions of jurisdiction, there are multiple different princi-
ples based on which jurisdiction can be asserted. Consequently, states may assume 
jurisdiction over an event based on, e.g., the territory where it occurred, nationality of 
 
63 Bauchner 2000, p. 715; Kuner 2015a, p. 245. Both of these principles can also be seen to apply 
to the EU as a regulator in the international field. 
64 Akehurst 1972–1973, p. 145. 
65 Or, in the case of the EU, a regulator’s right transferred to it by the Member States. 
66 Oppenheim et al. 1996, p. 456. Other definitions are naturally possible, however, jurisdiction on a 
general level is often defined specifically through the allocation and claims of competence to control 
different activities, relationships and phenomena (see Capps et al., 2003 p. xix and Berman 2003, p. 
3). 
See also Kuner 2010a, p. 178–179, defining jurisdiction as “the State's right under international law 
to regulate conduct in matters not exclusively of domestic concern” – some definitions therefore as-
sume that the term “jurisdiction” inherently includes a sort of conflict of jurisdictions, i.e., even the 
slight possibility of several states willing to assert jurisdiction over a matter. This definition might be 
appropriate, though, since, as it will be discussed later, in an increasingly globalised economy, even 
the smallest actions can have global effects, in which case there remain very few matters that can 
be considered of a certain state’s “exclusive domestic concern”. 
67 Mann 1973, p. 22. See notes concerning sovereignty of the European Union above in section 2.1. 
68 See, e.g., Kuner 2010a, p. 184; Ryngaert 2015b, p. 9–10; Coughlan et al. 2007, p. 32 and Akehurst 
1972–1973, p. 145. Svantesson additionally points out that a separate type of jurisdiction may con-
cern the state’s power to investigate a certain matter (investigative jurisdiction, see Svantesson 
2013b, p. 67–68), and, according to Ryngaert, certain states have their own special type of limited 
jurisdiction over the activities in the states’ maritime zones and even on the high seas (functional 
jurisdiction, see Ryngaert 2015a, p. 58). 
69 Svantesson 2013b, p. 67–68. 
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the parties concerned, or the extent of the consequences of the event.70 The traditional 
principles for basing jurisdiction are discussed in the 1935 Research Draft Convention 
on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime,71 and, in practice, no substantial changes have 
taken place since the publication of the draft.72 While in accordance with their definitions, 
many of these principles are especially relevant in the context of criminal law with a 
clearly defined “perpetrator” and “victim”. However, essentially all of these principles 
can also be applied in a civil law context.73 
The Harvard Draft identifies a total of five74 principles for basing jurisdiction: the first and 
foremost principle is the (subjective) territoriality principle, under which, as it has been 
traditionally viewed, the state has exclusive authority and jurisdiction over events taking 
place within its geographical territory.75 In addition, while not part of the Harvard Draft 
list,76 the objective territoriality principle, concentrating on events taking place at least 
partially within a state’s territory, can also be highlighted as a separate principle for 
basing jurisdiction.77 However, as it will be discussed later, in the ubiquitous online world, 
 
70 See, e.g., Azzi 2018, p. 131. 
71 Harvard Draft 1935. 
72 Svantesson 2014, p. 80–81; see also, e.g., Kuner 2010a, p. 188–191 and Brownlie 2008, p 300–
306. For the purposes of this work, I will assume a slightly different approach to assertions of juris-
diction, since, as it will be discussed below, the Harvard Draft principles can be considered outdated 
in the era of the internet. Nevertheless, as these principles form the traditional international law un-
derstanding of jurisdiction, it is useful to briefly examine them. 
73 Even though non-criminal jurisdiction is “formally civil”, it often involves coercive and penal ele-
ments – the situation is similar in the case of data protection law. See Kuner 2010a, p. 188; Mann 
1973, p. 30–31; Brownlie 2008, p. 300; Currie 2008, p. 333–334. 
74 Harvard Draft 1935, p. 445. While the Harvard Draft lists only five principles, according to Svantes-
son, the draft actually covers six, as the subjective and objective territoriality principles should be 
treated separately (Svantesson 2014, p. 81) 
75 Buxbaum 2009, p. 636. The subjective territoriality principle has been, without a doubt, the primary 
principle of basing jurisdiction during the past decades, and it is universally recognised all over the 
world (Ryngaert 2015a, p. 55–56). 
76 Svantesson 2014, p. 81. 
77 As opposed to subjective territoriality, the later-developed objective territoriality is a principle for 
certain criminal cases where an offence has taken place abroad, but an “essential constituent ele-
ment of a crime” takes place within the territory of the state asserting jurisdiction (Crawford 2012, p. 
458–459; Buxbaum 2009, p. 636; Bernhardt 1995, p. 341. As argued by Svantesson, objective terri-
toriality can also be applied to non-criminal non-compliance – according to him, Article 4(1)(c) DPD 
was based on this principle, as the assertion of jurisdiction was based on the location of equipment 
used in data processing; see Svantesson 2013b, p. 142).  
Objective territoriality principle was adopted in the Lotus case, which paved the way for the growing 
use of objective territoriality as a basis for asserting jurisdiction. The Lotus case concerned a collision 
between a French mail steamer and a Turkish cargo ship causing the Turkish ship to sink and killing 
eight crew on board. After the collision, Turkey claimed criminal jurisdiction over the watch duty of-
ficer of the French ship, allegedly responsible for the death of eight Turkish nationals aboard the 
Turkish ship. France stated that Turkey had no jurisdiction over the French officer, but, according to 
the PCIJ, France had to show that Turkey’s assertion of jurisdiction violated some specific rule of 
international law. As no rules were violated, Turkey was granted jurisdiction over the case, despite 
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it may not even be possible to define a location of an event, suggesting that in this 
respect, the principles of territoriality may be nearing their obsolescence. Other princi-
ples identified in the Harvard Draft are the active personality principle78, the protective 
principle,79 the universality principle80 and the passive personality principle,81 in the 
general order from the most universally accepted to the most controversial.82  
In addition to these six principles, and as an extended variation of the objective territo-
riality principle,83 the effects doctrine can be assumed. According to the effects doctrine, 
a state may assert jurisdiction over a certain event or conduct taking place abroad when 
 
the flag state of Lotus being France. In the judgment, the PCIJ formed two generally accepted prin-
ciples: (i) a state may not exercise jurisdiction on the territory of another without its consent, and (ii) 
a state may claim jurisdiction abroad if a reasonable contact exists between the subject of the case 
and the state asserting jurisdiction (The Case of SS Lotus; Bernhardt 1995, p. 339–340; Raustiala 
2009, p. 106; Crawford 2012, p. 459). 
78 Originally mentioned in the Harvard draft as the “nationality principle”. However, for the sake of 
clarity of the comparison with the passive personality principle, I have assumed the term “active 
personality principle” used by, e.g., Ryngaert (see Ryngaert 2015b, p. 104). 
On the basis of the active personality principle (i.e., the nationality principle), a state may assert 
jurisdiction over a case where the perpetrator is a national of that state, despite him or her being 
located abroad. The use of the active personality principle is seen as a mark of allegiance of nationals 
to the state, and, thus, can be considered as an element of sovereignty (Crawford 2012, p. 459–460; 
Brownlie 2008, p. 303). The principle is typically applied only in the case of the most serious crimes, 
where it is recognised that there might be a need to establish their penalisation in case the domestic 
authorities in the state of perpetration fail to do so (Ryngaert 2015b, p. 104–106, Crawford 2012, p. 
460). 
79 The protective principle allows a state to assert jurisdiction in order to protect itself from harmful 
activity abroad. Traditionally, this principle has concerned specifically the protection of the state itself, 
including its sovereignty and independence, and not the protection of the citizens of the state. Being 
a diplomatically controversial principle, it is rarely applied in practice (Kuner 2010a, p. 190; Ryngaert 
2015b, p. 114, 116; Wimmer 2018, p. 558). 
80 Based on the universality principle, a state can essentially assume jurisdiction over a specific mat-
ter with no factual link between the state and the matter or its parties (Ryngaert 2015b, p. 126). Such 
assertions have often been related to, e.g., piracy, drug trafficking, and other serious crimes with an 
international nature and that are so serious that “all mankind has a legitimate interest in repressing 
them” (Lowe 2007, p. 177). Universal jurisdiction is often established by the means of international 
conventions (Akehurst 1972–1973, p. 160–161). 
81 The passive personality principle allows a state to assert jurisdiction over a case based on the 
nationality of the victim of the illegal conduct. The principle is based on a state’s legitimate interest 
to assert jurisdiction over a case involving its national as a victim; however, it is unclear whether such 
interest constitutes a proper jurisdictional link for the assertion to be acceptable and to outweigh the 
other states’ potential assertions based on more common principles (Wimmer 2018, p. 558; Ryngaert 
2015b, p. 110; Brownlie 2008, p. 304).  
82 Harvard Draft 1935, p. 445. It should be noted that justification of an extraterritorial assertion does 
not automatically follow the applicability of these principles (Wimmer 2018, p. 559). As it will be dis-
cussed below, assertion should always be justified separately considering all relevant factors, and 
the applicability of the Harvard Draft principles can be viewed as just one of the factors justifying an 
assertion. 
83 Bernhardt 1995, p. 341. As principles for basing jurisdiction presented above may overlap, the 
effects doctrine can also be seen to be related to, e.g., the passive personality or the protective 
principles, as both of these also deal with certain kinds of domestic effects caused by conduct that 
takes place abroad (see also Svantesson 2014, p. 83). 
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said event has some effects within the territory of the state making the assertion.84 The 
use of the effects doctrine can be extended to apply to many fields of law, and it has 
been developed in competition law where anti-competitive behaviour has caused neg-
ative effects of outside the state, in which the behaviour initially took place.85 The scope 
of the effects doctrine is also wider in so far as it does not set strict requirements con-
cerning the personal or territorial connection of parties to the state asserting jurisdic-
tion.86 As it will be discussed later on, the targeting criterion under Article 3(2) GDPR 
can be considered to be based, at least partially, on the effects doctrine. 
However, exaggerating, one could even argue that the effects doctrine lets basically 
any willing state to assume jurisdiction over a case, as “everything has an effect on 
everything”.87 Such assertions could, after all, cause certain states’ jurisdiction to ex-
pand excessively encroaching on the exclusive sovereign rights and freedoms of other 
states.88 Additionally, as the effects doctrine as a basis for jurisdiction has never been 
 
84 Kuner 2010a, p. 190; Ryngaert 2015b, p. 83–84; Svantesson 2013b, p. 136–137. 
85 For decades, the US was famous for its broad territorial assertions based on the use of the effects 
doctrine – after the enactment of the US Sherman Act, the US’ extraterritorial assertions in the field 
of competition law became commonplace (Raustiala 2009, p. 111, 113). For instance, in Alcoa case, 
the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit distanced itself from strict territoriality and was the 
first to adopt the doctrine in a civil matter (Senz & Charlesworth 2001, p. 81), stating that “any state 
may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders 
that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends” (Alcoa, p. 443; see also Bern-
hardt 1995, p. 340; Raustiala 2009, p. 102–103). Similar approach was later assumed by the US 
Supreme Court in Hartford Fire Insurance (Hartford Fire Insurance, p. 796; see also Sufrin 2003, p. 
106). 
Widespread assertions by the US also prompted as wave of blocking legislation enacted by the 
states affected by the US’ assertions in order to mitigate their effects (Raustiala 2009, p. 115–116, 
Developments in the Law: Extraterritoriality 2011, p. 1255. For examples of blocking legislation, see 
the UK Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, or Regulation 2271/96).  
At first, the EU was reluctant to apply the effects doctrine, as demonstrated in the Dyestuffs Case 
(C-48/69 – ICI v Commission) and the Wood Pulp Case (C-89/85 – Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and Others 
v Commission; cf. Opinion of Advocate General Mayras in C-48/69 – ICI v Commission, delivered on 
2 May 1972, p. 685 and Opinion of Advocate General Darmon in C-89/85 – Ahlström Osakeyhtiö 
and Others v Commission, delivered on 25 May 1988, para 44, in both of which Advocates General 
did support the use of the effects doctrine; see also Gerber 1983, p. 756; Layton & Parry 2004, p. 
319–321; Capps et al. 2003, p. 110–111). However, as the economic power of the European Union 
grew, the EU also embraced the effects doctrine (Scott 2014b, p. 88). The effects doctrine was openly 
adopted in Gencor v. Commission (T-102/96 – Gencor v Commission, para 90 et seq.). 
86 Svantesson 2014, p. 83.  
87 Kuner 2010a, p. 190. 
88 Bernhardt 1995, p. 341–343. This is especially problematic in the case of civil law, as different 
states may have different intentions when regulating economic matters. 
However, the issue has already been addressed in the Alcoa case mentioned above, in which the 
Second Circle concluded that “There may be agreements made beyond our borders not intended to 
affect imports, which do affect them, or which affect exports. Almost any limitation of the supply of 
goods in Europe (…) may have repercussions in the United States if there is trade between the two. 
Yet when one considers the international complications likely to arise from an effort in this country to 
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defined comprehensively, its meaning has always been somewhat vague. Mann, for 
instance, considered the effects doctrine exorbitant by its nature89 – such an approach, 
however, can no longer be considered appropriate in a world where globalisation and 
cross-border business activity is constantly growing. For this reason, a more nuanced, 
sophisticated and case-specific approach should therefore be assumed when as-
sessing issues potentially requiring the use of the effects doctrine,90 or any other prin-
ciple diverging from strict territoriality.  
2.3 Extraterritoriality 
As it was with the previously discussed concepts, it is far from easy to clearly determine, 
what one exactly means when speaking about extraterritoriality.91 According to the def-
inition presented by the UN International Law Commission, extraterritorial jurisdiction 
means “an attempt to regulate by means of national legislation, adjudication or enforce-
ment the conduct of persons, property or acts beyond its borders which affect the inter-
ests of the state in the absence of such regulation under international law.”92 In the light 
of the definition above, the differentiation between territorial and extraterritorial claims 
of jurisdiction can often be unclear, as assertions often incorporate both territorial and 
extraterritorial elements making the border between the two rather hazy.93 Adding to 
the confusion, different meanings are given to extraterritoriality in different jurisdictions, 
with the US system focusing on state boundaries’ role as limiters of how broadly a state 
 
treat such agreements as unlawful, it is safe to assume that Congress certainly did not intend the Act 
to cover them.” (Alcoa, p. 443) [emphasis added]). 
89 See, e.g., Mann 1973, p. 89–90, stating that from the point of view of international law, the court 
decisions where jurisdiction is based on the effects doctrine cannot be justified. 
90 Kuner 2015a, p. 239. 
91 Svantesson 2015a, p. 226. 
92 ILC 2006, p. 516. 
Interestingly, historically, extraterritorial assertions were mostly caused not by states extending the 
territorial scope of their laws, but by states not being willing to assume jurisdiction over foreigners on 
their territory to states attempting to extend their jurisdiction well past their geographical borders. For 
example, according to Kassan, some elements of extraterritoriality can be found in the ancient world, 
even predating the Greek and Roman empires (Kassan 1935, p. 239–240, 247). It should be noted, 
though, that Kassan’s argument of extraterritoriality originating in the ancient times is based on the 
fact that because back then (and, as noted in Bernhardt 1995, p 338, up until the Middle Ages), 
societies as whole were built around communities and not the geographical borders of a state, and 
the principle of territoriality as such was not recognised. Instead, the legislation was rather based on 
personality, i.e., the membership of a certain community. In such situations, a foreign person could 
not enjoy the rights and benefits of the local legislation and, consequently, was still extraterritorially 
subject to their own legal system. It was only after the enactment of the US Sherman Act (discussed 
above in note 85) when the attitude shifted towards the expansion of the territorial scopes of domestic 
laws. 
93 Svantesson 2015a, p. 227; Scott 2014a, p. 1343, 1345. 
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may exercise its jurisdiction, while the European approach differs in so far as state bor-
ders allocate jurisdiction to a certain party or parties, while withholding it from the oth-
ers.94 
In the absence of a clear definition, certain commentators have even gone as far as 
deciding to avoid using the term “extraterritoriality”. According to Ryngaert, for instance, 
extraterritoriality should only refer to such assertions of jurisdiction that are made with-
out any territorial link. As such cases are rare, a territorial link is therefore present, at 
least to a certain extent, in most so-called extraterritorial claims.95 Additionally, it is 
pointed out that the term “extraterritoriality” often bears a certain negative connotation 
with people understanding extraterritorial assertions as automatically illegitimate or ex-
cessive.96 
However, despite all the critique concerning the mere notion of extraterritoriality, for the 
purposes of this work, it is sufficient to assume a simple and rather broad definition, 
which vaguely resembles the ILC definition quoted above. According to the definition 
assumed here, extraterritoriality refers to the state’s endeavour to control the activities 
of a person – natural or legal – situated outside its borders.97 This definition captures 
the core meaning and purpose of extraterritorial assertions – the states’ attempt to as-
sert jurisdiction, control or affect events and conduct of persons originating or taking 
place entirely abroad, be it by means of legislation, adjudication, or enforcement. This 
definition does not make it possible to make a clear distinction between purely territorial 
 
94 Michaels 2006, p. 1058–1059. 
95 Ryngaert 2015b, p. 7–8. It should also be noted, though, that the mere concept of territoriality rests 
on the assumption that the physical location of persons, things and actions is knowable and known 
(for further discussion on this topic, see Eichensehr 2016, p. 145–146). 
96 Ryngaert 2015b, p. 8. Prompted by Ryngaert’s findings, Kuner prefers to use the term “exorbitant 
jurisdiction” instead of “extraterritorial jurisdiction” (Kuner 2010b, p. 227). Buxbaum also finds that 
the terms “territoriality” and “extraterritoriality” are legal constructs that are often used with the inten-
tion to support or promote the user’s personal interests (Buxbaum 2009, p. 635). However, as noted 
by Svantesson, and later acknowledged by Kuner, it is ultimately a factual and purely objective issue 
whether a claim of jurisdiction is “extraterritorial”, but it is a subjective matter of opinion whether a 
claim is “exorbitant” – not all “extraterritorial” jurisdiction is necessarily “exorbitant” (Svantesson 
2013b, p. 85; Kuner 2015a, p. 239). 
97 Svantesson 2015a, p. 227; Svantesson 2013b, p. 85. Svantesson formed this definition based on 
the definition of Senz & Charlesworth, according to whom extraterritorial jurisdiction is “the exercise 
of jurisdiction by a state over activities occurring outside its borders” (Senz & Charlesworth 2001, p. 
72). Despite this definition being rather straightforward, it cannot be denied that in the modern inter-
connected world, it can be problematic to try to define the location of an activity, especially if it takes 
place in the cyberspace. For this reason, Svantesson proposes to define extraterritoriality through 
the location of the person engaging in the activity, instead of the location of the activity itself. 
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and extraterritorial claims; however, it is not its aim,98 and it does not pose a problem 
for the purposes of this work. All claims of jurisdiction are to be treated and examined 
individually in their context in order to determine the extent of their extraterritoriality.99 
Additionally, the acceptability of a claim can neither be automatically tied to its extrater-
ritoriality – whether a claim of jurisdiction is acceptable, should be decided only after 
assessing the claim as a whole, including the aims and the reasoning behind it.100 
Using such a definition, it is very well possible to examine the extraterritorial extent of 
the European data protection law, which, after all, is the main aim of this work. As this 
definition is rather broad, many types of assertions will be seen as extraterritorial, at 
least to a certain extent. One further distinction can be made, however: there is a differ-
ence between what is meant by an “extraterritorial scope” (of, for instance, a certain 
legislative act), and what is meant by a mere “extraterritorial effect” (or impact).101 The 
former refers to a direct extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction that can be made by, e.g., 
formulating a legislative act in a certain way and by extending its territorial scope to 
directly cover certain conduct of persons situated abroad. Extraterritorial effects, on the 
other hand, can be caused by uses of jurisdiction that, despite being seemingly com-
pletely domestic and territorial, can still have an effect on international market.102 For 
 
98 According to Svantesson, this definition instead makes it possible to determine whether an asser-
tion of jurisdiction has any “extraterritorial effect or implications”, further emphasizing that no mutually 
exclusive binary distinction can be made between territorial and extraterritorial claims (Svantesson 
2013b, p. 85). 
99 Svantesson 2013b, p. 85.  
100 Svantesson 2015a, p. 227. 
101 Poullet 2007, p. 145. As with extraterritoriality as a whole, the distinction here is not binary either, 
as certain assertions may have an implicit extraterritorial scope. As it will be discussed later on, the 
importance of the differentiation between the extraterritorial scope and effect comes into play when 
assessing the extent and the severity of an extraterritorial assertion, and, therefore, its need for jus-
tification (see Svantesson 2015a, p. 227). 
102 See, e.g., C-366/10 – Air Transport Association of America and Others, where certain US airline 
companies claimed that the amendments introduced by the EU Directive 2008/101 were a unilateral 
attempt to extraterritorially impose the EU emission requirements on non-EU countries. The Court 
found, however, that the extraterritorial effects of the directive were acceptable as they were based 
on territoriality (or, as Scott frames it, the trigger for the application of the directive was territorial) – 
the requirements only applied to aircraft departing or arriving at airports within EU Member States 
(C-366/10 – Air Transport Association of America and Others, para 125–129; Scott 2014a, p. 1345). 
It cannot be denied, though, that despite its seeming territorial and domestic nature, the directive 
does have substantial effects beyond the borders of the EU (see also Coughlan et al. 2007, p. 33). 
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the purposes of this work, I will further expand the definition of extraterritoriality pre-
sented above to also include the incidental “extraterritorial effects” – influence on be-
haviour outside state borders, regardless of whether it is intended or not.103 
Extraterritorial effects not explicitly integrated into the scope of a statute are especially 
often found in EU legislation.104 It has been claimed that certain assertions extending 
beyond the borders of the Union are not “extraterritorial” as such, but rather employ a 
technique labelled “territorial extension”. Territorial extension arises in cases where the 
application of a certain measure, such as a legislative act, is triggered territorially, but 
when certain circumstances abroad have to be taken into account when applying the 
measure.105 According to Scott, an example of territorial extension is EU regulation 
2111/2005, which regulates, inter alia, the access of aircraft to EU territory based on 
the aircrafts’ global safety records.106  
The EU’s strict rules in relation to the consumer markets, combined with the Union’s 
substantial market power,107 causes another phenomenon that has been noted by Brad-
ford – the “Brussels effect”. The Brussels effect occurs when the EU uses its market 
power to influence activity abroad by the means of regulation that might initially appear 
completely domestic. It is, therefore, a matter of unilateral regulatory globalisation, 
which occurs when “a law of one jurisdiction migrates into another in the absence of the 
former actively imposing it or the latter willingly adopting it.”108 Such migration takes 
place in two stages. First, multinational companies adopt the EU standards adjusting 
their global activity to adhere to the EU requirements, resulting in a “de facto Brussels 
effect”. Subsequently, often as a result of lobbying, the companies’ local governments 
may adopt similar standards in their own jurisdictions in order to ensure equal opportu-
nities for all companies on their market, which gives rise to “de jure Brussels effect”.109 
 
103 See also Kuner 2015a, p. 236, arguing that it is not necessarily useful to even make a distinction 
between extraterritorial scope and effect. 
104 Poullet 2007, p. 148–149; Scott 2014b, p. 90 et seq.; see also Bradford 2012, p. 6. 
105 Scott 2014b, p. 90. 
106 Scott 2014a, p. 1343–1344.  
107 Bradford 2012, p. 11–12. 
108 Bradford 2012, p. 3–4. Bradford explicitly differentiates this kind of globalisation of standards from 
the one that is based on negotiated standards, or where certain requirements are imposed on other 
jurisdictions by the means of threats or sanctions.  
109 Bradford 2012, p. 6. 
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Bradford argues that the externalisation of EU regulation is a part of the so-called “race 
to top”, where the economic development has triggered the enactment of increasingly 
strict regulation.110 As a key prerequisite for the Brussels effect, Bradford highlights the 
geographically inelastic nature of consumer markets: as opposed to capital markets, 
the 500 million consumers residing within the EU are not likely to move location for 
regulatory reasons, causing the risk for non-compliant businesses to be left outside the 
whole European market.111 Additionally, in order to be able to externalise its law, a state 
must have an established regulatory infrastructure and power over its large market, 
which is especially true in the case of EU and the regulation of data protection.112 How-
ever, in the end, the success of the export of standards depends on the activity of the 
multinational companies – in order for a standard to become global, it must first be 
globally assumed by a company. For companies, it might often be economically sensi-
ble to adjust all global operations to adhere to the same standards, and, therefore, their 
role cannot be underestimated.113  
Using the definition of extraterritoriality assumed above, it is evident that a rather wide 
array of different assertions can be considered extraterritorial, and that the Brussels 
effect has the potential to be one of them. Despite this, one could argue that when 
enacting legislation affecting multinational companies, the EU is not willingly trying to 
affect the companies’ conduct outside the EU, let alone the regulatory activities of non-
EU states, and that the global effect of the domestic regulatory activities of the EU is a 
mere accidental by-product of completely territorial legislation.114 However, considering 
the definition described above, a mere incidental effect abroad – even if not intended – 
can constitute extraterritoriality. Therefore, influence on the conduct abroad caused by 
the Brussels effect should also be considered extraterritorial in spite of the legislation 
not being formulated with an explicit extraterritorial scope.115 As unilateral regulatory 
 
110 Bradford 2012, p. 4–5. 
111 Bradford 2012, p. 16–17. As opposed to this, in a “race to bottom”, a more mobile target, such as 
capital, can be moved to a jurisdiction with less strict regulation. 
112 Bach & Newman 2007, p. 835; Bradford 2012, 12, 22–23. 
113 Bradford 2012, p. 18 and 25; see also Drezner 2005, p. 845.  
114 Bradford 2012, p. 36 and 41 – the EU might argue that it merely enforces locally equal rules of 
the single market on both EU and non-EU companies with no attempt to extend the effect of its rules 
beyond the single market. 
115 It should also be considered that when enacting legislation, the EU is not unaware of its significant 
market position and the effects its legislation has on conduct abroad – as noted by Bradford, the EU 
does seek to “vigorously promote its interests on the global stage”, and it has been criticized for 
attempting to practice a “novel form of imperialism” (Bradford 2012, p. 35–36). For an additional 
example of the EU’s transnational regulatory action, see, e.g., Scott 2014a, p. 1363–1365, explaining 
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globalisation indeed does not require any active transnational coercive measures from 
the state enacting the legislation, the Brussels effect can be seen as one of the “mildest” 
versions of extraterritoriality. 
It is clear that the definition of extraterritoriality assumed in this work is rather broad. 
However, it can be concluded that this definition focuses on the actual outcome of an 
assertion of jurisdiction – whether a state has actually attempted to control the activities 
of persons outside its borders – regardless of the means used in the attempt. Therefore, 
this definition constitutes a kind of a pragmatic approach to extraterritoriality, which will 
be applied in practice later when I will discuss in detail all the different extraterritorial 
dimensions of the GDPR. 
2.4 Issues related to extraterritoriality 
As indicated previously, independent states possess a specific set of rights that they 
are entitled to practice exclusively. This phenomenon is commonly referred to as sov-
ereignty.116 One of the most apparent grounds for critique of extraterritorial assertions 
of jurisdiction is that such assertions encroach on these prerogatives of other states.117 
Therefore, the problems related to extraterritoriality stem from the inherent nature of 
extraterritoriality as a concept: as a starting point, sovereign states should be able to 
fully regulate the conduct taking place on their territory – extraterritorial assertions by 
other states, however, contravene with this principle. 
States often have divergent values that are reflected in their law. For instance, the 
United States clearly emphasises the importance of the freedom of speech above the 
right to privacy,118 as it appears from its status as the First Amendment right and as 
supported by the US Supreme Court in, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper.119 As opposed to this, 
the European Union is known for leading the way in the field of privacy regulation, with 
 
the extraterritorial extent and the global effect of the EU capital market legislation and demonstrating 
the EU’s readiness and willingness to directly regulate conduct taking place outside its borders. 
116 As discussed above in section 2.1, in the context of this research, the EU acts as the party making 
assertions of jurisdiction – for this reason, while the EU is not fully comparable to other sovereign 
states, these differences are not relevant for the purposes of this work. 
117 Perritt 2000, p. 892. 
118 Whitman 2004, p. 1209. As opposed to the EU, there is no single key federal act concerning data 
protection, and, instead, the regulation is fragmented by states and sectors (Petkova 2018, 1140). 
119 According to the US Supreme Court, “privacy concerns give way when balanced against the in-
terest in publishing matters of public importance.” (Bartnicki v. Vopper, p. 534; see also Wimmer 
2018, p. 571). 
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privacy even being called the “Europe’s First Amendment”.120 Therefore, when requiring 
US businesses to comply with EU data protection requirements,121 the EU, in a sense, 
forces its values upon the US, despite the US having its own divergent values that it is 
fully entitled to adhere to in accordance with the principle of sovereign equality.122 Ad-
ditionally, such assertion can also be seen to imply that the values of the state asserting 
jurisdiction, in this case the EU, are more important than the values of other states, such 
as the US.123  
For these reasons, before I begin the examination of the actual extraterritorial mecha-
nisms of the GDPR, it is first useful to establish the framework that will be used when 
critically reviewing these mechanisms. In this section, I will discuss some of the issues 
often related to extraterritorial assertions, focusing specifically on their justification and 
enforcement. After this, I will review certain principles that can potentially be viewed as 
limitations to extraterritorial assertions. 
2.4.1 Justification of extraterritorial assertions 
As extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction almost always interfere, at least to some ex-
tent, with the sovereign rights of other states, it is always necessary to properly justify 
each assertion. Often multiple states with intersecting ambitions may take interest in 
regulating a certain matter124 – how should it be decided which state’s interests should 
prevail and which state should be able to assert jurisdiction over a matter? The second 
issue with extraterritoriality is, therefore, the range of difficulties surrounding the justifi-
cation of an extraterritorial assertion.  
First of all, it appears to be not entirely clear which party should be justifying an extra-
territorial assertion. Some commentators view that the state asserting jurisdiction 
should itself validate the legitimacy of its assertion, whereas others claim that parties 
 
120 For further discussion concerning the differences between the difference of values between the 
US and the EU, see Petkova 2019. While the right to data protection is not absolute in the EU either 
(see, e.g., Recital 4 and Article 17(3)(a) of the Regulation and C-136/17 – GC and Others, para 57–
59, 66), it is clear that the privacy is given a higher priority in the EU when compared to the US. 
121 For instance, pursuant to Article 3(2) GDPR, which will be discussed in section 3 below.  
122 Throughout this work, the US will often be used as an example of a target of extraterritorial as-
sertions of the EU. While this is the case, the purpose of this work is not to provide insights that are 
only based on the EU–US relationship, but instead to evaluate the extraterritorial assertions made 
by the EU in relation to all non-EU states in general. 
123 See Svantesson 2013a, p. 278.  
124 For a general review of why states may choose to have an extraterritorial extent to their legislation, 
see ILC 2006, p. 516. 
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objecting to an assertion should name the rules of international law that are being bro-
ken by the contested assertion and, therefore, prove why the assertion is not legiti-
mate.125 It appears, though, that currently the common practice is that the party making 
an assertion should be the one proving its legitimacy, retaining the position of state 
sovereignty as a starting point in the assessment of extraterritorial claims.126 
Above were discussed the traditional principles of asserting jurisdiction: the passive and 
active territoriality, the passive and active personality, and the protective and the uni-
versal principles and the effects doctrine. Especially the first six principles described in 
the Harvard Draft bear a sort of a deep-seated “acceptability value”.127 It has become 
clear, though, that reliance on the inherent acceptability of the principles is not sufficient 
in order to determine whether a jurisdictional claim is really legitimate.128  
In the modern interconnected world, a single matter can have multiple independent reg-
ulators willing to claim jurisdiction based on different subjective interests, principles, and 
connections to the matter. Attempting to solve which state is entitled to claim jurisdiction 
over a case automatically based on the acceptability of the principle used would be 
unfair. One state might have a much stronger interest to assert jurisdiction based on, 
e.g., the interest to protect its nationals, as opposed to another state basing its jurisdic-
tion on the more generally-accepted territorially. It does not help that with an increasing 
amount of activity taking place in cyberspace, the significance of geographical state 
boundaries is diminishing and the classical territorial principle starts to lose its mean-
ing.129 
 
125 Lowe 2007, p. 179. It should be noted, though, there has never been a recorded instance of the 
latter situation with a state opposing an assertion demonstrating the existence of a rule prohibiting 
the assertion. 
126 Wimmer 2018, p. 559. 
127 Harvard Draft 1935, p. 445. 
128 See Wimmer 2018, p. 559. 
129 Svantesson 2015c provides an example: according to the territoriality principle, in cloud compu-
ting contexts, “state A always must have a jurisdictional claim over all aspects of data that happened 
to be located on a server located in state A”. Considering the distributed transnational nature of cloud 
computing, with often numerous actions taking place simultaneously and multiple parallel copies of 
data being stored all in different parts of the world, it is apparent that a classical territorial approach 
is not practically applicable in this context. The difficulty of the situation was also highlighted in the 
Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in C-131/12 – Google Spain and Google, delivered on 25 
June 2013, para 63, where the truly transnational nature of operations of Google Inc. and its subsid-
iaries was briefly described. 
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For these reasons, Svantesson has proposed a completely different approach to the 
question of justification of jurisdictional claims. He suggests that the principles for as-
serting jurisdiction described above, albeit well established, are outdated and actually 
part of the problem of justification130 – according to his proposition, the classical princi-
ples as such should therefore be abandoned, as they are mere “proxy principles”, and 
instead broken down to reveal the core principles contained within them. Consequently, 
jurisdiction should therefore be only exercised when the assertion meets the following 
three prerequisites: 
1. The connection between the matter and the state willing to assert jurisdiction 
should be substantial;  
2. The state willing to assert jurisdiction should have a legitimate interest in the 
matter; and 
3. The assertion of jurisdiction should be reasonable considering the propor-
tionality of interests of the state asserting jurisdiction and competing interests 
of other states, and, in some cases, other parties.131 
This approach strongly reflects the broad individual approach to extraterritorial claims, 
as the three core principles listed above make it possible to individually assess all mo-
tivations and reasoning behind even the most controversial extraterritorial claims.132 
However, neither does this approach provide a succinct and straightforward solution to 
the problem of assessing the legitimacy of an extraterritorial assertion. What kind of a 
connection between the matter and the state is substantial enough? What kind of an 
interest is so legitimate that a state could assert jurisdiction based on it? Which types 
of interests can be considered more important than others, and why? With every con-
troversial case requiring separate attention and assessment and with the absence of 
objective criteria for the assessment, Svantesson’s approach does help one not to con-
strain their thinking with 80-year-old principles of Harvard Draft,133 but still does not pro-
vide any much clearer guidelines for the actual assessment. 
 
130 See Svantesson 2015c, arguing that these principles were formed to reflect the legal practice at 
the time of the Harvard Draft, over 80 years ago. See also Mann 1973, p. 27–28, acknowledging the 
need to reconsider the principle of territorial jurisdiction for practical reasons even before the dawn 
of cyberage. 
131 Svantesson 2015a, p. 227; for further detail on how the proposed principles relate to the Harvard 
Draft, see Svantesson 2015–2016, p. 71–72. 
132 See, e.g., Svantesson 2015a, p. 227. 
133 Svantesson 2015–2016, p. 72. 
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Svantesson acknowledges the issue and counters by stating that although the proposed 
core principles do not provide a new easy way to automatically assess the legitimacy of 
an assertion, neither actually do the Harvard Draft principles. If one were to assess the 
allocation of jurisdiction over a transnational cloud arrangement134 by means of classi-
cal principles of territoriality and personality, it would soon become clear that these old 
principles can hardly be applied to such novel circumstances. Therefore, even though 
the new principles do offer more space for interpretation, even more substantial difficul-
ties arise when trying to apply the old principles less suited for the modern world.135 For 
this reason, it is sensible to assume a more modern approach to the justification of 
extraterritorial claims – not by the means of the Harvard Draft principles, but by using 
the core ideas contained within them. Nevertheless, the Harvard Draft principles should 
not be abandoned completely – they still have utility when, e.g., examining the mecha-
nisms of extraterritorial assertions and they can still be used as a part of the argumen-
tation for or against the legitimacy of an assertion.136  
2.4.2 Extraterritorial enforcement 
As already discussed above in relation to the use of enforcement jurisdiction, the gen-
eral international law does not allow for a state to perform such measures on the territory 
of another state, which only the state officials are entitled to perform.137 Akehurst high-
lights that this condition applies even if certain individuals in the second state consent 
to the measures of the first state – the consent would then concern an encroachment 
of the state’s sovereignty, which, in principle, cannot be consented to by any individual 
persons or entities.138 If a state has no way to enforce the extraterritorial scope of its 
legislation, what is the objective of such assertion? 
 
134 See example above in note 129. 
135 Svantesson 2015–2016, p. 72. Svantesson also considers it possible that a set of new, more 
specific “proxy principles” can be developed based on the three core principles discussed above. If 
such principles can successfully facilitate the assessment of extraterritorial assertions while closely 
reflecting the values of the core principles, Svantesson welcomes them.  
136 The Harvard Draft principles can be used as a part of justification of an assertion especially when 
determining the extent of the connection between the state asserting jurisdiction and the subject 
matter. On the synthesis of the principles see also, e.g., Currie 2008, p. 352–354, suggesting that 
various principles could be applied considering, among other things, the circumstances of the matter 
and the interests of the states involved. 
137 Akehurst 1972–1973, p. 146; Currie 2008, p. 335–336; Kuner 2010b, p. 232; Ryngaert 2015b, p. 
31; see also The Case of SS Lotus, para 45. 
138 Akehurst 1972–1973, p. 147. Akehurst notes that at times, states have consented to other states 
taking such measures on their territory, but, according to him, this does not alter the main rule that 
without a proper permission, such measures are against international law. 
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It has been argued that the real extraterritorial scope and effectiveness of a law is in-
deed measured not by how it is written, but how it is put into action, i.e., by the use of 
enforcement jurisdiction, as opposed to use of legislative jurisdiction.139 Following the 
footsteps of renowned positivists Hart140 and Kelsen141, one could even go as far as 
arguing that the whole legitimacy of a law is compromised in situations where there is 
no real chance of enforcement of the said law.142 Without assuming such a radical view, 
it still cannot be denied that a law does lose some of its meaning when there is no real 
chance of enforcing it – after all, fear of sanctions is one of the most important motiva-
tors for ensuring compliance with the law.143 This has led certain commentators to con-
clude that while the actual enforcement of the law does not necessarily matter when 
assessing its effectiveness, it is its enforceability that is essential.144 
However, sanctions and enforcement action are not the only reasons why people do 
comply with the law.145 If so, is enforceability really essential in order for the extraterri-
torial assertions to have a purpose? Svantesson approaches the problem by making a 
distinction between the so-called “bark jurisdiction” and “bite jurisdiction”, with all asser-
tions of jurisdiction belonging to either of these groups depending, essentially, on 
whether there is a possibility of enforcing a jurisdictional claim.146 In many cases, extra-
territorial claims fall specifically in the category of “bark jurisdiction” – they are mere 
attempts to regulate a certain matter, without any realistic chance of being enforced.147 
Assertions falling into the category of “bark jurisdiction” have been widely criticised as 
 
139 Goldsmith 2000, p. 139. 
140 According to Hart 2012, p. 116, one of the two conditions necessary for the whole existence of a 
legal system is that valid rules of behaviour contained in the legal system “must be generally obeyed” 
– if a law cannot be enforced, it cannot be considered generally obeyed. 
141 Kelsen 2005, p. 41–42: “A norm is considered to be valid only on the condition that it belongs to 
a system of norms, to an order which, on the whole, is efficacious”.  
142 Similar ideas have been expressed even earlier: according to Bentham and Austin, there is no 
legal obligation without a threat of punishment, or “the evil of a sanction”, see Morrison 2016, p. 365–
366. 
143 See Kuner 2015a, p. 244–245; Kuner 2010b, p. 236. 
144 Kohl 2007, p. 205. 
145 This has also been acknowledged by Kelsen, who understood that certain moral or religious mo-
tives can also affect the actions of people: “A man fulfils his legal duty to pay his debts very often not 
because he wishes to avoid the sanction provided by the law against an individual who does not pay 
his debts, but because … if he does not pay his debts, he will lose his credit.” Kelsen also states that 
conduct based on other motives than fear of sanctions can also be a sign of an efficacious legal 
order. Kelsen also acknowledges the view of Ehrlich, according to whom much of human behaviour 
is motivated by other reasons than fear of punishment or compulsion (Kelsen 2005, p. 24–28).  
146 Svantesson 2013b, p. 68–69. 
147 As opposed to “bark jurisdiction”, “bite jurisdiction” refers to assertions that are actually enforcea-
ble in practice (Svantesson 2015b, p. 556–557). 
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“regulatory overreaching” – a situation that occurs when the “rules are expressed so 
generally and non-discriminatingly that they apply prima facie to a large range of activ-
ities without having much of a realistic chance of being enforced.”148 In such cases, 
when the scope of the law is much broader than what can actually be enforced, the 
respect for the law, or even the legal system, may be undermined.149  
However, enforceability is not everything – the moral justifiability and the public’s per-
ception of the law should also be considered, as they can affect the outcome of an 
exercise of “bark jurisdiction”.150 There may be reasons why a state would choose to 
enact a law that cannot be fully enforced abroad. For example, when enacting the Sin-
gapore Personal Data Protection Act 2012, the Ministry of Information, Communications 
and the Arts of Singapore openly acknowledged the difficulties of enforcing extraterrito-
rial claims but identified the deterrent effect the extraterritorial claims may still have de-
spite the lack of proper enforcement. Additionally, such a claim can demonstrate the 
effort to treat domestic and foreign subjects equally.151  
When an unenforceable law is morally justifiable, the threshold for non-compliance can 
be somewhat high – as a starting point, companies prefer not to be publicly viewed as 
deliberate law-breakers, even though the law in question could never be enforced.152 
However, such potential effect of a morally justifiable law can be hindered by the re-
quirements of the law being excessive. This has especially been identified as a risk in 
connection with the EU data protection law, known for its broadly formulated and mate-
rially strict extraterritorial requirements that will be discussed in section 3. Even as 
 
148 Bygrave 2000, p. 225, see also Moerel 2011a, p. 29. 
149 Kuner 2010b, p. 235; Hijmans 2016, p. 476. This can be especially true in the case of criminal 
law, see Coughlan et al. 2007, p. 50. 
150 Svantesson 2015b, p. 561–566; Svantesson 2013b, p. 70. 
151 MICA 2012; see also Svantesson 2015a, p. 233. 
152 Svantesson 2013b, p. 70–71; Kohl 2007, p. 208; see also WP 56, p. 15, stating that despite an 
EU judgment not being recognised and enforced abroad, “there exist examples that the foreign web 
site may nevertheless follow the judgement and adapt its data processing with a view to developing 
good business practice and to maintaining a good commercial image.” Such an assumption is, nat-
urally, not always correct, especially if there is little to no publicity attached to the non-compliance. 
As an example of such compliance, see the case of Yahoo! Inc.: in 2000, a French court ordered 
the US-based Yahoo! Inc. and its French subsidiary to prevent access to certain sites distributing 
Nazi artefacts – despite there being no possible risk of enforcement of such a court order in the 
US, Yahoo! Inc. complied with it as to not be viewed as deliberately breaking the law (LICRA v. Ya-
hoo!; Kohl 2007, p. 201–207; Greze 2019, p. 112). 
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acknowledged by the EU officials themselves, the EU makes broad extraterritorial as-
sertions but pursues the enforcement of only a fraction of them.153 From the point of 
view of international law, this potential disproportion between the morally justified inter-
ests and the actual severity of the requirements causes a risk of non-Europeans viewing 
the GDPR in a negative light, which may end up in a complete loss of respect for the 
EU data protection regime abroad.154  
One additional thing to consider is the intent of the state enacting the law. Svantesson 
makes one further distinction between “bark jurisdiction” and “failed bite jurisdiction”: 
when making an extraterritorial claim, does the state acknowledge that it will not be 
possible to enforce it, and is it aware of the claim’s actual ramifications? Or is the claim 
made without further considering its practical application? While the latter case might 
jeopardise the credibility of a legal system, the former type of claims can be interpreted 
as the state making the claim perceiving having the right to regulate a certain matter 
while accepting that the regulation cannot be enforced.155  
It cannot be denied that the enforceability does further affirm a law’s legitimacy – after 
all, it is the best way of ensuring the compliance with the law.156 However, as it has been 
made clear, enforceability is not everything. The law can have an effect even without a 
real possibility of it being enforced abroad. In addition to mechanisms discussed above, 
an effect can also be achieved, for instance, by the means of the Brussels effect dis-
cussed above – as certain standards are in use within the EU market, they can slowly 
find their way abroad by means of regulatory migration, creating an effect abroad that 
does not require any coercion or enforcement. As it will be discussed below, the EU 
data protection law influences behaviour outside the EU through multiple such mecha-
nisms.  
 
153 WP 225, p. 3: “Under EU law, everyone has a right to data protection. In practice, DPAs will focus 
on claims where there is a clear link between the data subject and the EU, for instance where the 
data subject is a citizen or resident of an EU Member State” [emphasis added]. See also Svantesson 
2015a, p. 232. 
154 Svantesson 2015a, p. 233–234. Such loss of respect can result in even further diminished com-
pliance, which, due to the fact that the GDPR is not fully enforceable abroad against a non-compliant 
company (see section 4.3 below), further feeds the loss of respect, potentially causing a vicious cycle.  
155 Svantesson 2013b, p. 71. 
156 Kohl 2007, p. 205. 
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2.4.3 Potential limitations of extraterritoriality 
In addition to – and, to some extent, based on – the justification and enforceability is-
sues identified above, international law can be seen to set out157 some limitations to 
how broadly extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction can be exercised. The existence of 
limitations concerning the use of enforcement jurisdiction is accepted more or less uni-
versally.158 Additionally, most states and authorities do recognise the existence of limi-
tations to the use of legislative jurisdiction,159 but the actual content of such limitations 
remains unclear.160 For this reason, one cannot definitely claim, what kind of an extra-
territorial assertion of legislative jurisdiction is acceptable, and what, on the contrary, is 
not legitimate. 
When discussing the limitations to the extent of assertions of jurisdiction in each case, 
at the core of the question is the determination of appropriate allocation of regulatory 
authority between the states concerned, or, as Mills puts it, “which idea of justice … 
would be the most just to apply.”161 In order to answer this question and determine ap-
plicable law, numerous tests and doctrines have been developed – these can help trace 
the connection between the party asserting jurisdiction and the subject matter of a cer-
tain case.162 However, such tests are not always applicable, or, as highlighted by Kuner, 
 
157 Due to the decentralised nature of international law and in the absence of any single regulatory 
instrument addressing the allocation of jurisdiction, no clearly defined written rules concerning the 
allocation of jurisdiction – especially legislative – have been formulated and universally accepted 
(Ryngaert 2015b, 29–30, 35–36; Currie 2008, p. 4–5; McConville & Chui 2017, p. 254). 
158 Brownlie 2008, p. 309; Mann 1973, p. 111–113, 121; Buxbaum 2009, p. 664; such a limitation 
was expressed in, e.g., The Case of SS Lotus (p. 18–19) described above: “the first and foremost 
restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that – failing the existence of a permissive 
rule to the contrary – it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State”. 
159 See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co, Ltd, p. 105, where, according to the separate opin-
ion of Judge Fitzmaurice, international law “postulate[s] the existence of limits – though in any given 
case it may be for the tribunal to indicate what these are for the purposes of that case; and … in-
volve[s] for every State an obligation to exercise moderation and restraint as to the extent of the 
jurisdiction assumed by its courts in cases having a foreign element, and to avoid undue encroach-
ment on a jurisdiction more properly appertaining to, or more appropriately exercisable by, another 
State.” See also Mann 1973, p. 38; ILC 2006, p. 520; Ryngaert 2015a, p. 74–75; cf. Akehurst 1972–
1973, p. 187, according to whom it appears that there are no limitations to the extraterritorial practice 
of legislative jurisdiction in the area of private law. 
160 Kuner 2010a, p. 185–186: Kuner notes that when states are willing to regulate a certain matter, 
they have been “creative” when coming up with justifications for their extraterritorial assertions of 
legislative jurisdiction. 
161 Mills 2009, p. 18. 
162 Kuner 2015a, p. 242. Kuner mentions, e.g., the test concerning the “centre of gravity” of a dispute 
or the determination of minimum connecting factors to the forum. Such tests often boil down to the 
core principles of comity and “jurisdictional reasonableness” 
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the use of such doctrines can even be attempted to be ruled out.163 For instance, in 
relation to the EU data protection law, both the Advocate General Jääskinen and the 
Article 29 Working Party have emphasised the nature of the EU data protection regime 
as an independent system that is not subject to jurisdiction tests conducted under inter-
national law. Instead, according to these statements, only the system’s own rules for 
determining jurisdiction should be applied.164 While this is the case, principles of comity 
and sovereign equality still cannot be discarded – such a solution would be diplomati-
cally unsustainable. Instead, these principles should be used to assess whether the 
EU’s assertions of jurisdiction are reasonable.165 
In addition to the uncertain existence and the uncertain applicability of the possible lim-
iting principles, another challenge is posed by the subjective nature of the question. 
Instead of an objective assessment of which party should really be the one asserting 
jurisdiction based on the close connection and greatest interests involved, arguments 
concerning the legitimacy of an extraterritorial assertion are often based more strongly 
on the parties’ subjective values.166 
Despite these difficulties, certain solutions to the issue have been proposed and intro-
duced in practice. In addition to the general and somewhat ambiguous international law 
principles of comity and “jurisdictional reasonableness”, some more concrete solutions 
 
163 Kuner 2015a, p. 243.  
164 See the Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in C-131/12 – Google Spain and Google, deliv-
ered on 25 June 2013, para 54: “the interpretation of the Directive in accordance with the Charter 
cannot add any new elements that might give rise to the territorial applicability of the national legis-
lation implementing the Directive to those laid down in Article 4(1) of the Directive. Article 8 of the 
Charter must, of course, be taken into account in the interpretation of the concepts used in Article 
4(1) of the Directive, but the points of attachment defined by the EU legislator cannot be supple-
mented with an entirely new criterion by reference to that fundamental right” [emphasis added]. See 
also WP 56, p. 6: “As the directive addresses the issue of applicable law and establishes a criterion 
for determining the law on substance that should provide the solution to a case, the directive itself 
fulfils the role of a so-called “rule of conflict” and no recourse to other existing criteria of international 
private law is necessary.” 
Similar opinion has been expressed in connection with the autonomy of EU fundamental rights law: 
in C-402/05 P – Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, para 316, 
the Court stated that “the review by the Court of the validity of any Community measure in the light 
of fundamental rights must be considered to be the expression, in a community based on the rule of 
law, of a constitutional guarantee stemming from the EC Treaty as an autonomous legal system 
which is not to be prejudiced by an international agreement.” The Court essentially highlighted the 
autonomous nature of certain principles of EU law and stated that they prevail over international law, 
referring to, in particular, provisions of international agreements (Hijmans 2016, p. 472–473, 505). 
See also Kuner 2014, p. 62 et seq. and C‑584/10 P – Commission and Others v Kadi. 
165 If necessary, these principles can also be relied on in order to find alternative regulatory solutions 
that would be better in line with international law. 
166 Kuner 2015a, p. 241; see also Koskenniemi 2005 p. 513–515. 
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can be used in order to define the limits of one state’s jurisdiction and, consequently, 
avoid potential conflicts. For instance, in the field of competition law, Ryngaert highlights 
the importance of different means of co-operation between the states, including reci-
procity and communication, as a prerequisite for the avoidance of jurisdictional con-
flicts.167 Kuner, on the other hand, proposes that the applicability of a law168 should di-
rectly follow its enforceability – if there is no reasonable chance of the law being en-
forced, the assertion of legislative jurisdiction made in the scope of the law should be 
limited as well.169 Such an approach, however, would be prone to strip the law of its 
other possible extraterritorial effects discussed above, which is why enforceability can-
not be considered the only determining factor when assessing whether an extraterrito-
rial assertion of legislative jurisdiction is truly legitimate. 
Furthermore, Scott specifies two limiting instruments that already appear in the EU leg-
islation. These instruments do not act as external restraints on extraterritorial assertions 
per se; instead, Scott characterises them as “safety valves” – principles that are built 
into the law to prevent the extraterritorial claims made by the law from mushrooming 
unreasonably. These principles are contingency and contextuality. As Scott describes 
them, contingency refers to situations where the EU, despite its increasing ambitions to 
regulate conduct taking place abroad, is also prepared to refrain from applying its leg-
islation abroad in cases where it considers that the non-EU state has sufficiently regu-
lated the matter itself, without requiring the use of strictly identical standards. As regards 
contextuality, it is used in order to reduce the rigidity of EU law and, on the contrary, to 
assess the applicability of EU law to a given case based on a nuanced contextual case-
by-case review of a specific set of circumstances.170 Scott indicates the use of both of 
these instruments in various extraterritorial EU laws that concern the regulation of fi-
nancial market, but a similar dynamic can be observed in other fields of EU law, as 
 
167 Ryngaert 2015a, p. 64–65. 
168 In Kuner’s example, data transfer regulations. 
169 Kuner 2015a, p. 244–245. 
170 Scott 2014a, p. 1365–1367. 
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well.171 According to Scott, these instruments provide an opportunity for dialogue be-
tween the EU and third country regulators and reduce the one-sidedness of the extra-
territorial assertions made in EU law. 172 
Based on the findings of this section, it can be concluded that there are no clear princi-
ples as to what kind of assertions are acceptable under international law, and what kind 
of assertions are exorbitant. Consequently, the assessment of the extraterritorial mech-
anisms of the GDPR should be carried out considering all relevant factors: the level of 
connection between the regulator and the matter, the interests of the regulators involved, 
their proportionality, predictability, fairness, and enforceability. However, before such 
assessment can be carried out, we will first examine research question (1) and look into 
the actual mechanisms of the GDPR that have an effect outside the EU borders. 
3 Extraterritorial mechanisms of the GDPR 
The enactment and the entry into force of the General Data Protection Regulation was, 
without a doubt, a great leap in the field of privacy regulation. In addition to the intro-
duction of strict material requirements, a rather broad territorial scope was also adopted 
as part of the regulation. The territorial scope has since been subject to heated discus-
sion and passionate critique by commentators worldwide. According to some views, the 
broad territorial scope of data protection legislation protects the rights and freedoms of 
individuals from threats caused by lax data protection requirements abroad.173 On the 
other hand, broad cross-border data protection requirements are often viewed as an 
 
171 Contingency and contextuality, as described by Scott, do not appear in the EU data protection 
law. However, the adequacy decision system of the EU data protection law in the direction of contin-
gency: according to the Article 45, personal data may be transferred to a third country if the European 
Commission has decided that the country is able to ensure an adequate level of protection of per-
sonal data. The European Commission does not require for the foreign data protection safeguards 
to be identical to those of the EU – instead, an adequacy decision is based on an overall assessment 
of, inter alia, relevant legislation, rule of law, respect for human rights, existence and functionality of 
supervisory authority, and other relevant factors (for an example of argumentation, see the recent 
Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/419 concerning the adequate level of protection of 
personal data in Japan. The decision examines the system of Japanese data protection legislation 
and the rights and obligations contained therein in contrast to the EU data protection requirements). 
The nature of adequacy decisions and their effect outside the borders of the EU will be discussed in 
detail in section 3.3.1. 
An adequacy decision does not make the GDPR not applicable to the processing abroad, as it should 
under Scott’s description of contingency (Scott 2014a, p. 1366), but it still does achieve similar results: 
flexibility, openness to dialogue with third countries and diminished unilateralism. 
172 Scott 2014a, p. 1365. 
173 See, e.g. Reding 2012, p. 127. 
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unjustified encroachment on other states’ domestic interests.174 The latter view has 
gathered a lot of attention especially outside the EU: the territorial scope of EU data 
protection law has been called “an effort to impose the EU’s will on the US” by US 
officials175 and characterised as “aggressive”.176 
The Council of Europe Convention 108 acted as a basis for the Data Protection Di-
rective, and, subsequently, the General Data Protection Regulation that replaced the 
Directive.177 As argued by de Hert & Czerniawski, it allows for and even encourages the 
expansion of the territorial scope of the data protection legislation.178 Respectively, the 
GDPR employs multiple different mechanisms of affecting data processing activities 
outside the EU. Some of these mechanisms are written directly into the text of the reg-
ulation, such as its broad territorial scope under Article 3 or the regulation of cross-
border data transfers under Articles 44–50, whereas certain other effects are more dis-
creet and not based on specific GDPR provisions, such as the Brussels effect of the 
GDPR.  
3.1 General territorial scope of the GDPR (Article 3) 
3.1.1 Operator’s establishment within the EU (Paragraph 1) 
Article 3 GDPR provides for the general territorial scope of the regulation. First para-
graph of the Article concerns situations where personal data is processed in the context 
of the activities of an establishment of the controller or processor179 within the EU. Par-
agraph 1 reads as follows:  
 
174 Kuner 2015a, p. 235–236; Bauchner 2000, p. 715.  
175 Cnet 2002. 
176 Goldsmith & Wu 2006, p. 175. 
177 The principles of Data Protection Directive were directly based on the principles of the Convention 
108 (see COM(92) 422 final – SYN 287, p. 4–5). The same principles have then been incorporated 
and expanded in the General Data Protection Regulation. While the aim of this section is to look into 
the extraterritorial mechanisms of the GDPR, as certain provisions that will be reviewed here are 
similar in both the GDPR and the DPD, the interpretation of the DPD will also be given importance 
over the course of this work, where relevant. 
178 de Hert & Czerniawski 2016, p. 231–232. According to the updated Article 3(1) of the Convention, 
“Each Party undertakes to apply this Convention to data processing subject to its jurisdiction” [em-
phasis added], signifying a departure from the strict territorial approach. 
179 Under Article 4 GDPR, “controller” refers to a party that “determines the purposes and means of 
the processing of personal data”. As opposed to the controller, “processor” refers to a party that 
“processes personal data on behalf of the controller”. As in the context of the applicability of the 
GDPR it is mostly irrelevant whether a company acts as a controller or a processor, hereinafter 
controllers and processors will be jointly referred to as “operators”. 
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“This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data in the con-
text of the activities of an establishment of a controller or a processor 
in the Union, regardless of whether the processing takes place in the 
Union or not.” 
This paragraph is similar to that of the Data Protection Directive, where, in Article 4(1)(a), 
a similar territorial scope concerning the “processing carried out in the context of the 
activities of an establishment of the controller on the territory of the Member State” was 
in place. The meaning and the true reach of the provision has caused a great deal of 
uncertainty180 – what constitutes an establishment within the EU, and when is the pro-
cessing considered to be carried out in the context of the activities of such establish-
ment?181  
 Evaluation of the establishment criterion and the relevant case law 
At first sight, the nature of this Article 3(1) appears to be purely territorial – the GDPR 
is applicable when an operator established in the EU engages in data processing activ-
ities. However, this is not the case, as the provision does neither require that the estab-
lishment in the EU acts as an operator, nor that the processing activities should take 
place within the EU.182 In the end, the provision applies to a surprisingly wide panoply 
of activities, which has been demonstrated in the CJEU case law. Google Spain183 and 
Weltimmo184 have established the broad territorial reach of Article 4(1)(a) of the Di-
rective,185 demonstrating that the Directive could apply to operators established outside 
the EU should they have a certain relevant establishment within the EU that could trig-
ger the application of 4(1)(a). As the provision adopted in the GDPR is equivalent, this 
case-law sets significant precedents defining the future interpretation of the GDPR.186 
 
180 Svantesson 2016a, p. 210; Bygrave 2014, p. 199. 
181 Such twofold approach to the interpretation of Article 4(1)(a) of the Directive was adopted by both 
the CJEU (in relation to the Directive; see, e.g., C-230/14 – Weltimmo, para 28, 34) and the EDPB 
(in relation to the GDPR). However, when examining Article 3(1) GDPR, the EDPB raises an addi-
tional consideration considering the last phrase of the provision, further highlighting that the location 
of the actual processing activities plays no role in determination of applicability of the GDPR under 
Article 3(1) (see EDPB Guidelines 3/2018, p. 8–9). 
182 See, e.g., Moerel 2011b, p. 97; Van Alsenoy & Koekkoek 2015, p. 107. 
183 C-131/12 – Google Spain and Google. 
184 C-230/14 – Weltimmo. 
185 WP 179 update, p. 2. 
186 Svantesson 2016a, p. 210; Brkan 2016, p. 336. 
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In its judgment in Google Spain, mostly known for the CJEU confirming the existence 
of the right to be forgotten, the Court also addressed the interpretation of the phrase “in 
the context of the activities of an establishment [in the EU]” under Article 4(1)(a) of the 
Directive and its applicability to a non-EU operator with a subsidiary in the EU. The 
question before the Court was whether the processing activities carried out by the US-
based Google Inc. could be subject to EU data protection law due to the fact that it was 
carried out for the purposes of advertising business activities of the Spain-based Google 
Spain SL. According to Google, the Spanish establishment had no role in the processing 
activities themselves and that the business of the Spanish establishment did not depend 
on the processing carried out by Google Inc.187 CJEU found, however, that despite the 
processing activities taking place wholly within the US, these activities were still subject 
to the Directive under Article 4(1)(a) due to the fact that there was a significant economic 
link between the processing activities of Google Inc. and the advertising business of 
Google Spain SL.188  
According to the CJEU, considering the business model of a search engine using ad-
vertising as its main source of revenue, the inextricable economic link between the ac-
tivities constituted that “the processing of personal data in question is carried out in the 
context of the commercial and advertising activity of the controller’s establishment on 
the territory of a Member State, in this instance Spanish territory.”189 Additionally, the 
Court renounced the restrictive interpretation of the Directive, referring to the general 
objective of the Directive to ensure the “effective and complete protection of the funda-
mental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy, 
with respect to the processing of personal data”.190 The Court also noted that the pur-
pose of the broad territorial scope of the Directive was to prevent the circumvention of 
the Directive and the deprivation of natural persons of the protection guaranteed by the 
 
187 C-131/12 – Google Spain and Google, para 51; Van Alsenoy & Koekkoek 2015, p. 107. 
188 C-131/12 – Google Spain and Google, para 56. 
189 C-131/12 – Google Spain and Google, para 46, 56–57; despite the substantial differences in the 
conclusions concerning controllership and the existence of the right to be dereferenced between the 
Court and the Advocate General Jääskinen in Google Spain, the Court’s views concerning the inter-
pretation of Article 4(1)(a) of the Directive were similar to those expressed in the Opinion of Advocate 
General Jääskinen in C-131/12 – Google Spain and Google, delivered on 25 June 2013, para 64–
68; see also WP 148, p. 10. The judgment has subsequently been criticised due to the fact that it 
remained somewhat unclear how the economic link should be interpreted in the context of differing 
business models (see Brkan 2016, p. 327). 
190 C-131/12 – Google Spain and Google, para 53. Here, the Court chose an approach focusing on 
the consequences of different possible interpretations, which it later referred to again in C-230/14 – 
Weltimmo, para 25 (see Svantesson 2016b, p. 335). 
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Directive.191 A similar view concerning the restrictive interpretation of Article 3(a) GDPR 
was later adopted by the EDPB.192 
Later, in Weltimmo, the CJEU further explained the content of Article 4(1)(a), especially 
focusing on the meaning of the notion of “establishment”. The case concerned a Slo-
vakian-registered company Weltimmo that ran a website for dealing Hungarian proper-
ties and provided the property advertisers with free trials of advertisement space on the 
website. Failing to delete the advertiser’s data upon request, Weltimmo charged the 
advertisers for the services they did not want and, having not received payment, for-
warded their data to debt collection agencies.193 One of the questions before the Court 
was, in this case, whether Weltimmo has an establishment in Hungary, despite being 
registered in Slovakia, and whether Hungarian law was to be applied to the pro-
cessing.194  
The Court found that the only link Weltimmo had to Slovakia was the place of its regis-
tration – in all other respects, Weltimmo’s business was connected to Hungary, where 
it had the customers, representatives, a bank account, and where it conducted the ac-
tual business and data processing activities.195 When determining the actual place of 
establishment, the Court noted that “both the degree of stability of the arrangements 
and the effective exercise of activities in that other Member State must be interpreted 
in the light of the specific nature of the economic activities and the provision of services 
concerned. This is particularly true for undertakings offering services exclusively over 
the Internet.”196 In the end, the Court found that Weltimmo did have an establishment in 
Hungary, and that the processing of personal data was indeed carried out in the context 
of the activities of said establishment.197 
 
191 C-131/12 – Google Spain and Google, para 54. 
192 EDPB Guidelines 3/2018, p. 6. 
193 C-230/14 – Weltimmo, para 9. 
194 As noted by Advocate General Cruz Villalón, the role of Article 4(1)(a) of the Directive was dual, 
with the first role being the territorial extension of the applicability of the Directive to concern parties 
situated outside the EU processing personal data within the context of activities of an EU establish-
ment (which was the case in Google Spain), and, on the other hand, to serve as a choice of law rule 
when determining, legislation of which Member State was to be applied to a certain case (Opinion of 
Advocate General Cruz Villalón in C-230/14 – Weltimmo, delivered on 25 June 2015, para. 23). With 
the introduction of the GDPR, it is evident that the significance of the latter role has greatly decreased, 
as, for the most part, the content of the Regulation is the same in all Member States (Brkan 2016, p. 
336). 
195 C-230/14 – Weltimmo, para 32–33. 
196 C-230/14 – Weltimmo, para 29. 
197 C-230/14 – Weltimmo, para 38–39. 
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It has been noted that the criteria the CJEU used in Weltimmo when assessing whether 
the company had an establishment in Hungary bore a similarity with, and, in a sense, 
paved the way for the targeting test, which was later codified in Article 3(2) GDPR.198 
The Court rejected a formalist approach199 and reflected the opinions expressed earlier 
in Google Spain, reiterating the fact that the concept of “establishment” should be inter-
preted broadly. By this, the Court lowered the threshold for “effective and stable ar-
rangements” within a Member State200 and further confirmed that Member State law – 
and, in the era of the GDPR, EU law – can be applicable even despite the operator’s 
registered domicile not being inside the Member State, or the EU.201  
The findings of Google Spain and Weltimmo were later adopted and reaffirmed in Verein 
für Konsumenteninformation202 and Wirtschaftsakademie,203 ascertaining the broad in-
terpretation of Article 4(1)(a) in accordance with Weltimmo and Google Spain.204 This 
subsequent case law further confirmed that “any real and effective activity, even a min-
imal one, exercised through stable arrangements” can constitute an establishment 
 
198 C-230/14 – Weltimmo, para 41; Svantesson 2016b, 337. The targeting approach will be discussed 
in further detail in the next section dealing with Article 3(2) GDPR. 
199 McCullagh 2016, p. 98. 
200 Revolidis 2017, p. 27. 
201 C-230/14 – Weltimmo, para 29–33, 39. Approach that was chosen in the Weltimmo judgment has 
been criticised: Revolidis, for instance, has argued that the broad concept of establishment creates 
an uncertain jurisdictional environment that maximises forum shopping and will authorise courts to 
adjudicate matters to which they have a trivial connection, undermining the quality of such decisions 
(Revolidis 2017, p. 27). Svantesson, on the other hand, has argued that the circumstances consti-
tuting the targeting in Weltimmo were highly straightforward and that such approach could be more 
difficult or even impossible to apply in more complex scenarios, questioning the utility of the targeting 
test (Svantesson 2016b, p. 337). However, here it is not necessary to further examine this critique, 
as it does not contribute to the general examination of the extraterritoriality of the EU data protection 
law. 
202 C-191/15 – Verein für Konsumenteninformation. Verein für Konsumenteninformation was a con-
sumer protection case, which concerned the question of choice of law and the applicability of Rome 
I and Rome II regulations in an e-commerce setting. As the case concerned the intra-EU choice of 
law between the data protection laws of different Member States and introduced no significant new 
findings regarding the extraterritoriality of the EU data protection regime, the findings of the Court 
concerning the Rome I and Rome II regulations will not be discussed here in further detail; for a 
detailed analysis of the case, see, e.g., Law 2017. 
203 C-210/16 – Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein. Wirtschaftsakademie was a significant case 
in determining the allocation of controllership in the context of Facebook fan pages and cleared the 
fog around the interpretation of the concept of joint controllership (see, e.g., para 44).  
204 C-191/15 – Verein für Konsumenteninformation, para 73. Advocate General Saugmandsgaard 
Øe noted, however, that the broad interpretation in Google Spain was motivated by the aim to prevent 
the circumvention of the requirements of the directive – in Verein für Konsumenteninformation, on 
the other hand, the question concerned the choice between different Member State laws, which have 
both been drafted in accordance with the requirements of the Directive (Opinion of Advocate General 
Saugmandsgaard Øe in C-191/15 – Verein für Konsumenteninformation, delivered on 2 June 2016, 
para. 124–125). See also C-210/16 – Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein, para 54. 
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within the EU, and that Member State law (or, depending on the context, EU law in 
general) applies when processing takes place in the context of the activities of said 
establishment, even though the establishment itself does not engage in the pro-
cessing.205  
The EU case law has helped clear some of the confusion surrounding the interpretation 
of the establishment criteria. The findings were also later adopted by the EDPB, which 
has summed them up in relation to the interpretation of Article 3(1) GDPR and further 
emphasised the fact that according to the provision, the Regulation applies if all condi-
tions of Article 3(1) are met “regardless of whether the processing takes place in the 
Union or not”.206 Considering the interpretations and the case law reviewed above, it is 
therefore evident that the territorial scope of Article 3(1) (and its counterpart in the Di-
rective) is much broader than it may seem at first: as it was famously demonstrated in 
Google Spain, the California-based Google Inc. was considered subject to the require-
ments of the Directive. Next, however, I will examine the Article’s next paragraph, the 
extraterritorial extent of which is somewhat more direct. 
3.1.2 Data subjects situated within the EU (Paragraph 2) 
Paragraph 2 concerns situations where the operator is situated abroad but processes 
the personal data of individuals within the EU. Paragraph 2 is, perhaps, the most explicit 
and clear manifestation of extraterritoriality in the EU data protection law – the provision 
attempts to directly regulate and have an impact on the conduct of operators outside 
the geographical borders of the EU with no establishment or any other kind of presence 
in the EU.207 Paragraph 2 reads as follows: 
“This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data 
subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not estab-
lished in the Union, where the processing activities are related to: 
 
205  C-191/15 – Verein für Konsumenteninformation, para 78, 80. In para 76, the Court did 
acknowledge, however, that there are limits to the broad interpretation of the concept of “establish-
ment”: the possibility to access an operator’s website from a certain Member State, for instance, 
does not constitute an establishment in said Member State. See also C-210/16 – Wirtschaftsakade-
mie Schleswig-Holstein, para 57, 60; de Lima Pinheiro 2018, p. 171.  
206 EDPB Guidelines 3/2018, p. 5–7. 
207 Azzi 2018, p. 127–128. 
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(a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment 
of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or 
(b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes 
place within the Union.” 
 Development of the provision 
Article 3(2) has no similarly formulated counterpart in the Directive, but it can be seen 
as a kind of a successor of the Directive’s Article 4(1)(c), under which Member State 
data protection law would be applicable to operators that process personal data making 
use of equipment situated within the Member State, regardless of the geographical lo-
cation of the operator itself.208 At the time of replacement, the provision was old and 
outdated, and there was a lack of clarity concerning its meaning.209 Additionally, the 
“use of equipment” criterion was never clarified in CJEU case law, with questions con-
cerning the interpretation of Article 4(1)(c) being dismissed in Google Spain210 and 
Rease and Wullems211 being withdrawn from the Court before a judgment could have 
been made.212 However, it was made clear that the notion of “equipment” was intended 
to be interpreted broadly213 and that the aim of the criterion was to further expand the 
territorial scope of the Directive to concern situations where an operator had no EU 
establishment and EU law could not be applied under Article 4(1)(a).214 For this reason, 
Article 3(2) of the Regulation can be considered as a spiritual successor of Article 
4(1)(c), since, as it will be discussed below, its aim is also to further extend the territorial 
scope beyond what has been established in relation to Article 3(1). 
 
208 According to the Article, Member State law was not applicable if the equipment in the EU was 
only used “for purposes of transit through the territory of the Community”. 
209 It has also been noted that the ambiguity of the provision resulted in rather substantial variation 
in the national implementation of the provision, and thus a failure in harmonisation, further empha-
sising the need for a revision (Moerel 2011a, p. 29). 
210 Questions 1(b) and 1(c) to the Court concerned the interpretation of the “use of equipment” crite-
rion under Article 4(1)(c). However, as the Court considered that EU law applied based on Article 
4(1)(a), the Court saw no need to further examine Article 4(1)(c) (C-131/12 – Google Spain and 
Google, para 20 and 61). 
211 C-192/15 – Rease and Wullems. 
212 OJ C 78, 29.2.2016, p. 11. 
213 At the time of drafting, the provision was probably intended to concern large mainframe computers 
and other tangible equipment, whereas later is was expanded to concern non-physical technologies 
used in web browsing (Azzi 2018, p. 128). It has been debated, for instance, whether the use of 
cookies, JavaScript, ad banners or spyware constitutes “use of equipment” within the meaning of 
Article 4(1)(c) (see, e.g., Moerel 2011a, p. 29, 39–43). 
214 See, e.g., WP 179, p. 20.  
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As already noted above, the territorial scope provided for by Article 3(2) is rather broad, 
considering it affects all overseas operators’ processing of personal data of EU data 
subjects that is related to the offering of goods and services to them or the monitoring 
of their behaviour in the EU. According to the original provision, along with recital 20, 
proposed in 2012, the regulation would have applied to all processing of personal data 
of data subjects residing in the EU, “where the processing activities are related to the 
offering of goods or services to such data subjects”, or when monitoring of the behaviour 
of such data subjects is concerned.215 The territorial scope of the original proposal was 
criticised for its vague nature and lack of further explanation of its meaning and the 
underlying principles,216 especially considering the significance of a clearly defined ter-
ritorial scope from the viewpoint non-European operators.217 
As noted in the previous section, after the release of the 2012 proposal, a novel target-
ing criterion had begun to appear in some of the CJEU case law concerning the inter-
pretation of Article 4(1)(a). 218  In 2014, in accordance with Advocate General Jä-
äskinen’s opinion, the Court found that the fact that a search engine “orientates” its 
activity towards the inhabitants of a Member State can be seen as a factor supporting 
the conclusion that the processing takes place “in the context of the activities of an 
establishment” of the operator within the EU.219 In Weltimmo, the fact that a website 
that was “directed” at a Member State was considered as one of the factors that were 
to be taken into account when deciding whether an operator has an establishment in 
the targeted Member State.220 The wider adaptation of targeting as a criterion for the 
applicability of EU data protection law without a proper provision allowing for it was 
 
215 COM(2012) 11 final, p. 20, 41. It should be emphasised at this point that the 2012 proposal did 
not include any limitations concerning whether an operator indeed intends to target the European 
market. 
216 See, e.g., Svantesson 2013b, p. 106, vividly describing the peculiar nature of the situation: “Any-
one attempting to get clarification of the exact meaning of [Article 3] and the underlying principles 
that has guided the drafters, will logically turn to the Explanatory Memorandum [COM(2012) 11 final]. 
Unfortunately, doing so is an utter waste of time. Depending on one’s personal disposition one will 
be either amused, dumbfounded or feel great despair in finding that under the heading ‘3.4 Detailed 
explanation of the proposal’, all the Explanatory Memorandum states about Article 3 is the following: 
‘Article 3 determines the territorial scope of the Regulation.’ If this is the ‘detailed explanation of the 
proposal’, we need the drafters to provide a ‘super-extended director’s cut’ version as well.” See also 
Tene & Wolf 2013, p. 6. 
217 Moerel 2011b, p. 92. 
218 The lack of a targeting criterion was one of the grounds for critique of the 2012 proposal, see 
Tene & Wolf 2013, p. 6–7. 
219 C-131/12 – Google Spain and Google, para 60; Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in C-
131/12 – Google Spain and Google, delivered on 25 June 2013, para 68. 
220 C-230/14 – Weltimmo, para 41. 
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considered problematic,221 but in the CJEU case law, targeting was always used as a 
mere auxiliary factor in order to confirm the applicability of the establishment criterion.222 
The final version of Article 3(2), along with Recital 23, provided some additional level of 
clarity by officially adopting the targeting criterion.223 Additional changes compared to 
the 2012 proposal are the narrowing of the scope to only concern people located in the 
EU instead of all EU residents worldwide,224 addition of the clarification concerning the 
fact that a payment for goods or services is not required in order for the application of 
the GDPR to be triggered, and addition of the clarification that behaviour monitoring is 
subject to the GDPR only when the behaviour takes place within the EU.  
 Evaluation of the targeting criterion and the relevant case law 
As with the establishment criterion, when assessing whether individuals in the EU are 
targeted under Article 3(2), the EDPB recommends a two-step approach: first, it should 
be assessed whether the processing concerns data subjects within the EU, and second, 
it should be determined whether it indeed relates to the offering of goods or services or 
 
221 Brkan 2016, p. 328; see, e.g., suggestions in Moerel 2011a, p. 44. 
222 In Weltimmo, Advocate General Villalón stated that “Other factors, such as (…) the fact that the 
service provided by that data controller is directed at the territory of another Member State lack direct 
and decisive relevance for the purpose of establishing the applicable law, although these factors may 
constitute evidence of the real and effective nature of the activity for the purpose of determining the 
place of establishment and, in particular, when it comes to determining whether the data processing 
was carried out in the context of the activities of that establishment.” Opinion of Advocate General 
Cruz Villalón in C-230/14 – Weltimmo, delivered on 25 June 2015, para 42. See also WP179, p. 31 
and C-191/15 – Verein für Konsumenteninformation, para 34 (4b) and 72–81, where, despite the 
formulation of the question 4b, the Court did not comment on the directing of activities as a factor in 
the determination of applicable law. 
223 In recital 23, it was clarified which matters and circumstances should be taken into account when 
assessing whether an operator intends to offer goods or services within the EU. It was also acknowl-
edged that “the mere accessibility of the controller's, processor's or an intermediary's website in the 
Union, of an email address or of other contact details, or the use of a language generally used in the 
third country where the controller is established, is insufficient to ascertain such intention [to offer 
goods or services within the EU]” – the circumstances surrounding the activity should be evaluated 
as whole in order to define whether an operator really intends or “envisages” to do business on the 
EU market; see P7_TA(2014)0212, p. 5.  
224 Under the original proposal, under Article 3(2), the GDPR would have applied to processing re-
lated to data subjects “residing in the Union”, which could have resulted in EU residents being entitled 
to rely on the protection granted by the GDPR even when travelling outside the EU. Under the current 
wording, the GDPR concerns the processing of personal data of all “data subjects who are in the 
Union”, ruling out the possibility of applying the regulation to EU residents temporarily outside the 
EU. See Svantesson 2015a, p. 230.  
Interestingly, the current Spanish and Portuguese wording of the paragraph still refers to individuals 
residing in the Union (“interesados que residan en la Unión” and “residentes no território da União”). 
Considering the explicit removal of the residence condition from the paragraph, in can be concluded 
that the GDPR indeed intents to refer to all individuals located in the Union, and not all individuals 
globally that have a place of residence in the Union (de Lima Pinheiro 2018, p. 2018). 
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to monitoring of their behaviour within the EU.225 The first condition is quite unambigu-
ous, despite the slight confusion concerning the fact whether one should reside in the 
EU for the GDPR to be applicable,226 or if just a mere temporary location within the EU 
is sufficient to trigger the application of the GDPR. However, the confusion has been 
cleared in the enacted version of the Regulation, where it is made clear that just a mere 
location within the EU is sufficient in order to trigger the application of the GDPR in case 
all other conditions are met.227 
The second condition is less clear: the operator providing the goods or services should 
be targeting individuals in the EU, or, as it is expressed in recital 23, it should be appar-
ent that the operator “envisages offering services to data subjects” within the EU, in 
order for the GDPR to be applicable.228 It is clear that the definition for “goods and ser-
vices” is rather broad as it is explicitly stated that no payment is required for the pro-
cessing to be subject to the GDPR.229 However, the conditions for the fulfilment of the 
targeting criterion are less clear – as it appears from the case law reviewed below, the 
fulfilment of the condition requires the subjective intent of the operator to be ob-
served.230 
The recital 23 provides examples of factors which, on one hand, do not constitute the 
targeting of a Member State and which, on the other hand, “may make it apparent” that 
data subjects in a Member State are targeted. While it is acknowledged that, e.g., the 
 
225 EDPB Guidelines 3/2018, p. 11. 
226 Confusion was caused by the presence of the residence requirement in the Paragraph 3(2), when 
compared to recitals 2 and 12 of the same proposal claiming that data protection requirements of the 
GDPR should apply regardless of nationality of residence of natural persons. See, e.g., Svantesson 
2013b, p. 107, basing his view on the Paragraph 3(2) 2012 proposal. Additionally, the targeting cri-
terion was already included in the Recital 15 of the 2011 draft version of the GDPR Proposal, adding 
to the confusion when the criterion was removed (See Draft GDPR proposal 2011 (Version 56), p. 
20; see also Kuner 2012, p. 6). 
227 See also EDPB Guidelines 3/2018, p. 13. 
228 This targeting test is familiar from the EU consumer protection law, see Svantesson 2015a, p. 
231. 
229 The specification that no payment is required is rather significant in the context of data protection. 
Considering that many online services get their revenue from advertising, the data subjects, who do 
not pay to use the online service – along with their data – become a product from a commercial point 
of view, and the advertisers become the actual clients of such online service providers. However, 
while this is the case, the GDPR still applies due to the lack of the payment requirement.  
230 Svantesson 2015a, p. 232. 
  43 
accessibility of the operator’s website231 or contact details or the use of a language gen-
erally used in the country where the operator is established does not ascertain the op-
erators intention to offer services to data subjects in the EU, the use of specific Member 
States’ languages or currencies or references to customers in the EU may mean that 
individuals in a Member State are targeted in accordance with Article 3(2). 
In addition to the recital 23, when discussing the targeting criterion, the EDPB refers to 
the CJEU case law in joined cases Pammer & Hotel Alpenhof,232 where the CJEU clar-
ified the conditions for “directing activity to [a] Member State” under Brussels I regula-
tion.233 In Pammer & Hotel Alpenhof, the Court took a stand on the interpretation of the 
concept of “directing activities” within the meaning of Article 15(1)(c) of Regulation 
44/2001, and, specifically, whether the accessibility of a website from a Member State 
justifies the conclusion that an activity is directed towards the said Member State.234 
The Court created an extensive but non-exhaustive list of matters that should be con-
sidered when ascertaining whether “it is apparent from [the trader’s] websites and the 
trader’s overall activity that the trader was envisaging doing business” with consumers 
in the EU, confirming that a mere accessibility of a website from a Member State does 
not constitute that activities are orientated to the said Member State.235 The matters 
constituting evidence for the conclusion that a Member State is targeted include, inter 
alia, the international nature of the activity, the use and the possibility of making a res-
ervation in the language of the targeted Member State, the use of international codes 
with telephone numbers and the use of a non-local top-level domain name.236 
 
231 Cf. C-191/15 – Verein für Konsumenteninformation, para 76, where the Court noted that the mere 
accessibility of an operator’s website in a Member State does not constitute an establishment within 
the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) DPD in this Member State.  
232 C-585/08 – Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof. 
233 EDPB Guidelines 3/2018, p. 15; the same case law was referred to in the context of targeting in 
EU data protection law even before the release of the EDPB Guidelines 3/2018, see, e.g., Tene & 
Wolf 2013, p. 7; Kuner 2012, p. 6–7. 
234 C-585/08 – Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof, para 24 and 31. 
235 C-585/08 – Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof, para 94, 95. From the perspective of international law, 
if mere accessibility of a website in the Union constituted targeting, the territorial scope of EU law 
would have expanded unreasonably as essentially anyone administering a website online would 
have to comply with the EU standards. 
236 C-585/08 – Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof, para 93. For some reason, the Court did not consider 
the use of geolocation technologies emerging at the time of the judgment, for which it has been 
criticised: the use of geo-location technologies can clearly signal an intent to target – or specifically 
to not target – a certain market (Svantesson 2015a, p. 232).  
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The list of considerations provided by the Court in Pammer & Hotel Alpenhof and later 
affirmed in Mühlleitner237 and Emrek238 is significantly more extensive than its counter-
part in recital 23 of the Regulation and provides a great deal of factors to be assessed 
when determining whether it is apparent that individuals in a Member State are targeted. 
The judgment in Pammer & Hotel Alpenhof also strongly highlighted the subjective na-
ture of “directing activities”,239 and the Advocate General Trstenjak stated that the ap-
plicability of the targeting criterion requires an undertaking to actively endeavour to con-
clude contracts with consumers in the EU, and that it is essential that there is active 
conduct on the part of the undertaking in order to gain customers within the EU.240  
The targeting criterion specified in recital 23 appears to only relates to Article 3(2)(a) 
concerning the offering of goods and services to data subjects in the EU, and no active 
targeting requirement is introduced in relation to the behaviour monitoring under Sub-
paragraph (b). Considering the rather broad definition of monitoring assumed in the 
GDPR,241 it would, however, be somewhat unreasonable to assume that every single 
type of monitoring action concerning data subjects located in a Member State would be 
subject to EU law, regardless of whether such action is intentional.242 Additionally, ac-
cording to the EDPB, the word “monitoring” used in the Regulation implies the purpose-
ful intention of the controller to process behavioural data concerning a data subject’s 
conduct in the EU.243 For this reason, and in accordance with the interpretation of the 
EDPB, it should be concluded that a variation of the targeting requirement also concerns 
Subparagraph (b), signifying that the operator should actively intend to monitor data 
subjects in the EU. For this reason, as an example, an operator of a Chinese social 
media would not be subject to the GDPR only based on the fact that it monitors the 
online behaviour of its Chinese users, some of which happen to be travelling in the EU, 
 
237 C-190/11 – Mühlleitner, para 44. 
238 C-218/12 – Emrek, para 27. 
239 C-585/08 – Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof, para 75–76. 
240 Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak in C-585/08 and C-144/09 – Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof, 
delivered on 18 May 2010, para 63. 
241 The broad definition of “monitoring” can be seen in Recital 24 of the GDPR, where it is seen to 
refer to all types of activity where “natural persons are tracked on the internet [and using other types 
of networks and technology]”, in particular in order to analyse or predict their behaviour or to make 
decisions concerning them (EDPB Guidelines 3/2018, p. 17–18); see also Article 4(4) concerning 
the definition of the term “profiling” and opinions expressed in WP 251 rev. 01, p. 6–8. 
242 From the perspective of international law, such an interpretation implying that even incidental 
monitoring of behaviour taking place within the EU could lead to overly broad territorial scope of the 
EU data protection law, causing the Regulation to apply to processing which the EU has no interest 
in regulating. 
243 EDPB Guidelines 3/2018, p. 18. 
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if, otherwise, the operator only aims its services at the Chinese market. Therefore, in 
order for the GDPR to be applicable to a certain processing activity based on Article 
3(2)(b), it should first be ascertained whether such processing is related to the monitor-
ing of behaviour of data subjects in the EU, and, secondly, whether the operator really 
intends to monitor the data subjects in the EU. 
The significance of the extraterritorial effect of both of the subparagraphs of Article 3(2) 
is further emphasised by the fact that under Article 27, all operators that are subject to 
the GDPR pursuant to Article 3(2) are obliged to designate a representative within the 
EU.244 The requirement is not absolute, however, as no representative needs to be ap-
pointed if processing is occasional or if it does not include processing of special cate-
gories of personal data on a large scale.245 Here, it is not sensible to further discuss the 
specific situations when a representative should be appointed;246 however, the exist-
ence of the requirement further goes on to prove the potential impact of the extraterri-
torial effects of the Regulation.247 The significance of the representative will be further 
highlighted below in section 4.3 when discussing the extraterritorial enforceability of the 
GDPR. 
3.1.3 GDPR applicable by virtue of public international law (Paragraph 3) 
The last paragraph of Article 3 reads as follows: 
“This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data by a con-
troller not established in the Union, but in a place where Member State 
law applies by virtue of public international law.” 
This provision is equivalent to the one contained in Article 4(1)(b) of the Directive. De-
spite the intriguing reference to public international law, the actual effect of the provision 
is not substantial – as an example, Recital 25 clarifies that the provision applies to pro-
cessing taking place in Member States’ diplomatic missions or consular posts on the 
 
244 Despite the Article 3(2) GDPR being completely new, a similar requirement concerning the ap-
pointment of a representative in the EU was expressed in Article 4(2) of the Directive. 
245 See also Recital 80. 
246 For further information about the requirement and the exceptions to it, see EDPB 3/2018, p. 19–
23. 
247 While the requirement under Article 27 does not have a separate effect on the territorial scope of 
the GDPR, it has significance when discussing the extraterritorial enforcement of the Regulation. In 
section 4.3, I will examine the impact of having a designated representative in the EU on the enforce-
ment of DPA decisions against non-European operators, and I will look into the question of whether 
a designated representative can be held liable for the non-compliance of the designating operator. 
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territory of non-EU states.248 As the allocation of jurisdiction in such cases is laid down 
in multinational conventions, and, due to its well-established nature, such exercise of 
jurisdiction is therefore rarely disputed, there is no practical need to further examine the 
extent and the effect of Article 3(3). 
3.2 Regulation of international data transfers (Articles 44–50) 
Chapter V (Articles 44–50) GDPR regulates the situations where personal data can be 
transferred outside the geographical borders of the EU. Serving as an additional safe-
guard to the territorial scope discussed above, the aim of the Chapter is to ensure that 
no personal data leaves the EU without proper protective measures in place. The chap-
ter is opened by Article 44, which reads as follows: 
“Any transfer of personal data which are undergoing processing or are 
intended for processing after transfer to a third country or to an inter-
national organisation shall take place only if, subject to the other pro-
visions of this Regulation, the conditions laid down in this Chapter are 
complied with by the controller and processor, including for onward 
transfers of personal data from the third country or an international or-
ganisation to another third country or to another international organi-
sation. All provisions in this Chapter shall be applied in order to ensure 
that the level of protection of natural persons guaranteed by this Reg-
ulation is not undermined.” 
Articles 45–47 describe all of the possible means of basing a transfer of personal data 
outside the EU – these are the reliance on adequacy decisions and the use of appro-
priate safeguards, such as Binding Corporate Rules or Standard Contractual 
Clauses.249 All of these means for transfer will not be discussed in detail here, as it is 
not relevant for the purposes of this work250 – instead, I will focus on examining the 
 
248 The EDPB reminds that not all processing by such operators will be subject to the GDPR, as not 
all of it falls within the material scope of the GDPR contained in Article 2. Another example of when 
the GDPR can be applicable pursuant to Article 3(3) is the processing of personal data that takes 
place on vessels with flag state in the EU, which are, therefore, under the jurisdiction of the said 
Member State (EDPB Guidelines 3/2018, p. 19; see also WP 179, p. 17–18 and Svantesson 2014, 
p. 66). 
249 Additionally, Article 49 contains a list of exceptions to the main rule permitting data transfers in 
certain specific situations. 
250 For an extensive review of the adequacy decisions, as well as the appropriate safeguards that 
should be in place in the absence of an adequacy decision, see ICO Guide to the GDPR, p. 261–
274. 
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impact of the data transfer regulation in general. As a similar regulatory mechanism was 
in use in the Directive, where Articles 25 and 26 concerned the international data trans-
fers, interpretations and opinions concerning the Directive remain relevant when dis-
cussing the data transfer provisions of the Regulation.  
As opposed to the territorial scope under Article 3 of the regulation, there is much less 
ambiguity as to what kind of transfers of personal data fall within the scope of the pro-
visions in Chapter V, even though the international data transfers are not defined as 
such in Article 4 of the Regulation.251 The requirements in Chapter V apply to all trans-
fers, regardless of the roles of the operators taking part in the process as the data im-
porter and the data exporter,252 except for transfers where personal data only transits 
through a non-EU country and where no processing activities take place in said coun-
try.253 On the other hand, there has been some notable unclarity concerning the relation 
of the data transfer regulation to the general territorial scope of the Regulation – in some 
respects, they overlap, and a non-EU operator could be subject to the requirements of 
the EU data protection law both pursuant to the GDPR’s territorial scope, and due to 
additional safeguards used when exporting the personal data outside the EU.254  
The ways, in which the regulation of international data transfers has an effect outside 
the EU, are somewhat more specific and flexible when compared to those of Article 3, 
which, essentially, just provides that all of the GDPR should be applied to a non-EU 
operator if all relevant criteria are met. On the contrary, when personal data is initially 
collected by an EU operator and subsequently transferred outside the Union by the said 
operator, the parties of the transfer should decide which safeguards will be used to 
ensure the compliance with the GDPR.255 Each of the safeguards have a somewhat 
 
251 This issue (in the context of the Directive) has been acknowledged in C-101/01 – Lindqvist, para 
56. 
252 It should be noted, however, that currently, if a data transfer is based on the Standard Contractual 
Clauses, a transfer between two processors is not possible as no Standard Contractual Clauses 
have been approved by the European Commission for such cases; see European Commission – 
Standard Contractual Clauses. 
253 Korpisaari et al. 2018, p. 393–394. The Court has looked into the definition of a transfer in its 
judgment in C-101/01 – Lindqvist, para 56–71, were the Court found that upload of personal data to 
a website that can potentially be accessed from outside the EU does not as such constitute a transfer 
of personal data. 
254 Kuner 2015a, p. 244. The implications of this overlap, dubbed by Kuner as a “belt and suspenders” 
approach, will be discussed in further detail below in section 4.3.2. 
255 Here, it is assumed that the transfer is made to a country, concerning which the European Com-
mission has not given an adequacy decision. The function and effect of the European Commission’s 
adequacy decisions in the international community will be discussed in the next section. 
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different effect on the data importer located outside the EU: when using Standard Con-
tractual Clauses, for instance, the importer binds itself to the enforceable data transfer 
agreement, the requirements of which are similar to those of the GDPR.256 Or, when 
making an intra-group transfer of personal data, the data importer can undertake to 
comply with the Binding Corporate Rules approved by a national supervisory author-
ity.257 Other appropriate safeguards that can be used are, e.g., the use of approved 
codes of conduct or certification mechanisms together with enforceable commitments 
of the data importer.258 
As described above, it is evident that when regulating international data transfers, the 
wording of the GDPR goes further than just to make an assertion of jurisdiction over the 
data importers – at the core of the permitted safeguards is their enforceability. Along 
with the requirement to use a data processing agreement when a transfer between a 
controller and a processor takes place,259 these safeguards guarantee the EU a better 
control over the personal data leaving its territory. EU’s control is, however, hindered 
by the fact that these safeguards rarely provide a level of protection identical to that of 
the GDPR260 – in the light of the Snowden revelations, it has been challenged whether 
the Standard Contractual Clauses adopted by the European Commission years prior to 
the revelations are still able to provide an adequate level of protection to personal data 
exported from the EU to the US.261 It is therefore evident that when regulating interna-
tional data transfers, the EU is balancing between guaranteeing the adequate level of 
standards on one hand, and making them acceptable, enforceable and easy to comply 
with on the other. Such balancing is especially visible in the context of multilateral ne-
gotiations concerning level of data protection, which will be examined next. 
 
256 All current Standard Contractual Clauses are based on the Directive, as they have not been up-
dated for the GDPR (ICO Guide to the GDPR, p. 266–267). 
257 ICO Guide to the GDPR, p. 265–266. The enforceability of the Binding Corporate Rules is high-
lighted in the Article 47(1) GDPR. 
258 ICO Guide to the GDPR, p. 268–269. There are, additionally, certain exceptional situations where 
additional safeguards need not be used. Conditions for such situations are listed in Article 49, and 
the EDPB has confirmed that they are to be interpreted restrictively (see EDPB-EDPS 2019, p. 1). 
259 For the requirements concerning the content of the data processing agreement, see, e.g., Article 
28 GDPR. 
260 See, e.g., C-362/14 – Schrems, para 73 
261 The validity of, and the adequacy of the protection provided by the Standard Contractual Clauses, 
along with the Privacy Shield framework, have been questioned in CJEU Case C-311/18 – Facebook 
Ireland and Schrems, which will be discussed in further detail below. 
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3.3 Effects caused by regulatory globalisation 
3.3.1 Regulatory globalisation through multilateral treaties and adequacy decisions 
In addition to the direct cross-border effects of the GDPR provisions discussed above, 
there are certain more discreet ways in which the European data protection law affects 
the data processing activities outside the EU. First of all, when discussing the influence 
of the European data protection law, one cannot disregard the effect of the Convention 
108. Although Convention 108 is a multilateral treaty of the Council of Europe, and not 
an EU legislative instrument per se, it has served as a basis for the development of the 
European data protection law.262 Subsequently, certain non-EU countries have also 
joined and ratified the Convention 108 leading to the spread of data protection stand-
ards based on Convention 108 outside the European borders.263 
Nowadays, it is argued that the EU has taken over the role initially assumed by the 
Council of Europe as the forerunner in the field of data protection.264 With the Conven-
tion 108 undergoing modernisation, the Council of the European Union has found in its 
decision concerning the authorisation to ratify the updated Convention that due to the 
fact that the safeguards contained in both updated Convention 108 and GDPR are 
based on the same principles, the entry into force of the modernised Convention would 
result in, among other things, the further promotion and the raised awareness of the EU 
data protection standards at a global level.265 Therefore, from serving as a basis for the 
EU data protection law, the EU now views Convention 108 as an instrument that can 
be used to export its data protection standards to an even broader range of non-EU 
countries.266  
 
262 Hustinx 2013, p. 9. Additionally, the influence of the OECD Privacy Guidelines (1980) cannot be 
denied, as the principles formed initially therein bear a similarity with the ones in the Convention 108. 
The influence of the Guidelines has been noticeable especially outside Europe until 1995, when the 
DPD providing for a higher level of data protection standards was adopted (Greenleaf 2019, p. 3–5). 
It should also be noted that while both the EU and the US are members of the OECD and subscribe 
to the Guidelines, the differences in the level of data protection between the two is substantial 
(Hijmans 2016, p. 456). It should also be noted that the Guidelines are not binding, as opposed to 
the Convention 108 (Bu-Pasha 2017, p. 1–2). 
263 Currently, Convention 108 has been signed and ratified by 8 Non-Members of the Council of 
Europe, including Argentina, Mexico, Uruguay and Senegal (see Council of Europe 2019). 
264 Hustinx 2013, p. 50. 
265 Council Decision 2019/682. 
266 However, the EU also allows for derogations based on international agreements: under Article 48, 
third country judgments or decisions requiring the disclosure of personal information may be recog-
nised or enforceable only if there is an international agreement, such as a mutual legal assistance 
treaty, in force between the Member State and the third country requesting disclosure. 
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Another matter that the Council of the European Union found in the same decision was 
that the ratification of the updated convention would “facilitate data flows between the 
Union and the non-Union Parties to Convention 108”, i.e., the ratification could stream-
line the process of international data transfers described in previous section. Such fa-
cilitation would be achieved, most likely, by the means of an increased amount ade-
quacy decisions concerning those countries that have adopted the data protection 
standards of Convention 108 and implemented them in their national legislation.267 
Adequacy decisions, as a starting point, permit data transfers from the EU to certain 
approved non-EU countries without any of the additional safeguards listed in Article 46 
in place.268 The decisions are made by the European Commission, and, therefore, are 
not bilateral treaties between the EU and the target state – however, the negotiation 
and preparation work in order for a state to achieve an adequate level of data protection 
involves cooperation between the target state and the EU.269 Adequacy decisions are 
granted somewhat rarely: as of September 2019, only 9 countries and territories were 
given a full finding of adequacy.270 From the perspective of the EU, the intent of which 
is to regulate all global processing of personal data relating to persons located within 
the EU, there is a notable drawback of the adequacy decisions and multilateral agree-
ments concerning the level of data protection. As adequacy decisions, and especially 
the multilateral agreements, are prepared in cooperation between the parties,271 the 
 
267 An example of this trend is the adequacy decision concerning Uruguay: at the 1118th meeting of 
the Ministers’ Deputies of the Council of Europe in July 2011, Uruguay was invited to accede the 
Convention 108 (Dec(2011)1118/10.3). In August 2012, the European Commission gave a decision 
concerning the adequate level of data protection in Uruguay, in the reasoning of which it referred to, 
among other things, Uruguay joining the Convention 108 (Commission Implementing Decision 
2012/484/EU, Recital 13). Accession to Convention 108 was also viewed as a favourable factor in 
the negotiations concerning EU-US Safe Harbour revision following the Snowden revelations in 2013, 
see COM(2013) 846 final, p. 9. 
268 ICO Guide to the GDPR, p. 263–264. 
269 For a glimpse of the process surrounding the adequacy negotiations concerning Japan and South 
Korea, see, e.g., Greenleaf 2018. 
270 Full findings concern Andorra, Argentina, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Israel, Jersey, New Zealand, 
Switzerland and Uruguay, with only certain types of processing being covered by the adequacy find-
ings of Japan and Canada, and with the US being considered adequate only under the EU-US Pri-
vacy Shield framework (European Commission – Adequacy decisions, see also ICO Guide to the 
GDPR, p. 264).  
271 It should be noted, however, that the internal guidelines used by the European Commission when 
carrying out an adequacy assessment have never been made public (Kuner 2017, p. 900–901). 
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achieved end result may not always be ideal from the EU’s point of view, as some trade-
offs may need to be made in terms of detailed requirements.272 
3.3.2 Specific considerations concerning the EU–US relationship 
A notable example of the compromises involved in bilateral cooperation were the nego-
tiations between the EU and the US that eventually led to the adoption of the Safe 
Harbour Privacy Principles. While the US was reluctant to incorporate the EU privacy 
standards in its own legislation,273 the Safe Harbour framework was negotiated between 
the EU and the US to facilitate the transatlantic flows of personal data. The EU man-
dated that the framework be put in place as the general level of data protection in the 
US did not meet the EU’s requirements.274 In accordance with the Commission Decision 
of 26 July 2000, operators certified under the US-EU Safe Harbour framework and com-
plying with all secondary requirements set out in the decision were considered to pro-
vide an adequate level of data protection under Article 25 of the Directive.275  
However, as the framework was a result of negotiations between the EU and the US, it 
did not perfectly reflect all of the EU’s data protection standards. For instance, in the 
principles themselves it was stated that “Adherence to these Principles may be limited 
(…) by statute, government regulation, or case law that create conflicting obligations or 
explicit authorizations, provided that, in exercising any such authorization, an organiza-
tion can demonstrate that its non-compliance with the Principles is limited to the extent 
necessary to meet the overriding legitimate interests furthered by such authorization”.276  
As expected, the Safe Harbour arrangement was vehemently criticised from the mo-
ment it was passed, as the framework did not meet the EU data protection requirements 
nor, e.g., the OECD Privacy Guidelines.277 The wording of the principles was very vague, 
 
272 Gady 2014, p. 17. Interestingly, the possibility of compromise was initially denied be the advisor 
of the European Commission, Spiros Simitis, who argued that data protection “is not a subject you 
can bargain about”, see Cate 1995, p. 439.  
273 Petkova 2018, p. 1141, 1143 
274 Weber 2013, p. 125. 
275 Commission Decision 2000/520/EC. 
276 Additionally, in Annex II, FAQ 2, it was clarified that where “the rights of a free press embodied in 
the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution intersect with privacy protection interests, the First 
Amendment must govern the balancing of these interests with regard to the activities of U.S. persons 
or organizations.” Furthermore, in Annex IV, Section B, it was acknowledged that the US organisa-
tions must prioritise the compliance with US law above the compliance with the Safe Harbour princi-
ples, and, in the case of a conflicting authorisation, respect must be paid to the “legislative preroga-
tives” of the elected lawmakers of the US. See also Petkova 2018, p. 1141–1142. 
277 See, e.g., WP32, p. 4–6. 
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leaving lots of room for interpretation and even “light” compliance being considered suf-
ficient. The exceptions from the principles were rather broad, the efficiency of the self-
certification mechanism at the core of the framework was questionable, and the com-
pliance with the principles turned out to be inadequate.278 These concerns were further 
amplified at the time of the Snowden revelations when the general public became aware 
of the US’ large-scale data collection programs. Essentially, it was understood that the 
personal data transferred from the EU to the US under the Safe Harbour framework 
was not safe from US intelligence agencies, prompting the European Commission to 
commence work on the revision of the framework.279  
Before anything was done, however, the whole Safe Harbour agreement was invali-
dated by the CJEU in Schrems.280 The case before the CJEU originated from a com-
plaint lodged in June 2013 in the wake of the Snowden revelations by Maximillian 
Schrems to the Data Protection Commissioner, the Irish DPA. The complaint concerned 
the EU–US data transfer practices of Facebook, and, in particular, the fact that US Na-
tional Security Agency was intercepting Facebook’s transfers of personal data from the 
EU to the US.281 In his complaint, Schrems claimed that “the law and practice in force 
in [the US] did not ensure adequate protection of the personal data held in its territory 
against the surveillance activities that were engaged in there by the public authori-
ties”.282 The case was first rejected by the Commissioner as unfounded, but the Irish 
High Court found that the mass surveillance carried out in the US undermined the se-
curity of personal data transferred to the US and that the Safe Harbour decision is not 
compliant with the requirements of Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.283  
The CJEU found that the level of protection provided by the Safe Harbour framework 
was insufficient: while, according to the Court, the notion of “adequacy” did not require 
the level of protection to be identical to that in the EU, it should be “essentially equivalent 
 
278 Weber 2013, p. 126–127, Petkova 2018, p. 1142. 
279 COM(2013) 847 final, see, in particular, p. 16–18. 
280 C-362/14 – Schrems, para 107. Another of the Court’s findings affirmed the national Data Protec-
tion Authorities’ right and ability to question the adequacy decisions of the European Commission 
(para 66). Kuner argues that such one-sided examination of foreign law carried out by the Data 
Protection Authorities, and, ultimately, the CJEU, can, at worst, lead to “false application of foreign 
law” leading to conclusions far from the objective truth (Kuner 2017, p. 901). 
281 Lam 2017, p. 4. 
282 C-362/14 – Schrems, para 28. 
283 C-362/14 – Schrems, para 29–34. 
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to that guaranteed within the European Union by virtue of Directive 95/46 read in the 
light of the Charter”284 – the Safe Harbour framework, however, failed to guarantee such 
protection.285 Additionally, the CJEU found that while the self-certification system as 
such was not flawed, the credibility of the whole framework was weakened considering 
the broad derogations in place, and due to the fact that the framework was only limited 
to commercial organisations receiving the personal data and that their compliance was 
in no way monitored.286 The Court therefore acknowledged that while certain less sig-
nificant trade-offs may be accepted when assessing the adequacy of data protection 
abroad, these trade-offs may not concern the core data protection requirements. This 
approach further demonstrated the EU’s ambition and the main target of the EU data 
protection regime to provide protection for the personal data of data subjects in the EU 
transcending the borders of the Union, as, understandably, lax requirements outside 
the EU could undermine the whole purpose of the regime.287 
The abrupt annulment of the Safe Harbour framework resulted in a great stir in different 
stakeholders ranging from EU and US government officials and academics to operators 
relying on the framework in EU–US data transfers.288 The invalidation decision came 
into force with no transition period and the operators relying on Safe Harbour had to 
adjust their business practices quickly. Only a year later, in July 2016, the European 
Commission issued an implementing decision establishing and confirming the adequate 
level of data protection provided by the Safe Harbour’s replacement, the EU–US Privacy 
Shield framework.289 Structurally, the Privacy Shield framework is similar to the Safe 
Harbour,290 as both are based on self-certification and adherence to a set of basic prin-
ciples based on the EU data protection law, albeit more detailed than the ones in Safe 
Harbour. As opposed to the Safe Harbour, the Privacy Shield also includes obligations 
 
284 C-362/14 – Schrems, para 73; for further analysis of the meaning of term “adequate” in this con-
text, see Opinion of Advocate General Bot in C-362/14 – Schrems, delivered on 23 September 2015, 
para 142. 
285 This restrictive interpretation of “adequacy” has been criticised, as it does not consider different 
cultural values affecting the level of data protection in different countries and as it places an increased 
burden on these countries if they wish to have a level of data protection that is considered “adequate”, 
see Kuner 2017, p. 900–901.  
286 C-362/14 – Schrems, para 81–87. 
287 See, e.g., Poullet 2007, p. 144. 
288 Kuner 2017, p. 882–883. 
289 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250. 
290 Petkova 2018, p. 1153–1154. 
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for the US national security and intelligence agencies concerning the protection of per-
sonal data transferred to the US under the framework.291  
However, despite the seeming improvements, the future of the Privacy Shield has also 
been questioned even before it came into force. For instance, the EDPS stated that 
“robust improvements are needed” for the framework to be solid and stable in the long 
term,292 and the WP29 has expressed its concern in relation to, inter alia, the frame-
work’s lack of rules concerning data retention limitation, the continuously vague exemp-
tions from the principles under Annex II, Section I.5. of the Decision 2016/1250, and the 
possibility of the collection of massive and indiscriminate data.293 Certain reasons for 
insecurity originate from the US, as well: certain US legislative instruments are crucial 
for the Privacy Shield to function as intended294 – however, these orders, issued before 
the Trump administration, form derogations from the US Constitution, and President 
Trump has threatened to repeal them.295 
Despite the built-in annual re-evaluation mechanism, the future of the Privacy Shield is 
by no means certain.296 As the framework was drafted under the Directive, it is unclear 
whether it truly offers an “adequate” and “essentially equivalent” level of protection un-
der the much more complex requirements of the GDPR.297 Some conclusion to this de-
bate will arrive, however, once the CJEU gives its judgment in Facebook Ireland and 
Schrems,298 which was heard before the Court in July 2019. Although the subject matter 
of the case is not primarily related to the Privacy Shield framework, its status has also 
 
291 See, e.g., Annex VI to the Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250; WP 238, p. 4; 
Kuner 2017, p. 902–903. 
292 EDPS Opinion 4/2016, p. 12. It is clear from the comment of the EDPS that while future improve-
ments are essential for the framework to be viable in the long run, the introduction of a framework as 
quickly as possible regardless of its possible shortcomings was important in order to greatly facilitate 
the EU-US data flows. 
293 WP 238, p. 17, 40. 
294 These instruments are the EO 12333 and PPD-28, see recitals 68–69 of the Decision 2016/1250. 
295 At his campaign rally in Greenville, NC, Trump proclaimed that “The change will begin my first 
day in office – number one, we're going to eliminate every unconstitutional executive order and re-
store the rule of law to our land”, after which the discussion took a quick turn towards the construction 
of the US–Mexico border wall (C-Span 2016, at 6 minutes and 48 seconds). Both of these promises, 
however, are yet to materialise.  
296 For example, see the report on the second annual review that took place in late 2018, where the 
European Commission concluded that the US continues to ensure an adequate level of protection 
as regards personal data transferred to the US under the Privacy Shield framework but reminded the 
US to appoint the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson by 28 February 2019 (COM(2018) 860 final, p. 5–
6). The US Senate appointed Keith Krach as the Ombudsman on 20 June 2019 (US Congress 2019). 
297 Kuner 2017, p. 903–904; Bu-Pasha 2017, p. 13–14. 
298 C-311/18 – Facebook Ireland and Schrems. 
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been contested in the reference for a preliminary ruling.299 According to the Irish High 
Court, referring the matter to the CJEU, “Neither the introduction of the Privacy Shield 
Ombudsperson mechanism nor the provisions of Article 4 of the [decisions concerning 
the Standard Contractual Clauses]300 eliminate the well-founded concerns raised by the 
[Irish Data Protection Commissioner] in relation to the adequacy of the protection af-
forded to EU data subjects whose personal data are wrongfully interfered with by the 
intelligence services of the United States once their personal data have been trans-
ferred for processing to the United States.”301 
It is clear that uninterrupted data flow between the EU and the US are of utmost im-
portance for the functioning of global economy. The balancing between ensuring the 
data flows and guaranteeing an adequate level of protection is not an easy task, espe-
cially now that the future of the Standard Contractual Clauses is also at stake – their 
annulment would affect all data transfers from the EU based on them, regardless of the 
destination country. It has been suggested that due to the nature of governmental data 
collection in the US, the CJEU could introduce new limitations to the Privacy Shield and 
Standard Contractual Clauses based data transfers to the US. On the other hand, the 
US is not the only non-EU country practicing indiscriminate data collection: for instance, 
Russian and Chinese data collection practices are neither compatible with the GDPR, 
but there are no additional limitations or safeguards to the Standard Contractual 
Clauses put in place for these states.302 Therefore, it remains to be seen which interests 
will be prioritised by the CJEU. 
3.3.3 Unilateral regulatory globalisation (the Brussels Effect) 
Another means of affecting foreign operators’ activities taking place outside the EU, and, 
in some cases, even the decisions of non-EU legislators, is by the means of unilateral 
 
299 The status of the Privacy Shield framework was directly challenged in T-738/16 – La Quadrature 
du Net and Others v Commission due to, inter alia, the collection of personal data by US authorities 
and the Privacy Shield framework not providing sufficient safeguards against such data collection, 
thus not ensuring an adequate level of protection. For these reasons, the applicants directly claimed 
that the Court should declare Commission Implementing Decision concerning the adequacy of the 
Privacy Shield Framework be contrary to Articles 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter and to annul the decision, 
which would exactly follow the CJEU’s findings in Schrems. The hearings in the case were sus-
pended until a judgment is issued in Facebook Ireland and Schrems (See Baker 2019a). 
300 In particular, this referred to the Commission Decision 2010/87/EU, as amended by Commission 
Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/2297. 
301 The Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Limited & Maximillian Schrems, para 339. 
The US legislation serving as a basis for the data collection was examined in, e.g., para 164–183 of 
the judgment. 
302 Swire 2019, Baker 2019b. 
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regulatory globalisation, also dubbed as the “Brussels effect”, which has already been 
discussed on a general level in section 2.3. As noted above, the Brussels effect occurs 
when, due to the substantial market power of the European Union, an activity outside 
the EU is influenced by EU law despite no direct attempt to achieve such an effect being 
made in the law – instead, such situations revolve around non-EU states and, more 
importantly, operators within these states voluntarily accepting and adopting the EU 
requirements and applying them to their own activity.303 Brussels effect is, therefore, a 
type of regulatory globalisation where no coercion is exercised by the EU in order to 
make its standards adopted abroad.304 
It is said that the Brussels effect caused by the GDPR is tightly linked to the data transfer 
regulation and the “adequacy-based framework” under Chapter V.305 However, that is 
not necessarily always the case – Bradford argues that the Brussels effect should be 
separated from the politically negotiated globalisation of regulatory standards.306 De-
spite the European Commission’s adequacy decisions being made unilaterally by the 
European Commission alone, they are prepared in cooperation with the target states 
and therefore do not satisfy the criteria for Brussels effect. As argued by Bradford, one 
of the key factors for the Brussels effect to occur is the activity of the operators: the 
effect is visible when a company operating in the European market implements a single 
set of standards based on EU law requirements to concern all of its global activity.307 
For this reason, the Brussels effect is related to both the data transfer regulation and 
the general territorial scope of the GDPR: once the European data protection standards 
apply to a part of the operator’s data processing activities, regardless of whether com-
pliance is based on, e.g., Article 3, Standard Contractual Clauses, Binding Corporate 
Rules or the Privacy Shield framework, it can be easier for a foreign operator to adjust 
all of its processing activities to comply with the same set of requirements.308 
 
303 Bradford 2012, p. 11–12. 
304 Bradford 2012, p. 4. 
305 Lynskey 2015, p. 42–43. 
306 Bradford 2012, p. 4. 
307 Bradford 2012, p. 18 and 25. 
308 For actual examples of companies implementing certain EU data protection requirements globally, 
see the Facebook 2018 and Microsoft 2018. 
Certain commentators have, however, doubted whether the Brussels effect does actually take place 
in the context of data protection. Lam interprets Bradford’s understanding of the Brussels effect as 
the CJEU “dictating” the content of the data protection legislation of the rest of the world (Lam 2017, 
p. 10). Furthermore, Schwartz goes on to claim that there is no unilateral regulatory globalisation EU 
data protection standards as the EU has always been open to negotiations concerning international 
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The next step for the Brussels effect is to not only affect the operators engaging in the 
processing activities on the European market, but to also affect the foreign legislators 
themselves to adopt data protection requirements similar to those of the GDPR, turning 
a de facto Brussels effect into a de jure Brussels effect.309 For instance, such an effect 
was directly acknowledged when the Australian Privacy Act was amended in 2000. In 
the explanatory memorandum, it was noted that “There are serious questions surround-
ing the ability of Australia to meet the requirements for continued trade with EU Mem-
bers under the [Data Protection Directive]”.310 
The obvious benefit of the Brussels effect is the fact that no coercion is involved in the 
globalisation of regulatory standards. On one hand, as the globalisation under the Brus-
sels effect involves no coercion whatsoever and the foreign parties assume the EU rules 
voluntarily, no “forceful” assertion of jurisdiction is made, and therefore the effect cannot 
be contested as insufficiently justified. When a de facto Brussels effect occurs, the only 
sensible options for the states where such behaviour is observed are to either remain 
completely passive or to revise their own legislation to match the standards assumed 
by the operators311 – as no forceful assertion of legislative jurisdiction is made, blocking 
action would seem overly defensive.  
On the other hand, the list of prerequisites for the Brussels effect is long, and the effect 
cannot occur in any field of law.312 Additionally, the lack of coercion involved in the Brus-
sels effect can, at the same time, be considered as its disadvantage: as the main active 
role in the fulfilment of the Brussels effect is on the companies subject to regulation, the 
EU has no way of making sure that the Brussels effect does take place and result in 
 
data transfers, failing to notice, however, that the negotiated solutions can also have a Brussels effect 
of their own (Schwartz 2013, p. 1987, 1990). Both of these commentators appear to disregard the 
wider perspective of the EU affecting the behaviour and legislation abroad, including the de facto 
Brussels effect, and fail to examine the relevance of the effect outside of the EU–US perspective. 
309 If the standards assumed by the foreign legislator are sufficiently close to the ones of the GDPR, 
adequacy talks can potentially be begun following a de jure Brussels effect. As noted above, an 
adequacy decision can greatly facilitate the data flows between the EU and the third state. 
310 C2004B00628, p. 13. 
311 Perhaps, due to the lobbying of the companies themselves aspiring to achieve a level playing field 
with their competitors not engaging in business activities on the European market (Bradford 2012, p. 
6). 
312 See Bradford 2012, p. 10–11. 
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non-EU states adopting similar standards.313 Despite these possible issues, the global-
isation of EU data protection standards can be considered successful from the point of 
view of the EU: the Brussels effect, along with the abovementioned effect of bilateral 
negotiations and multilateral agreements have resulted in seeing the influence of Euro-
pean data protection regime in over 30314 different national non-EU data protection 
laws.315  
3.4 Other effects 
Lastly, the EU data protection regime can cause even more subtle effects by influencing 
consumer behaviour, attitudes and awareness by the means of available information. 
As a result of the Snowden revelations, the Facebook–Cambridge Analytica data scan-
dal, and the numerous news concerning large companies being involved in massive 
data breaches, more and more people are beginning to pay more attention to privacy 
matters.316 These events, along with the additional privacy awareness caused by the 
enactment of the GDPR and the implementation of its requirements by the operators, 
are bound to “nudge” consumers towards “better” decisions, at least from a privacy 
standpoint: such nudging may result in, e.g., consumers becoming aware of and tinker-
ing with their social media privacy settings or preferring more privacy-oriented online 
service providers. Such influence on the expectations and the behaviour of at least 
some consumers may, in the end, result in market pressure and a growing number of 
operators adopting better privacy standards,317 paving the way for the growing, albeit 
less direct effect of the GDPR. 
 
313 It should also be noted that, as demonstrated by Petkova, globalisation of norms often goes both 
ways, with EU accepting certain US approaches relating to data breach notifications and data pro-
tection officers (Petkova 2018, p. 1150–1152, 1156). 
314 As of 2012. 
315 Greenleaf 2012, p. 74–75. 
316 According to certain surveys, majority of US consumers would like to have similar data protection 
safeguards as the one provided by the GDPR to consumers in the EU (SAS 2018, p. 4, see also 
nCipher 2019). It has been argued, additionally, that the plethora of information concerning data 
protection also affects the business practices of operators and is linked with the potential reputational 
damage of non-compliance (for further reasoning, see Greze 21019, p. 112). 
317 Referred to as “double nudging”. When a growing amount of companies adopt such standards, 
even the most passive consumers can be forced to adopt these standards – such a situation is 
referred to as “triple nudging” (see Halpern 2015, Chapter 7. Data and transparency – Nudging me, 
nudging you and Obesity). 
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It is clear that transparency and the dissemination of information can have a drastic 
effect on the behaviour and the decisions of data subjects318 – hence “[processing] in a 
transparent manner” and “accountability” being some of the key principles in Article 5 
GDPR. However, while it is important to acknowledge the existence of such an effect, 
it is less legislative and more sociological, as it is caused by the influence on human 
behaviour through information. Falling outside of the scope of this work, it will not be 
discussed here in further detail.  
4 Assessment of the extraterritoriality of the GDPR 
4.1 Is the EU data protection regime extraterritorial? 
As discussed above, there are numerous different definitions to the concept of “extra-
territoriality”. Assuming different understandings of extraterritoriality, one could come to 
varying conclusions regarding the question in the heading of this section. For instance, 
when analysing the CJEU decision in Google Spain, some might claim that when an 
operator is found to have an “establishment” within the EU, there is nothing “extraterri-
torial” about applying EU law to the activity of such an operator.319 However, it cannot 
be overlooked that while Google did have an establishment in the EU, what the Google 
Spain judgment also concerned was the CJEU ruling in favour of applying EU law to 
Google Inc. located in Mountain View, California.320 Therefore, stating that the judgment 
was purely territorial would be misleading – after all, the processing activity subject to 
regulation took place on non-European soil and was carried out by a non-European 
entity.321 
Regardless of the notable cross-border effects of the EU data protection law, the term 
“extraterritorial” is rarely used by the EU officials and courts to describe its territorial 
scope.322  CJEU has, however, acknowledged that due to the nature of protection 
 
318 Halpern 2015, Chapter 7. Data and transparency – Conclusion: data transparency plus behav-
ioural science can reshape markets, and often do a better job of it than conventional regulation. 
319 Gidari 2014. 
320 While Google does have a substantial establishment in the EU, the broad interpretation of the 
“establishment” criterion implies that a much weaker connection between the operator and the Union 
could constitute an establishment, and, therefore, subject the non-European operator to the GDPR. 
321 Van Alsenoy & Koekkoek 2015, p. 110–111. According to de Hert & Czerniawski 2016, p. 234, 
the judgment in Google Spain in any event ascertained that the scope of the “establishment” criterion 
is not purely territorial. 
322 For instance, “extraterritoriality” is not mentioned in the recent EDPB Guidelines 3/2018 discuss-
ing specifically the territorial scope of the GDPR.  
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granted by the EU data protection law and the risks associated with its circumvention, 
its territorial scope is rather broad.323 While “extraterritoriality” of the EU data protection 
law as such is rarely officially acknowledged, the problems associated with overly broad 
territorial claims have already been recognised in the 2003 CJEU judgment in Lindqvist, 
which concerned the legal status of disclosure of personal data on a website and the 
definition of a transfer of personal data to a third country.324 When assessing whether 
the availability of personal data to persons browsing the internet from outside the EU 
constituted a transfer of personal data to a third country within the meaning of Article 25 
of the Directive, the Court found, essentially, that it was not intended for the directive to 
be applicable to all activity on the internet, and, therefore, that the mere availability of 
the personal data in a third country did not constitute a transfer that would fall within the 
scope of the Directive.325 This finding constitutes that while the territorial scope of the 
Directive was broad, it was not reasonable to keep overly expanding it – continuous 
expansion might lead to a situation where, for instance, the EU essentially attempts to 
globally regulate all online conduct. Such a situation would be questionable and dispro-
portionate, to say the least.  
Despite the clear effects outside the EU, not all seem to agree whether the EU data 
protection regime is indeed extraterritorial, or, at least, to which extent it is extraterritorial. 
At times, European commentators belittle the GDPR’s extraterritoriality,326 whereas the 
non-Europeans often view the EU data protection rules as strongly and even overly 
extraterritorial.327 Such behaviour reflects a logical and expected situation: the party 
making an extraterritorial claim attempts to downplay the extent of its assertions in order 
to facilitate its justification, whereas opposing parties may, on the contrary, attempt to 
aggrandise the assertions in a defensive attempt to thwart them.  
In this work, I have assumed the broad definition of extraterritoriality mentioned above 
– extraterritoriality, on one hand, as a state’s endeavour to control the activities of a 
 
323 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in C-131/12 – Google Spain and Google, delivered on 
25 June 2013, para 28–29; C-131/12 – Google Spain and Google para 54; C-230/14 – Weltimmo, 
para 27; see also Svantesson 2016b, p. 335. 
324 C-101/01 – Lindqvist. 
325 C-101/01 – Lindqvist, para 69–70. 
326 See, e.g., Poullet 2007, p. 148–149, claiming (in relation to the Data Protection Directive) that 
only Subparagraph 4(1)(c) bears an extraterritorial scope. Poullet argues, for instance, that the Di-
rective’s provision concerning international data transfers do not have an extraterritorial impact, as 
the situations targeted by these provisions are “only ones clearly located in Europe”.  
327 See, e.g., US Congress 2001, where numerous commentators highlight the extraterritoriality of 
the EU data protection requirements. 
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natural or legal person situated outside its borders,328 and, on the other hand, as the 
factual effects on the activity of persons outside a state’s borders regardless of the 
state’s intent.329 Such a definition is suitable for the purposes of this assessment as the 
aim of this work is to form an overall picture of the EU’s ways to influence the data 
processing activity outside its borders. Using this definition, it is possible to conclude 
that actually, the GDPR appears to employ multiple different ways in which it has a de 
facto extraterritorial effect, with some of these ways being more direct than the others 
– in fact, all of the mechanisms discussed above in section 3 have a certain kind of 
effect on the behaviour of non-EU entities.330 Due to some effect abroad being achieved 
under all of these approaches, it should be discussed which ones of these effects serve 
the purposes of the EU data protection law best, and which of them are sufficiently 
justified relative to their results. 
The extraterritorial assertions made in the GDPR are characterised by the EU’s inten-
tion to create a level playing field between the domestic and foreign parties engaging in 
data processing operations on the EU market,331 and the aim to ensure an adequate 
level of protection for all natural persons within the EU.332 Additionally, the broad asser-
tions are often explained by the core nature of privacy as a right – as just a single 
incident involving unlawful access to certain information can cause irreparable damage, 
lax requirements abroad can cause a high risk to the security of personal data that is 
so diligently protected within the EU.333 Therefore, it is clear that the EU’s intentions are 
 
328 Svantesson 2015a, p. 227; Kuner 2015a, p. 238. 
329 See section 2.3 above. 
330 Hijmans has even concluded that “any intervention by the European Union with the purpose of 
ensuring privacy and data protection on the internet has extraterritorial effect” (Hijmans 2016, p. 504). 
331 Gömann 2017, p. 567–568; this was also highlighted in European Commission Vice-President 
Reding’s speech of 4 March 2014, where she stated the following: “On territorial scope I recall the 
broad support that was voiced for making sure that non-European companies, when offering services 
to European consumers, apply the same rules and adhere to the same levels of protection of per-
sonal data as European companies. This is about creating a level playing-field between European 
and non-European businesses. About fair competition in a globalised world” (Reding 2014). Cf. 
Svantesson 2015a, p. 230–231, questioning this intention by arguing that costs of compliance with 
the GDPR would be too heavy for the smaller businesses not located in the EU, as a result of which 
only large non-EU businesses could afford to compete in the EU market. See also Tene & Wolf 2013, 
p. 2, stating that the outcome of the extraterritorial scope of the GDPR, combined with the one-stop-
shop concept introduced by the Regulation, discriminates against organisations that are established 
outside the EU. 
332 This intention has already been stated in the preparation of the Data Protection Directive, see 
COM(92) 422 final – SYN 287, p. 13. See also recitals 1–3 of the GDPR. 
333 See, e.g., Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in C-131/12 – Google Spain and Google, para 
28–29. For these reasons, the GDPR is not the only data protection regime in the world making 
extraterritorial assertions – similar assertions, at least to some extent, can be found in Australian, 
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appropriate and even laudable; the question that will be discussed next is, however, 
whether the means used to achieve them are proportionate and acceptable.  
4.2 Are the extraterritorial claims justified? 
4.2.1 Justification under EU law 
As noted by Svantesson, when assessing the legitimacy and justification of an extrater-
ritorial claims, one must first assess whether they are in line with domestic law of the 
state making the assertion, after which one can review the assertion from the point of 
view of international law.334 While the purpose of this work is the normative assessment 
of the extraterritoriality of the GDPR in light of public international law, we can briefly 
review the internal justification of the extraterritorial assertions made in the GDPR in the 
light of relevant EU law.  
In this case, I am assessing the assertions made in the secondary EU law, in particular, 
the GDPR. As with all secondary law, it is based on the primary EU law – namely, the 
TEU, TFEU and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.335 As it is stated in Recital 1 of the 
GDPR, the subject matter of the Regulation is based on Article 8336 of the Charter and 
Article 16(1) TFEU.337 However, neither of these provisions directly require or provide 
for the extraterritorial application of the Regulation.338 Advocate General Szpunar has 
assessed the domestic legitimacy of the extraterritoriality of the Directive, and, in par-
ticular, its extraterritorial enforcement, in his opinion in Case C‑507/17. Basing his ar-
gumentation on Article 52 TEU and Article 255 TFEU, he concludes that outside the 
territory of the EU defined by the articles, “EU law cannot, in principle, apply or, conse-
quently, create rights and obligations.”339 However, following this overview, Szpunar 
then acknowledges that despite the basic principle, extraterritorial effects are allowed 
 
Singaporean, US and Canadian data protection legislation (see Azzi 2018, p. 131–132; Svantesson 
2013b, p. 113–122; Svantesson 2015a, p. 227; Kuner 2010a, p. 192). 
334 Svantesson 2013b, p. 86–87. 
335 Article 288 TFEU, Talus & Penttinen 2015, p. 6–7. 
336 According to Article 8(1) of the Charter, “Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data 
concerning him or her.” 
337 According to Article 16(1) TFEU, “Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data con-
cerning them.” 
338 It can be argued, though, that these provisions bear an implicit extraterritorial scope – if their 
application would be strictly restricted to the territory of the EU, the protection granted by the them 
would not be effective. 
339 Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in C-507/17 – Google, delivered on 10 January 2019, para 
47. 
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in EU law in certain situations, referring to settled case law in competition and intellec-
tual property law matters.340 Despite the settled case law, Szpunar views that such ex-
traterritoriality of EU law should be viewed as an exception from the main principle, 
acknowledging, however, that it is difficult to make analogous interpretations in the con-
text of omnipresent cyberspace.341 Therefore, while the assertions of legislative juris-
diction made in the GDPR appear to be domestically legitimate, Advocate General 
Szpunar advises against the extraterritorial enforcement of such assertions considering 
their possible implications.342 
4.2.2 Justification under international law 
Next, I will move on to the examination of the justification of the extraterritorial claims 
made in the GDPR in the light of international law.343 Above, I have examined the three 
core factors proposed by Svantesson that can be used to assess the justification of an 
extraterritorial claim: these are (i) the connection between the state making a claim and 
the matter, (ii) the legitimate interest of the state to assert jurisdiction over the matter, 
and (iii) the severity and proportionality of the assertion, all circumstances and compet-
ing interests considered. Due to the to the complex nature of data protection matters, I 
will use this approach in the following review.344 
 Level of connection 
Firstly, it should therefore be assessed whether there is a sufficient connection between 
the EU making an extraterritorial claim and the actual matter it wishes to regulate.345 In 
 
340 Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in C-507/17 – Google, para 50–52. See, for instance, a 
clear application of the effects doctrine in C-413/14 P – Intel v Commission, para 43. As regards the 
extraterritorial effects of regulation with a domestic trigger, such as the regulation of international 
data transfers under Chapter V GDPR, such effects were explicitly assessed and found domestically 
acceptable in C-366/10 – Air Transport Association of America and Others, reviewed above in note 
102. 
341 Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in C-507/17 – Google, para 53. 
342 Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in C-507/17 – Google, para 60–61, 63. 
343 For the relationship between fundamental rights in EU law and the principles of international law, 
see note 164 above, discussing, inter alia, CJEU cases C-402/05 P – Kadi and Al Barakaat Interna-
tional Foundation v Council and Commission and C‑584/10 P – Commission and Others v Kadi, in 
which the autonomous nature of EU law was highlighted. 
344 Svantesson 2015a, p. 227. For further information on these principles, refer to section 2.4.1 above. 
The complex nature of data protection matters has been exemplified in Google Spain, where the 
application of the Directive to California-based Google Inc. was based on the combination of territo-
riality and effects doctrine, making it difficult to assess the justification of the claim based on these 
principles alone (Van Alsenoy & Koekkoek 2015, p. 109). 
345 See also Hijmans 2016, p. 478–482, discussing what constitutes a meaningful link between the 
EU and a matter. 
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the cases where the EU directly attempts to control the activity of non-EU operator, such 
as under Article 3(2), the nexus for such control is the location of data subjects con-
cerned in the EU. In the case of Article 3(1) or the regulation of international data trans-
fers, the nexus is location of the establishment of the operator or the data exporter346 
respectively.347  
While I have adopted a novel approach to the justification of extraterritorial claims, the 
Harvard Draft principles reviewed earlier can still be useful when assessing the level of 
connection between the EU and the matter it attempts to regulate. In addition to the 
effects doctrine, it has been argued that the introduction of Article 3(2) GDPR marked 
a move from objective territoriality as the connection between the state and the matter348 
towards passive personality, constituting a shift from a “controversial ground” to an even 
“more controversial ground”.349 In light of this observation, it can be concluded that the 
nexus between the EU and the matters it attempts to regulate under Article 3(2) is 
somewhat tenuous.350 On the other hand, the more territorial-based connection implied 
in Article 3(1) and Chapter V appears to be much more firm.351 
 Interests of the regulator 
Secondly, an evaluation of the interest of the regulator performing the assertion should 
be made – the question is, therefore, whether the EU has a legitimate interest in regu-
lating a certain matter formally within the scope of its data protection law. It has been 
claimed in connection with the “use of equipment” principle under Article 4(1)(c) of the 
Directive that in certain situations the EU’s actual interest to regulate such processing 
might be rather low – why should the EU regulate, for instance, the processing of Indo-
nesian data subjects’ personal data carried out by an Indonesian controller using server 
 
346 Compare this with the theory of “territorial extension” proposed by Scott, see Scott 2014b, p. 90. 
347 For reasons discussed later in connection with the assessment of the reasonableness of extra-
territorial assertions, certain cross-border effects of the GDPR, such as the Brussels effect, are not 
reviewed in this particular context.  
348 Referring to the ”use of equipment” principle under Article 4(1)(c) of the Directive. 
349 Svantesson 2013b, p. 142–143. 
350 Ryngaert has implied that in certain situations, when a connection between the state and the 
matter is weak, the state should resort to exercise of its extraterritorial jurisdiction on a principle of 
subsidiarity, in case the state that has better possibilities to exercise jurisdiction fails to do so and 
the exercise of jurisdiction can be considered important from a global perspective. Such approach, 
however, applies better to, e.g., international crimes or competition law violations, which may have 
a direct harmful effect on a global scale (Ryngaert 2015a, p. 66 et seq.). 
351 Overly expansive interpretation of the establishment criterion can, however, undermine this con-
nection. 
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space that just happens to be physically located in Europe?352 As the provision allowed 
for Member States to regulate matters in which they had no real legitimate interest, it 
was argued that the it could have resulted in regulatory overreaching when applied to 
online environment.353 
While the introduction of the GDPR did away with the “use of equipment” criterion and 
the questionable assertions of jurisdiction based on it, the territorial scope of the EU 
data protection law was further expanded by the introduction of the targeting criterion. 
However, the broad territorial scope under renewed Article 3(2) requires the application 
of EU data protection standards whenever data subjects located in the EU are targeted. 
As one of the main aims of the Regulation is to ensure the effective protection of data 
subjects in the EU, in the case of Article 3(2),354 the EU’s interest to regulate the pro-
cessing activities is much higher than when attempting to regulate processing activities 
of a non-EU operator processing the data of non-EU data subjects under Article 4(1)(c) 
DPD. 
The legitimacy of the EU interests is supported by the fact that the interest of promoting 
privacy and, consequently, the protection of personal data has been recognised rather 
widely. In addition to its status as a fundamental right within the EU, the right to privacy 
has been affirmed, inter alia, in the ECHR and the ICCPR, promoting the understanding 
of privacy as a universal human right. Later, the importance of data protection as a part 
of privacy was highlighted when numerous states ratified the Council of Europe Con-
vention 108. In light of recent revelations concerning privacy violations all around the 
world, the widening scope of data protection related assertions of jurisdiction is there-
fore understandable.355 Considering this universal recognition of the value of privacy, 
Simitis has even argued that it has never been the intention of the EU to become a 
“privacy cop” and globally impose its own privacy standards – instead, the EU has just 
been acting in compliance with the requirements of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
 
352 Tene & Wolf 2013, p. 3–4. The issue has also been acknowledged by the WP29, calling the 
universal application of EU law caused by the “use of equipment” criterion an “undesirable conse-
quence” (WP 179, p. 31). Earlier, the WP29 suggested that Article 4(1)(c) of the directive should only 
be applied in those cases, “where it is necessary, where it makes sense and where there is a rea-
sonable degree of enforceability having regard to the cross-frontier situation involved” (WP 56, p. 9). 
Cf. Article 8(1) of the Charter and Article 16(1) TFEU providing that “everyone [regardless of nation-
ality] has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her”. 
353 Bygrave 2000, p. 255. 
354 See, e.g., Article 1 and Recitals 1 and 2 of the Regulation. 
355 Kuner 2015a, p. 242–243. 
  66 
of the European Union.356 While such view can be questioned, it is clear that the EU’s 
values and interests behind the extraterritorial assertions of the GDPR are significant. 
Additionally, the EU’s interest to regulate cases both under Article 3 and under Chapter 
V GDPR is very much understandable considering the nature of data protection as a 
right – as described above, if there are lacunae in the level of protection, even a single 
incident of unlawful disclosure of personal data caused by them can have far-reaching 
consequences for the natural persons in the EU. Without extraterritorial claims, the data 
protection law would be essentially useless: firstly, relocation to areas with weaker level 
of protection would be possible for domestic operators, and secondly, overseas opera-
tors would get a significant competitive advantage over the operators based in the 
EU.357 Extraterritoriality of the GDPR, on the other hand, provides, at least in theory, for 
a level playing field between both European and foreign operators.358 For these reasons, 
it is possible to conclude that the interest of the EU to regulate matters falling within the 
scope of the GDPR is, indeed, substantial and legitimate. 
 Proportionality of an assertion 
Lastly, it should be assessed whether the EU’s assertion of jurisdiction is reasonable 
and proportionate, considering all relevant circumstances and the proportionality of in-
terests of the EU in relation to the interests of other legislators and parties – a balancing 
act, of some sort.359 When assessing the reasonableness of an assertion of jurisdiction, 
one should first consider its severity. In this case, the matters to consider are, inter alia, 
how direct an assertion is, how much it encroaches on the exclusive prerogatives of 
other states, what are the differing interests of these other states, and what weight 
should be given to them. 
In the case of direct assertions of jurisdiction over the conduct of operators situated 
abroad, such as under Article 3(2) GDPR, the EU must demonstrate that its interests 
 
356 Simitis 2010, p. 1992–1993. Such justification by the means of primary EU law relates, however, 
to the domestic law justification of the assertion, discussed in the beginning of this section. Therefore, 
justification of an assertion under international law cannot be made by a reference to a higher-level 
domestic regulatory instrument. See also Lynskey 2015, p. 43, arguing that that the increasing ex-
traterritorial reach of the EU data protection regime is an organic development taking place as a 
secondary result of the EU international data transfer rules. 
357 Van Alsenoy & Koekkoek 2015, p. 110. 
358 Reding 2014. It is, however, not exactly clear whether the aim of creating a “level playing field” is 
really achieved, as the costs of compliance with the GDPR are high, causing some smaller foreign 
operators to withdraw from the European market, see Svantesson 2015a, p. 230. 
359 Svantesson 2015–2016, p. 71. 
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are strong and that they transcend the regulatory interests of third states, whose exclu-
sive rights are being encroached on. On the other hand, if an extraterritorial effect is a 
merely incidental result of domestic regulation, the required level of EU’s interest can 
be considered to be rather low. It can even be argued that in cases involving no extra-
territorial coercion, no justification is required whatsoever. For this reason, it can be 
seen that the Brussels effect and the cooperatively prepared adequacy decisions need 
no justification at all in this respect.360 The status of the regulation of international data 
transfers in this relation is somewhat unclear and appears to fall somewhere in between 
these two extremes – while it does have a direct effect on data importers outside the 
EU, it is aimed at the data exporters located within the EU. 
As argued above, the universally recognised status of privacy as a right signifies the 
importance of the EU’s efforts to protect data subjects within the Union and supports 
the finding that in this respect, the EU’s assertions of jurisdiction are reasonable. Cer-
tainty, predictability and fairness can also be considered to form a part of reasonable-
ness of an extraterritorial claim: for instance, the CJEU’s approach involving subjective 
targeting361 in relation to Article 3(2) GDPR has faced some critique, as basing the ap-
plicability of a law on a subjective intent can introduce some uncertainty to its application 
– it is not always unequivocal whether an operator actively endeavours to direct its ac-
tivities to a Member State, and, even if the operator does, its endeavours may not result 
in the actual acquisition of any clients in the EU. For these reasons, it has been pro-
posed that subjective viewpoints should not be considered when determining whether 
targeting takes place – instead, the assessment should be based on the actual outcome 
of the operator’s activity.362 On the other hand, it has been argued that the subjective 
targeting approach is also acceptable as due to its reasonable and fair approach to all 
operators endeavouring to do business in the EU.363 While it is impossible to draw a 
 
360 For this reason, these effects were not discussed earlier in this section. Nevertheless, the ade-
quacy framework has received its deal of criticism, see, e.g., Lam 2017, p. 10. 
361 See C-144/09 – Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof, C-190/11 – Mühlleitner and C-218/12 – Emrek 
discussed above in section 3.1.2. 
362 Svantesson 2015a, p. 232. Due to its focus on subjectivity, Svantesson even goes as far as ar-
guing that in practice, the targeting approach is “useless” and undermines the legitimacy of the GDPR. 
363 Greze 2019, p. 110. A focus on the subjective intention of the operator can be considered appro-
priate for many reasons: on a general level, in the context of data protection, it does provide a better 
protection for the data subjects in the EU. On one hand, for the operators, it is easier to ensure 
compliance with EU data protection law before commencing business activities on the EU market – 
otherwise the operator should adjust its practices right after launch the moment the first data subject 
appears. On the other hand, ensuring compliance when endeavouring to process the personal data 
of individuals in the EU can be seen as a cost of entering the EU market. Such a cost can be con-
sidered to be a part of the general risk associated with any kind of business – client acquisition might 
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clear line and claim that one approach is more reasonable than the other, the extensive 
list of factors constituting targeting provided by the CJEU does ensure that the applica-
bility of the targeting criterion is predictable and fair. 
While the EU claims may seem completely reasonable from the European point of view, 
the competing interests of other legislators cannot be forgotten. For instance, as argued 
above, while the US does not have such a developed data protection framework as the 
EU does, freedom of speech is one of the US’ core values, as secured in the First 
Amendment to the US Constitution. With freedom of speech being such a deep-rooted 
value, enforcement of, e.g., the right to be forgotten under EU law could turn out to be 
impossible under the heavy safeguards put in place in order to protect the freedom of 
speech.364 For this reason, while the EU’s data protection ambitions are based on inter-
nationally recognised human rights, the US valuing the right free speech over privacy 
can cause a real difficulty in the context of cases involving the right to be forgotten. As 
the right to free speech is also an equally recognised human right, the interest of the 
US may surpass the one of the EU on the US territory. 
On the other hand, the interests of developing countries and weaker parties situated 
therein should also be considered – from their perspective, EU’s approach to regulating 
data protection may even seem as an imperialist show of power.365 While the area of 
extraterritorial assertions is filled with different extreme opinions and exaggerations con-
cerning what is acceptable and what is not,366 considering the principles of comity and 
sovereign equality, the competing interests and values of all other parties should be 
assessed and properly accounted for.  
To finish this section, it should be reminded that it is a very serious claim to allege that 
an assertion of jurisdiction is exorbitant or that it is not in compliance with international 
law.367 For this reason, it is possible to come to a generalising conclusion that an asser-
tion of jurisdiction is, most probably, acceptable as long as nobody is “hurt” – if the EU 
 
fail and, in the end, there might be nobody whose personal data to process (cf. Johnson et al. 2017, 
p. 34, 45–46). 
364 See the US SPEECH Act, Section 2, which, according to Wimmer, if interpreted broadly, provides 
that “all foreign judgments that would violate the First Amendment or chill free speech should be 
unenforceable through the U.S. court system if those cases are deliberately brought in jurisdictions 
whose laws are less protective of free speech” (Wimmer 2018, p. 574–575). 
365 Zielonka 2008, p. 475. This view has been disputed in Poullet 2007, p. 147.  
366 See, e.g., Lam claiming that “any exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction undermines the interna-
tional order” in Lam 2017, p. 10. 
367 Kuner 2010b, p. 241. 
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asserts jurisdiction over a matter and no other states oppose the assertion, the assertion 
is most likely acceptable and its justification should not be worried about.368 It should 
also be reminded that in light of all of the many-sided circumstances reviewed above, it 
is probably not even possible to claim whether an assertion of jurisdiction is fully ac-
ceptable or entirely violating international law.369 For this reason, it can be seen as a 
problem that the GDPR’s requirements appear to apply extraterritorially in a black or 
white fashion370 – this problem will be addressed later in section 4.4.1. 
However, while it might not be possible to rule an assertion completely illegitimate, it 
should be kept in mind that any aspirations to globally regulate online activity, even if 
attempted for a good cause, cannot be accepted. Non-interference with unlimited ex-
traterritorial assertions by a democratic nation could signal to other states that global 
enforcement of their own values would also be acceptable – in such case, quoting Ad-
vocate General Szpunar, “[t]here would be a genuine risk of a race to the bottom, to the 
detriment of freedom of expression, on a European and worldwide scale.”371 As one of 
the limiting factors for such assertions, which can also be seen as a part of an asser-
tion’s reasonableness and as a safeguard of the Regulation’s effectivity, it is possible 
to examine the enforceability of the extraterritorial claims made in the GDPR.372 
4.3 Extraterritorial enforceability and enforcement of the EU data protection 
standards 
4.3.1 Enforceability in the case of non-compliance of a non-European operator 
As noted above, while the extraterritorial use of prescriptive jurisdiction may be ac-
cepted in certain contexts, the acceptability of the extraterritorial use of enforcement 
jurisdiction does not follow automatically – the basic principle regarding the use of en-
forcement jurisdiction remains that a state 373  cannot perform any enforcement 
 
368 Svantesson, for instance, proposes that the state asserting jurisdiction should also first consider 
whether it should refrain from an assertion by evaluating the whole picture: what would be the out-
come of the assertion, how would other states react to it, and what positive or negative results may 
follow (Svantesson 2013b, p. 86–87). 
369 Such approach, according to Svantesson, is neither productive – alternative approach to this 
problem will be discussed in section 4.4 (Svantesson 2013a, p. 280). 
370 Kuner 2015a, p. 242. 
371 Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in C-507/17 – Google, delivered on 10 January 2019, para 
61. 
372 Azzi 2018, p. 127.  
373 Or, in the context of this work, the EU. 
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measures on the territory of another state.374 The rule implies that no enforcement ac-
tion on the part of EU can be brought outside of the territory of the European Union.375 
While it has been argued that it is not exactly apparent how much enforceability of a law 
really affects the extent to which a law is complied with,376 it is clear that the overall 
efficiency of the EU data protection regime greatly relies on how well its requirements 
are honoured outside the EU.377  
From the point of view of enforcement, the biggest challenge of the GDPR is its territorial 
scope under Article 3(2),378 which is a problem already acknowledged by the WP29 in 
the context of Article 4(1)(c) of the Directive.379 A number of issues have been identified 
in connection with the enforcement difficulties of the GDPR when it is applicable under 
Article 3(2):380 for instance, if an EU court attempts to enforce a decision of a Member 
State DPA, the premise is that the implementation of the order can only be made by the 
domestic competent authority in the state where the operator is based – such authority 
is highly unlikely to apply the GDPR. Enforcement through a foreign court is neither a 
viable option: the foreign court is unlikely to apply the provisions of the GDPR due to, 
among other things, the conflict of laws issues and the rule of non-enforceability of for-
eign public law that is well-established in numerous jurisdictions.381 
When considering enforcement of the DPA decisions, the legal status of representatives 
appointed under Article 27 is also somewhat unclear – the binding text of the GDPR 
does not directly set a liability for the EU representatives of foreign operators, whereas, 
 
374 Akehurst 1972–1973, p. 146; Currie 2008, p. 335–336; Kuner 2010b, p. 232. 
375 Greze 2019, p. 115. 
376 Bygrave 2014, p. 189. 
377 Greze 2019, p. 110. See also Hijmans 2016, p. 178, arguing that under Article 16 TFEU, enforce-
ment by the DPAs constitutes an essential part of the EU data protection regime. 
378 Greze 2019, p. 110. 
379 WP 56, p. 15. While the ”use of equipment” criterion still maintained an objective territorial con-
nection between the Member State and the operator abroad, namely the equipment in the Member 
State, when using the targeting criterion of the GDPR there is, potentially, no territorial connection 
whatsoever between the EU and the operator.  
380 In certain cases, these issues can also relate to situations where the GDPR is applicable under 
Article 3(1). 
381 Greze 2019, p. 115. See, for example, Supreme Court of Canada case Google v Equustek, where 
the Supreme Court ordered Google to globally deindex results in which a company was breaching 
the intellectual property rights of Equustek Solutions Inc (SCC: Google Inc., v. Equustek Solutions 
Inc.). The Canadian decision was then struck down and its enforcement was prevented by a Califor-
nian court (N. D. Cal.: Google LLC v Equustek Solutions Inc.). See Svantesson 2018, p. 124. 
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according to the recital 80, the representatives “should be subject to enforcement pro-
ceedings in the event of non-compliance by the controller or processor.”382 In addition, 
the EDPB has stated that the obligation to appoint a representative was put in place in 
order to fill the enforcement gap caused by Article 3(2): “To this end, it was the intention 
to enable enforcers to initiate enforcement action against a representative in the same 
way as against controllers or processors. This includes the possibility to impose admin-
istrative fines and penalties, and to hold representatives liable.”383 This approach has 
faced critique, as the wording of the actual provisions of the GDPR suggests that the 
representatives could not be held liable for the non-compliance of the operators that 
designated the representative – as opposed to certain situations where the represent-
atives are explicitly mentioned as having a certain obligation, they are not mentioned in 
the context of liability for non-compliance.384 It can therefore be considered highly ques-
tionable to impose a potentially multi-million euro liability on a representative without a 
clear provision explicitly allowing for it and based only on non-binding normative mate-
rial.  
Additionally, when considering enforcement action aimed at a representative of a non-
EU operator, the nature of the enforcement action must be accounted for. If an operator 
ordered to pay a mere monetary sanction, enforcement can (in practice) be sought 
against the representative. Whereas, when the enforcement concerns a performance 
of a specific obligation, such as the compliance with a request concerning the use of a 
data subject right, there is little a representative can do if all processing activities are 
managed outside the EU. In fact, a similar problem arises in connection with enforce-
ment of judgments or DPA decisions concerning operators located outside the EU but 
having an establishment in the EU and that are thus subject to the Regulation under 
Article 3(1). As noted in Weltimmo, mere “stable arrangements” regardless of their legal 
form can constitute an establishment in a Member State.385 If a non-EU operator is 
 
382 Recitals in secondary EU law cannot, however, be granted the status of an independent source 
of law (Köndgen 2017, p. 141–142). 
383 EDPB Guidelines 3/2018, p. 23. EDPB also noted that while the representative could be held 
liable, such liability does not affect the liability of the operator itself. 
384 Greze 2019, p. 124. Greze additionally points out the possibility of variance in the representatives’ 
liability in accordance with Member State laws, with, for instance, Belgium law foreseeing civil liability 
and the matter remaining unclear in many other jurisdictions. 
385 C-230/14 – Weltimmo, para 28–31. 
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deemed to have an establishment similar to the one in Weltimmo, no enforcement ac-
tion can be brought against it due to the lack of the operator’s actual legal presence in 
the EU, in which case neither monetary nor performance obligations can be enforced.386 
It can therefore be concluded that the enforceability of the GDPR, when it applies to 
fully non-European operators under Articles 3(2) and, in some cases, under Article 3(1), 
is rather uncertain. The unenforceable assertions have faced vigorous criticism: for in-
stance, according to Kuner, the official recognition of enforcement difficulties by WP29 
make the assertions exorbitant.387 Additionally, while Svantesson acknowledges that, 
firstly, unenforceable laws can have certain symbolic and deterrent effects,388 secondly, 
that whether an assertion is overreaching depends on its moral justification, and thirdly, 
that unenforceability is not a big issue if it concerns less important parts of a law, he 
concludes that these exceptions are not relevant in the context of the Regulation (and 
the Directive). Considering the broadness of the assertions made in the GDPR and the 
burdensome nature of some of the requirements of the GDPR, he concludes that it 
cannot be considered a legitimate use of “bark jurisdiction”. Instead, he views that the 
overly broad claims of jurisdiction can, at worst, cast a negative light on the EU data 
protection regime and, eventually, undermine its legitimacy.389 
4.3.2 Relationship between the territorial scope and regulation of international data 
transfers 
Another significant issue that needs addressing in connection with the enforceability of 
the GDPR is the relationship between the Regulation’s territorial scope under Article 3 
and the regulation of international data transfers under Chapter V – as it has been noted 
before, the applicability of the Regulation under Article 3 and under Chapter V can 
sometimes overlap. For this reason, the approach has been dubbed a “belt and sus-
penders” approach – it might be more secure from a European point of view, but, as 
 
386 Greze 2019, p. 125. On the contrary, where a non-EU operator has an establishment in the EU 
in the form of a subsidiary or other legal person, financial penalties can be levied against these 
establishments even though the operator subject to fine is situated outside the EU, see, for instance, 
CNIL deliberation SAN-2019-001, p. 28, issuing a penalty of EUR 50 million against California-based 
Google LLC., but notifying the decision for its execution to the EU-based Google France SARL. 
387 Kuner 2010b, p. 236. 
388 Referring to his often-quoted concepts of “bark jurisdiction” and “bite jurisdiction”. 
389 Svantesson 2015a, p. 233; cf. Hijmans 2016, p. 505. 
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these requirements do not appear to be coordinated with each other, the approach has 
been criticised as making little sense as a legislative framework.390  
Despite the system adopted in the GDPR not being ideal with the possibility of regula-
tory overlaps, it cannot be denied that the data transfer mechanisms under Chapter V 
serve a more specific and nuanced function when compared to Article 3. Where the 
territorial scope under Article 3 establishes the general applicability of all of the require-
ments of the GDPR, the data transfer mechanisms provide some more specific and 
practical requirements and safeguards that the data importers outside the EU should 
comply with.391  
As discussed above, at the core of each of these “appropriate safeguards” is their en-
forceability, which makes clear why the regulation of international data transfers has 
been kept separate from the general territorial scope of the Regulation, despite the pos-
sible overlaps between the two. On one hand, personal data that has been initially col-
lected by a European operator, fully and indisputably subject to the GDPR, cannot es-
cape the influence of the GDPR by being transferred abroad. If one were to consider 
the processing of EU individuals’ personal data that has been collected outside the EU, 
the GDPR would apply to such processing in its entirety pursuant to Article 3. However, 
while all of the GDPR provisions would be applied, such an approach might not be ideal 
from the EU’s perspective as the enforceability of the requirements would not be cer-
tain,392 and, therefore, the level of protection provided by them might not necessarily be 
sufficient. On the other hand, while the subject matter requirements of the safeguards 
used when transferring the personal data outside the EU are not identical to those of 
the GDPR as whole and can contain certain trade-offs, these instruments are enforce-
able, guaranteeing the efficiency of the requirements contained therein.393  
 
390 Kuner 2015a, p. 244. Kuner even argues that the current dual regime of the GDPR should be 
replaced with a single coordinated one with no overlaps. 
391 For instance, the use of Standard Contractual Clauses adopted by the European Commission 
requires the data importer and exporter to enter into an agreement concerning the transfer, which, 
as opposed to the broad and contested assertion of jurisdiction under Article 3, can at a later point 
be fully enforced in case of non-compliance. 
392 Svantesson 2013a, p. 285. 
393 Schwartz 2013, p. 1987. For a famous example of trade-offs, see, for instance, the derogations 
provided for US-based operators under the Safe Harbour framework discussed above. 
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4.3.3 Extraterritorial implementation of data protection requirements  
The last issue to be reviewed in this section, in addition to the enforceability of the EU 
data protection requirements, is the territorial scope of the implementation of the re-
quirements of the GDPR. Therefore, as opposed to the enforceability examined above, 
I will discuss the actual enforcement of the Regulation next. As it will be described below, 
the issue of the territorial extent of enforcement of EU data protection standards is most 
relevant in the context of the implementation of the data subject rights, which is why the 
question will be assessed here in the context of the right to be forgotten.  
While Google Spain was a landmark case concerning the right to be forgotten and the 
territorial scope of the EU data protection law, it did not provide guidelines as to what is 
the territorial extent of the fulfilment of a data subject’s right to be forgotten.394 As a 
result of the decision, Google removed the relevant results only from the European 
search pages in a way that the results could all still be accessed from the EU by using 
the international .com version of the results page.395 However, the issue was later ad-
dressed by WP29, which found that in order to effectively protect the rights and free-
doms of data subjects, “limiting de-listing to EU domains on the grounds that users tend 
to access search engines via their national domains cannot be considered a sufficient 
means to satisfactorily guarantee the rights of data subjects according to the judgment 
[in Google Spain].” 396 If the delisting is carried out only on the European versions of the 
results pages, anyone could still access the information by using the international site, 
which undermines the whole idea of the right to be delisted. 
As a result of the pressure authorities put on Google, the territorial extent of the right to 
be delisted was extended: in 2016, Google announced that, in addition to its previous 
delisting practices, it introduced geolocation signals to locate the users viewing the 
search results page, and that a delisted search result would not appear in the results 
viewed by users located in the same EU Member State as from which the request to be 
delisted came from, regardless of the domain version used.397 From the European point 
of view, such an approach was a step in the right direction, but it still failed to provide 
full protection of data subject interests: geolocation could still be circumvented by the 
 
394 Kuner 2015b, p. 29, later acknowledged in the Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in C-507/17 
– Google, delivered on 10 January 2019, para 45. 
395 Van Alsenoy & Koekkoek 2015, p. 105–106. 
396 WP 225, p. 8–9. 
397 Google 2016. 
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use of a Virtual Private Network, and the results were still easily viewable by anyone 
that is not located in the same EU Member State as from which the request origi-
nated.398 
For these reasons, such implementation was not enough for CNIL – it required Google 
to implement the right to be forgotten globally. Google did not comply with this require-
ment and contested the penalty it was issued for non-compliance in the French Conseil 
d’État, which referred the case to the CJEU. Essentially, Conseil d’État asked the Court 
whether a search engine operator is obliged to perform de-referencing on a global scale 
so that the information concerned would not appear even for those users who are out-
side the EU.399  
In its decision, the Court affirmed400 the existence of the data subjects’ right to be del-
isted as regards internet search results401 and that upheld the earlier findings concern-
ing the applicability of the EU data protection law to Google’s processing activities.402 
While the Court conceded that global de-referencing would provide the data subjects in 
the EU with the highest level of protection in accordance with the objectives of the DPD 
and the GDPR,403 the Court acknowledged that in other jurisdictions the approach and 
the values related to the right to be forgotten can be different, calling for balancing of 
the right to the protection of personal data against other fundamental rights.404 When 
balancing the rights, the Court pointed out that neither the provisions of the DPD nor 
the GDPR imply that the de-referencing should be carried out on a global scale.405  
 
398 Taylor 2017, p. 202, 204. 
399 C-507/17 – Google, para 30–39. 
400 The case was examined in the light of both the DPD and the GDPR (C-507/17 – Google, para 41) 
and taking into account the relevant case law, particularly Google Spain discussed above. 
401 C-507/17 – Google, para 44–47. 
402 C-507/17 – Google, para 48–51. 
403 C-507/17 – Google, para 54–57; see also Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in C-507/17 – 
Google, delivered on 10 January 2019, para 36. 
404 C-507/17 – Google, para 59–60; Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in C-507/17 – Google, 
delivered on 10 January 2019, para 57 (see para 54-56 for fundamental rights related reasoning); 
see also Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in C-131/12 – Google Spain and Google, delivered 
on 25 June 2013, para 120–125. Despite Advocate General Jääskinen’s suggestions, the original 
Google Spain judgment was criticised for its lack of such balancing (Kuner 2015b, p. 41–42). 
405 C-507/17 – Google, para 62. In para 63, the Court also found that while there are mechanisms in 
the GDPR that allow for cooperation between Member State DPAs in order to establish the correct 
scope for de-referencing, there are no such mechanisms as regards establishing such scope outside 
the EU. 
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Hence, the Court found that the “operator is not required to carry out that de-referencing 
on all versions of its search engine, but on the versions of that search engine corre-
sponding to all the Member States”.406 While the CJEU, as opposed to the Advocate 
General Szpunar,407 did not explicitly refer to the use of geo-blocking techniques when 
complying with a de-referencing request, the Court instead stated that an operator 
should use, to the extent necessary, measures that “effectively prevent or, at the very 
least, seriously discourage an internet user conducting a search from one of the Mem-
ber States” – the use of geo-blocking can be considered to belong to this group of 
measures.408 While it is clear that such an approach does not guarantee the maximum 
level of protection to data subjects in the EU, it does make sense from the viewpoints 
of comity and balancing of fundamental rights: a decision requiring global de-referenc-
ing would substantially encroach on the prerogatives of other states. 
While Advocate General Szpunar advised strongly against global implementation of the 
right to be forgotten,409 the Court took a more moderate stance stating that while such 
global de-referencing is not required under EU law, it is neither prohibited. According to 
the judgment, “a supervisory or judicial authority of a Member State remains competent 
to [order] the operator of that search engine to carry out a de-referencing concerning all 
versions of that search engine”, if the authority finds it appropriate after balancing the 
right to freedom of information and the data subject’s right to privacy.410 The Court’s 
statement raises some questions concerning the actual impact of the judgment – if a 
Member State authority or a court can order global de-referencing of personal data and 
still be fully compliant with EU data protection law, what is the actual function of the 
judgment?411 Such court order would, at worst, make it possible for the Member State 
authorities to try to interfere in the internet use of persons located outside the EU to 
 
406 C-507/17 – Google, para 73. 
407 Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in C-507/17 – Google, para 78. 
408 C-507/17 – Google, para 73. As demonstrated in para 42, a geo-blocking mechanism was already 
implemented in the Google search engine at the time of the proceedings, making it much more diffi-
cult for users to switch between different localised versions of Google Search. 
409 Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in C-507/17 – Google, delivered on 10 January 2019, para 
46, 60–63. While in para 62, Advocate General Szpunar does consider the possibility that in certain 
cases, the application of the EU data protection law would be required due to the interest of the EU, 
it is clear that such derogation would not concern the global application of the right to be forgotten. 
410C-507/17 – Google, para 72. 
411 In its reaction to the judgment, CNIL found that based on the para 72 of the judgment, “a super-
visory authority, and so the CNIL, has the authority to force a search engine operator to delist results 
on all the versions of the search engine if it is justified in some cases to guarantee the rights of the 
individuals concerned” (CNIL 2019). 
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whom such an authority has no real connection and give rise to the risks of sending a 
questionable message to non-EU countries and race to bottom in the freedom of ex-
pression identified by Advocate General Szpunar.412 
For this reason, it still remains unclear what are the true implications of the CJEU judg-
ment in Google. On the surface, the judgment can be considered as a voice of reason 
from the Court: CJEU acknowledged that while the right to the protection of personal 
data is very highly valued in the EU, this might not be the case outside the EU.413 How-
ever, when assessed on a deeper level, the possibility of derogation expressed at the 
end of the judgment appears to, at least to some extent, annul the court’s other conclu-
sions. Therefore, it remains to be seen how the territorial extent of data subject rights 
under the GDPR will develop in the future, and whether the Member State authorities 
will resort to the possibility of global enforcement granted to them in the judgment. 
As it has been discussed above, the extraterritorial enforceability of the GDPR when it 
applies under Article 3(2), and, sometimes, Article 3(1), is uncertain, especially in cases 
with operators having no assets whatsoever within the EU. While the possibility of hold-
ing the designated representative of a non-EU operator accountable for the non-com-
pliance of the operator has been raised, potentially levying a substantial liability on such 
representative without a clear legislative authorisation would not be in conformity with 
the principle of legal certainty. Additionally, while there have been some successful at-
tempts at cooperation in the field of data protection, substantial results concerning the 
enforcement of the GDPR outside the EU are yet to be achieved.414 As regards the 
actual enforcement of data subject rights, the direction taken by the Court can be con-
sidered sensible yet cautious: while the EU data subjects are not given a maximum level 
of protection, the judgment in C-507/17 – Google can be seen to consider415 the global 
 
412 Taylor 2017, p. 205; Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in C-507/17 – Google, para 61. As a 
blunt example, one could even argue that guided by success of global de-referencing orders in the 
EU, authorities in China could order Google do globally de-reference all search results related to the 
Tiananmen Square Massacre. While such an order, let alone the compliance with it, is rather unlikely, 
the possible effects of permissiveness towards global de-referencing should be borne in mind. See 
also Kohl 2007, p. 199. 
413 It should be noted, though, that while Advocate General Szpunar assessed the justification of the 
extraterritorial effects of the EU data protection law (see, e.g., para 47–57 of the Opinion of Advocate 
General Szpunar in C-507/17 – Google), the Court’s reasoning relied only on the text of the relevant 
provisions of the DPD and the GDPR, and the balancing of fundamental rights. 
414 See Greze 2019, p. 116–117. Greze points out, for instance, the establishment of the Global 
Privacy Enforcement Network based on the OECD Recommendation on Cross-border Co-operation 
in the Enforcement of Laws Protecting Privacy and the successful cases of joint investigations con-
cerning data processing practices of WhatsApp and Google. See also Hijmans 2016, p. 502–503. 
415 See, e.g., note 404 above. 
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influence of the EU data protection regime and the implications a global implementation 
the right to be forgotten could have. 
However, considering the enforceability issues related to the GDPR, the level of protec-
tion granted by the EU data protection law may fall short of what was envisaged while 
drafting the GDPR. In the next section, I will examine the possible solutions to these 
issues faced by the Regulation. 
4.4 A possible way forward? 
The extraterritorial assertions made in the GDPR are not accepted by everyone. While 
it is not possible to say directly that some of these assertions are exorbitant and consti-
tute “regulatory overreaching”, it is possible to conclude that they are, due to their broad 
nature and uncertain enforceability, somewhat questionable – enforcement difficulties 
can undermine legal certainty and, in the end, even the legitimacy of the Regulation as 
viewed by non-European operators. It is clear that some work needs to be done when 
considering the future approach to the extraterritoriality of the EU data protection law: 
on one hand, the rights and freedoms of data subjects in the EU should be effectively 
protected, which is difficult without an extraterritorial reach of the data protection law, 
while, on the other hand, indiscriminate disregard of other sovereign regulators’ powers, 
values and interests can neither be accepted. As argued by Kuner, the balancing of 
interests of all involved parties and the principle of comity should be considered in order 
for the legal certainty to be retained in the application of data protection legislation.416 
For these reasons, this section will focus on potential ways of approaching the problems 
with the Regulation’s extraterritoriality reviewed above.  
4.4.1 Gradual applicability of the data protection legislation 
As identified earlier, the black or white applicability of the EU data protection law to non-
European operators can be considered problematic.417 Indeed, it can be viewed as un-
fair that if an online service operator aims at a global market, not only should its data 
protection practices fully comply with all detailed requirements of the GDPR, but also 
with all of the requirements of each of the other states, markets of which it is targeting. 
For this reason, it has been suggested that the applicability of data protection law, in 
this case, the GDPR, should be made more flexible by assuming a more nuanced, risk-
 
416 Kuner 2015a, p. 245. 
417 Kuner 2015a, p. 242. 
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based, context-specific, and perhaps even gradual approach when assessing whether 
the Regulation should apply to a non-European operator.418 Additionally, a proper intro-
duction of jurisdictional “safety valves” described by Scott419 could also make the extra-
territorial applicability of the GDPR more flexible.  
Following the “layered approach” proposed by Svantesson,420 it could be argued that 
the data protection obligations of the GDPR could be divided in different categories,421 
with only certain elements forming the core of the right to protection of personal data.422 
According to Svantesson, these types of obligations could then be applied to non-Eu-
ropean operators in a layered fashion so that those operators who have the biggest 
connection to the European market would be subject to most strict requirements, while 
the operators with less connection to the EU could just adhere to the core obligations.423 
In his example, Svantesson divides the obligations of the EU data protection law in three 
layers: the “abuse-prevention layer”, the “rights layer” and the “administrative layer”. 
The core of the right to data protection, or the “abuse-prevention” layer of data protec-
tion, would consist of basic rules and principles preventing the unauthorised processing 
of personal data – these are the collection limitation, purpose specification and use lim-
 
418 Kuner 2013, p. 183–184, calling for flexibility in the application of international data transfer regu-
lation; according to Svantesson 2013a, p. 280, however, reasonableness in all of data protection law 
could be achieved by adjusting the criteria for extraterritorial application of each of the requirements 
separately based on their importance. 
419 Scott 2014a, p. 1345; these “safety valves” were discussed above in section 2.4.3. 
420 Svantesson’s “layered approach” is, of course, only one of the numerous different approaches 
proposed in order to develop the extraterritoriality of the EU data protection law; see, e.g., Reed 2012, 
229–232 and 241–242, suggesting generalisation of data protection law provisions for it to be better 
adaptable to different business models and for the compliance to be based on the operator’s rea-
sonable belief of compliance – according to Reed, while such approach does appear less certain 
than the existing laws, it is a trade-off that has to be made in order to effectively influence the behav-
iour of “cyberspace actors” often operating without legal advisers.  
421 Svantesson 2013a. 
422 Svantesson 2013a, p. 280–281; Kuner 2015a, p. 243–244. 
423 There is currently one example of a similar approach in the Regulation itself: according to Article 
27(1), a non-European operator should designate a representative within the EU if the GDPR applies 
to the operator pursuant to Article 3(2). However, according to Paragraph 2, there is no obligation to 
designate a representative if the processing is, among other things, “occasional” and “unlikely to 
result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, taking into account the nature, context, 
scope and purposes of the processing” – in other words, if certain conditions concerning the extent 
of targeting are not met, the burdensome requirement of designating a representative does not apply 
to a non-European operator (Svantesson 2018, p. 118–119). Additionally, some sort of scalability of 
obligations is visible even within the EU: for instance, under Article 37, only some operators need to 
appoint a data protection officer depending on the nature of their processing activities, and under 
Article 35, not all processing activities require a data protection impact assessment to be carried out 
in advance. 
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itation principles found in the OECD Privacy Guidelines (1980). Even a minimal con-
nection with the EU would require compliance with these basic principles, and the en-
forcement of these principles could be carried out by the means of the EU’s “market 
destroying measures” – e.g., by the means of restriction of market access and imposi-
tion of trading limitations.424 
Next layers of data protection requirements in Svantesson’s example are the “rights 
layer” and the “administrative layer”, with the former including the data subjects’ rights 
concerning e.g. operators’ accountability and data accuracy, integrity and confidentiality, 
and with the latter concerning additional operators’ obligations that can be classified as 
administrative, such as the obligation to appoint a data protection officer or the require-
ments concerning data protection by design and by default. These requirements would 
become applicable when an operator has a certain minimum level of contact with the 
EU – in the case of the “rights layer”, when the operator “purposefully avail[s] itself of 
the privilege of conducting activities within [the EU], thus invoking the benefits and pro-
tections of its laws”, and, in the case of the “administrative layer”, when the operator’s 
connection with the EU is “substantial, continuous and systematic to make the exercise 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction reasonable.”425 
While Svantesson’s layered approach does provide for reasonableness and flexibility 
from the viewpoint of non-European operators, it jeopardises, at least to some extent, 
the level of protection granted to data subjects in the EU, as not all operators are obliged 
to achieve the same level of compliance with EU requirements. This becomes especially 
evident when the “abuse-prevention layer” is examined in contrast with Article 8 of the 
Charter – according to Svantesson, access and rectification rights codified Article 8(2) 
would belong to the “rights layer” requiring purposeful targeting on the part of the non-
European operator, thus, making certain elements of Article 8 more important than the 
 
424 Svantesson 2013a, p. 281–282. 
425 Svantesson 2013a, p. 281, 283–284. 
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others.426 It might be, therefore, appropriate to define the core of the right to data pro-
tection as it is defined in Article 8427 – this would, however, make the core of the right to 
data protection rather broad and the utility of the “layered approach” questionable. 
While such a layered approach would, most likely, make the EU data protection law 
more fair and proportionate from the viewpoint of non-European operators, there appear 
to be multiple issues related to the approach that would definitely need to be tackled 
first: How do data subjects stay aware what rights they have in relation to each of the 
operators they are dealing with? Can derogations from the Charter be made if the op-
erator’s connection to the EU is tenuous as a result of, e.g., global market being targeted? 
Is it fair and reasonable to apply different standards to different operators dealing with 
European data subjects? Although there already is some scalability to the obligations 
under the GDPR, the adoption of a layered approach would require a substantial 
amount of specification work428 and would create a tremendously complex ecosystem 
that, along with its attempts to define different levels of connection and targeting in order 
to preserve predictability and legal certainty, would probably create more questions and 
uncertainty that what it could resolve.429 Additionally, considering that the General Data 
Protection Regulation is a rather new regulatory framework as such, a complete legis-
lative reform in order to assume a layered approach is highly unlikely anytime soon. 
Consequently, it seems necessary to work out a solution that is, on one hand, either 
fully compatible with the current law in force or requires only slight amendments, and, 
on the other hand, which accounts for the issues with extraterritoriality of the EU data 
protection regime reviewed above. 
4.4.2 Emphasis on “friendly” extraterritoriality 
It is clear that there a much fewer restrictions on extraterritorial assertions of legislative 
jurisdiction than enforcement jurisdiction, and, therefore, it is understandable that legis-
lative assertions of the GDPR are somewhat broader than what can reasonably be ex-
pected to be enforced. While the significance of enforceability has been contested, it 
 
426 On the other hand, the purposeful targeting criterion can be viewed as equivalent to the one cur-
rently in use under Article 3(2) GDPR, whereas the territorial scope prescribed to the “abuse-preven-
tion layer” under Svantesson’s proposition would be even broader, as compliance with these top-
level requirements would be compulsory at all times when EU data subjects’ personal data is pro-
cessed (Svantesson 2013a, p. 282). 
427 Hustinx 2013, p. 17–18. 
428 Svantesson 2013a, p. 280–281; Kuner 2015a, p. 244. 
429 See Reed 2012, p. 229. 
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cannot be denied that completely unenforceable legislative assertions may weaken the 
non-European public’s and operators’ perception of the European data protection 
law.430 Therefore, it can be concluded that the legislative assertions made in the GDPR 
should be supported by the possibility of some kind of enforcement action. 
When attempting to regulate the activities of operators outside the EU, special empha-
sis should be placed on the use of mechanisms that are either enforceable locally within 
the EU or that have an effect with no enforcement action concerning them.431 The first 
group of extraterritorial mechanisms includes the use of the data transfer regulation 
under Chapter V of the regulation and the use of the establishment criterion in cases 
where an operator has some legal presence in a Member State.  
While there are certain issues associated with the broad interpretation of the establish-
ment criterion, basing jurisdiction on a slight territorial nexus can still be seen as more 
acceptable than when an assertion is made based on the targeting criterion. However, 
in terms of enforceability, the use of the enforceable safeguards for data transfers would 
probably be the most secure option from the European point of view. It should therefore 
be considered whether certain similar safeguards should be required from non-Euro-
pean operators performing the initial collection of personal data – an extreme solution 
might be to extend the representative requirement under Article 27 of the Regulation so 
that the collection of personal data would be carried out through the EU-based repre-
sentative, and the subsequent transfer outside the EU should follow the principles set 
out in Chapter V. However, while such an approach could better guarantee the compli-
ance with the Regulation outside the EU, it would form an even larger threshold for non-
European operators to attempt to enter EU market, essentially depriving it of its viability.  
It can be concluded that while the further expansion of the scope of the GDPR would 
provide the data subjects in the EU with a better and more effective level of protection, 
these requirements would not be fair for non-European operators. For these reasons, 
special attention should be paid another group of extraterritorial mechanisms. This 
 
430 As argued above in section 2.4.2, this could, at worst, further diminish the compliance with the 
unenforceable EU data protection standards. 
431 Hijmans argues that the effective enforcement of the EU data protection standards requires the 
selection of appropriate legislative instruments by the legislator and implies that effectivity of the 
enforcement should be evaluated based on whether EU retains control over the personal data 
(Hijmans 2016, p. 179). While Hijmans’ arguments mainly concern the enforcement of the EU data 
protection law within the EU, these findings can also be extrapolated to also concern the enforcement 
of the GDPR abroad. 
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group consists of the mechanisms that involve close to no coercion on the part of the 
EU, and includes the mechanisms such as the bilateral adequacy cooperation, devel-
opment of and adherence to multilateral treaties such as the Convention 108, and the 
unilateral regulatory globalisation. While the effect of these mechanisms can be less 
certain than the effect of the domestically enforceable ones, a non-aggressive message 
sent to other actors in the international field may encourage cooperation and be less 
likely to spark international conflict and blocking action.432 Additionally, as pointed out 
before, transnational cooperation in the field of privacy enforcement is also possible, 
albeit yet not sufficiently developed – work on such cooperation could enhance the ef-
fects of the other extraterritorial mechanisms of the GDPR, as well.433 
But then again, while the use of these friendly and non-intrusive regulatory techniques 
may be a good solution from the point of view of maintaining international order and 
diplomatic relations, it will certainly not provide the data subjects within the EU with a 
sufficient level of protection of their personal data in case of non-compliance. For this 
reason, as a last resort, while certain DPA decisions and orders might be unenforceable 
outside the Union, the EU could take action in order to restrict the market access of the 
operators deliberately breaking the requirements of the GDPR by, e.g., blocking their 
websites in the EU.434 While this would be a rather severe type of action, Svantesson 
views such exercises of market sovereignty as an approach that is “much more sophis-
ticated and targeted” when compared to attempts to regulate global activity,435 and the 
effectiveness of such market access restrictions could be quite significant considering 
the importance of the EU market to many multinational data-oriented companies.436 
 
432 Such as the one described above in the dispute between Equustek and Google, see note 381. 
433 See also Hijmans 2016, p. 487, 490–493, supporting the reliance on Brussels effect and the glob-
alisation under Convention 108 to unilaterally export the EU data protection standards. Hijmans 
acknowledges, however, the possibility of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the field, and sug-
gests that a UN treaty concerning data protection might, in the end, offer the best overall level of 
protection (Hijmans 2016, p. 508). 
434 See Greze 2019, p. 126. While not an enforcement measure specifically provided for in the Reg-
ulation, it is viewed to be a part of the EU’s market sovereignty. 
435 Svantesson 2017, p. 147–148; as regards “market destroying measures”, see also Svantesson 
2013a, p. 282. 
436 However, when implementing such market blocking measures, the risk of fragmentation of the 
internet should be borne in mind (Davenport 2019; see also Kohl 2007, p. 199). 
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5 Concluding remarks 
Over the course of this work, I have performed a critical examination of the various 
extraterritorial mechanisms in use as a part of the EU data protection law. The research 
questions of this work were aimed at, on one hand, the doctrinal examination of the 
extent of extraterritorial mechanisms of the GDPR, and, on the other hand, at the critical 
evaluation of said mechanisms in the light of public international law.  
It is clear that due to the nature of the online world, strict adherence to the principle of 
territoriality can, at times, be very impractical or even devoid of meaning. As discussed 
above, in the context of data protection, basing standards on pure territoriality would 
significantly undermine the level of protection and the general aims of a data protection 
law – operators could just relocate to data havens and completely evade strict data 
protection requirements in their home country. These reasons have prompted legisla-
tors all around the world to enact data protection requirements reaching beyond the 
states’ geographical borders, and, as it has become clear over the course of this work, 
the data protection regime of the EU is no exception. 
As discussed in section 3, there are multiple different ways in which the influence of the 
GDPR reaches beyond the borders of the EU. While the Regulation has a very broad 
territorial scope that applies to a significant number of operators outside the EU – 
namely, those who have an establishment within the Union and those who target indi-
viduals in the Union – its effects outside EU borders do not end there. In addition, the 
GDPR has an effect on operators receiving personal data from a data exporter in the 
EU, even if such operators are otherwise not subject to the GDPR under its territorial 
scope. Furthermore, the European influence abroad is visible through the European 
Commission’s adequacy decisions, bilaterally and multilaterally negotiated instruments, 
the Regulation’s Brussels effect and even the public awareness concerning privacy 
matters that has been affected, at least indirectly, by the strict requirements of the EU 
data protection law. 
In the light of the pragmatic definition of extraterritoriality assumed in section 2, I con-
cluded that all of these effects can indeed be considered extraterritorial. After inspecting 
these effects from the viewpoint of public international law, I was able to conclude that 
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some of these effects can be considered more “reasonable” than others.437 Especially, 
when one considers the proportionality and the enforceability of extraterritorial claims, 
certain mechanisms stand out: for instance, if an Asian business targets a global market 
and processes the personal data of data subjects in the EU, such operator is likely 
subject to the GDPR. However, how can the provisions of the GDPR, especially the 
ones with an administrative nature,438 be enforced against said operator in case of non-
compliance? While it is true that unenforceable laws can, in certain cases, have a value 
of their own, such assertions of legislative jurisdiction with no possibility of enforcement 
should be practiced with care, and it can be concluded that the GDPR appears to take 
unenforceable assertions a step too far. Therefore, although it might not be possible to 
conclude whether a certain assertion of jurisdiction is completely illegitimate under pub-
lic international law, some of these assertions can still be considered questionable and 
criticised – by resorting to such kinds of assertions of jurisdiction, the EU embarks on a 
dangerous journey that can, at worst, even result in loss of respect for the EU data 
protection regime abroad.439 
However, while it may seem at first that the EU aims to globally regulate almost every-
thing related to processing of personal data, this is also not the case, as it was cautiously 
implied in the recent CJEU case C-507/17 – Google. While the Court did not exclude 
the possibility of global enforcement of the right to be forgotten, it highlighted that the 
right to the protection of personal data is not absolute and that it is important to balance 
between it and other fundamental rights.440 This approach can be seen as a voice of 
reason that is possibly even slightly toning down some of the most broad assertions of 
jurisdiction made in the GDPR.441 
Although the Court did consider the balancing between different fundamental rights, it 
appears that the Court did not perform a proper balancing test between the interests of 
 
437 Regardless of the fact that from a European perspective, the GDPR’s extraterritorial effects have 
a strong foundation in the primary EU law and the fundamental rights of the EU, constituting the EU’s 
strong interest to regulate data protection extraterritorially. 
438 For instance, the “administrative” provisions identified by Svantesson, such as the requirements 
concerning the data protection officers and data protection by design and by default (Svantesson 
2013a, p. 281). 
439 See section 2.4.2 above. 
440 Such a trend is also apparent in other recent CJEU case law concerning the right to data protec-
tion, see, e.g., C-136/17 – GC and Others, para 57–59, 66; C-496/17 – Deutsche Post, para 64–68; 
and C-345/17 – Buivids, para 64–69. See also the recital 4 of the GDPR. 
441 However, the possibility of derogation from the judgment presented in para 72 makes it somewhat 
unclear, what the actual impact of the judgment will be. 
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different regulators, and assess whether the interest of the EU does transcend the in-
terests of non-EU states.442 As noted above, performing such a balancing test would be 
essential in order to establish whether an assertion of jurisdiction outside the EU can 
be considered fair and justified from an international perspective. On a theoretical level, 
a proper balancing test might call for an introduction of “layered” data protection require-
ments that would increase proportionally with the level of connection between the EU 
and the data processing activity in question and with the EU’s interest to regulate such 
activity. However, as such approach would require a complete legislative reform and 
would most likely create more uncertainty and questions than it can resolve, such ap-
proach cannot be considered viable, at least in the near future. 
Regardless of the issues associated with the “layered” approach, the performance of 
such a balancing test could also guide the EU towards the increased use of such kinds 
of effects abroad, which do not excessively – or at all – encroach on the prerogatives of 
sovereign non-EU states. Above, such type of influence on the data processing activi-
ties of operators abroad was called “friendly” extraterritoriality. At the core of “friendly” 
extraterritoriality are, firstly, the domestically enforceable mechanisms of the GDPR, 
such as applicability to an establishment in the EU and the regulation of international 
data transfers. Secondly, “friendly” extraterritoriality is composed of the mechanisms 
that do not depend on enforcement at all, such as the bilateral and multilateral cooper-
ation and the Brussels effect. Essentially, the legislative assertions of the European 
Union should, at least mostly and where appropriate, be supported by the possibility of 
enforcement, and the utilisation of such assertions should be maximised. However, 
should such types of assertions fail to ensure the sufficient protection of the fundamental 
rights of individuals within the EU, market blocking measures could be resorted to in 
cases where no other type of enforcement action is possible. 
Returning to the CJEU judgment mentioned above, enforceability of an assertion of 
legislative jurisdiction is not everything, and the content of the actual enforcement action 
itself matters, too. While it may be possible for an authority within the EU to enforce, for 
instance, the performance of a data subject right globally under the penalty of a fine 
against an operator’s establishment in the EU,443 it does not necessarily mean that such 
 
442 See C-507/17 – Google, para 59, where the Court only acknowledged that “numerous third States 
do not recognise the right to de-referencing or have a different approach to that right.” 
443 Such as it is for CNIL, if, in accordance with para 72 of C-507/17 – Google, it decides that a global 
enforcement is appropriate. 
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enforcement action should be taken. Again, a balancing of interests should be per-
formed in order to assess whether such enforcement action would be questionable from 
the points of view of comity and sovereign equality.444 For instance, a global right to be 
forgotten under EU law would be in an apparent contradiction with the First Amendment 
to the US Constitution, and the enforcement of such a right would be a significant inva-
sion into the domestic affairs of a non-EU state. 
From the point of view of comity, the CJEU judgment in C-507/17 – Google is a step in 
the right direction. While the balancing carried out in the judgment can be considered 
insufficient, it demonstrated that the EU acknowledges that the right to data protection 
is not unrestricted, and that there are territorial differences in how fundamental rights 
are balanced outside the EU. However, only time will tell what the actual influence of 
the judgment will be – currently, it has been left to CNIL’s discretion to decide whether 
it will pursue global de-referencing of internet search results. 
 
444 See Kuner 2015a, p. 245. 
